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A Special volume on Aesthetics Today

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Aesthetics Beyond Aesthetics*

Regarding the Contemporary Relevance of the Aesthetic and Recharting the Field of Aesthetics

WOLFGANG WELSCH

Introduction: Outline of the Problems

1. The prevailing presupposition: aesthetics as artistics

What is aesthetics ? The answer given by the encyclopedias is clear. The *Academic American encyclopedia* says: "Aesthetic is the branch of philosophy that aims to establish the general principles of art and beauty." Correspondingly, the Italian *Enciclopedia Filosofica* declares: Estetica e la "disciplina filosofica che ha per oggetto la bellezza e l'arte".² The French *Vocabulaire d' Esthetique* defines aesthetics as "etude reflexive du beau" and "philosophi et science de l'art" respectively.³ And the German *Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie* says: "Das Wort 'Asthetik' hat sich als Titel des Zweiges der Philosophie eingeburget, in dem sie sich den Kunsten und dem Schonen [...] zuwendet".⁴ In short: Aesthetics is artistics, is an exploration of the concept of art with particular attention to beauty.

What, then, could "aesthetics beyond aesthetics" - as advocated in the title of my paper - be? In order to be meaningful, the expression "aesthetics beyond aesthetics" would have to point to something beyond this art-bound understanding of aesthetics, to something beyond artistics. But how could this - although being beyond the established sense of aesthetics - still be a kind of aesthetics? Does the term 'aesthetics' lend itself to a trans- artistic meaning?

Traditionally, this clearly is the case. 'Aesthetics' goes back to the Greek word class *aisthesis*, *aisthanesthai* and *aisthetos* - expressions which designate sensation and perception in general, prior to any artistic meaning. Current usage is not restricted either: in everyday language we use the term 'aesthetic' even more often outside than inside of the artistic sphere, when speaking, for instance, of aesthetic behavior or an aesthetic lifestyle, or of aesthetic peculiarities of media, or an increasing aestheticization of the world.

The discipline "aesthetics", however, traditionally didn't thematize sensation and perception. It focused on art alone - and more on conceptual than sensuous problems of art. Mainstream contemporary aesthetics still does so. The academic

*Read at the 13th International congress of Aesthetics, Lahti, August 1-5, 1995

discipline tends to restrict itself to artistics - no matter how uncertain the notion of art itself may have become in the meantime.

Certainly, there have been exceptions and counter-tendencies to this dominant feature. Remember, for example, that Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, the father of aesthetics - he created the term 'aesthetics' in 1735, first lectured on the subject in 1742, and published the first book bearing the title 'Aesthetics' in 1750 - that Baumgarten conceived of aesthetics as a primarily cognitive discipline designed to improve our sensuous capacity for cognition. Among the scope of the new science - which he defined precisely as the "science of sensuous cognition"⁵ - he didn't even mention the arts; he certainly used examples from the arts, especially from poetry, but only to illustrate what aesthetic perfection - as the perfection of sensuous knowledge - might be.

Shortly thereafter, however, when between Kant's *Critique of Judgment* of 1790, *The Oldest System-Program of German Idealism* around 1796, and Schelling's *System of Transcendental Idealism* of 1800, aesthetics started an unheard-of career leading it to the top of philosophy, aesthetics was understood exclusively as being the philosophy of the arts. And for centuries this remained the dominant understanding of aesthetics started by philosophers as different as Hegel and Heidegger or Ingarden and Adorno.

There was, to be sure, still a counter-tendency, reaching from Schiller's shift from artistic at first to political and educational art and finally to the "art of life" ("Lebenskunst") through to Marcuse's idea of a new social sensibility, or from Kierkegaard's description of aesthetic existence and Nietzsche's fundamentalization of aesthetic activity through to Dewey's integration of art into life. But this counter-tendency didn't actually change the design of the discipline. The artistic focus remained dominant, and to a certain extent even these opposing tendencies shared the basic presumption of traditional aesthetics; they too understood art as being the very model of aesthetic practice and as providing paradigms for the shift to the trans-artistic understanding of aesthetics they advocated.

Currently, the discipline still sticks to the artistic restriction. There may be many good reasons to turn to the recognition of an aesthetics beyond artistics, but in trying to foster this tendency for some years, I have in fact found much interest and support outside the discipline - from cultural institutions, or theoreticians in other fields⁶ -, but predominantly resistance within the discipline itself. One still assumes it goes without saying that aesthetics has to be artistics. One is still held captive by this traditional picture. And to continue this allusion to Wittgenstein, I am inclined to say: "And we cannot get outside it, for it lies in our discipline and this repeats it to us inexorably."⁷

2. Overcoming the traditional presupposition

a. The scope of this congress

The present congress, however, makes an attempt to escape from the aesthetics-artistics equation. The program is quite clear on this point. It suggests bridging "the gap between academic research and phenomena of the everyday world" and analyzing "how aesthetics itself, as a discipline [...], is affected by this challenges". It further suggests that "traditional criteria and models developed to explicate art or beauty are not necessarily adequate for explicating phenomena in the real world", and it urges the placement of aesthetics "in a larger context" and reconsideration of the disciplinary design of aesthetics with particular emphasis on "interdisciplinary approaches".⁸ - Some progress, I think, has been made towards this goal during the last days.

b. From aesthetics to art criticism

Let me refer just to the initial step made by Arthur Danto. I take his opening presentation to represent an attack on the core of traditional aesthetics. Certainly, his suggestion to shift from aesthetics to art criticism doesn't question the traditional frame: we should still talk about art (and perhaps solely about art). But Danto refutes the traditional understanding as to how this frame is to be filled. Traditionally, the goal of aesthetics was to establish the proper concept of art- its universal und everlasting concept. Hence aesthetics could be - and was even supposed to be - explicated without considering individual works of art or historically different types of art. Schelling, for example, frankly expressed this when he declared that a philosophy of art had to treat only "art as such" and "in no way empirical art"⁹ - his own philosophy of art representing, as he continues, "a mere repetition" of his "system of philosophy", this time with respect to art, just as in the next instance with respect to nature or society.¹⁰

However inappropriate this strategy may appear to us today - and mostly appeared to artists (Musil for example decided such aesthetics as the attempt to find the universal brick fitting each work of art and being suitable for the whole building of aesthetics¹¹) - Schelling indeed expressed a basic belief of traditional aesthetics: that there is such a thing as an essential and universal concept of art, and that establishing this concept would constitute and fulfil the task of aesthetics. This was the immanent reason why aesthetics apparently didn't have to closely consider singular works of art, but make do with just some initial knowledge of some works of art,¹² taking these as a starting point for the development of aesthetics' intuition of the concept of art in general.

Of course, this traditional strategy is untenable.¹³ The practice of art doesn't consist in exemplifying a universal notion of art, but involves the creation of new versions and concepts of art. And the new concept certainly has some aspects in common with the concepts formerly dominant, but definitely differs from it in other, no less important aspects. This is obvious in every shift from one style or paradigm to another. Hence paradigms are connected by some overlaps from one concept to the next - by "family resemblances" -, but not by a universal feature applicable to all of them or constituting an essential core of all works of art. There is no such thing as an essence of art.

So the traditional approach is basically mistaken. It is based on a misunderstanding of the conceptual status of art - with this misunderstanding even constituting the very core of traditional aesthetics. In this sense, insight into the genesis of different concepts of art through art itself, and into their family resemblance - instead of a supposed essential unity - reveals the fundamental flaw of traditional, globalizing aesthetics and requires the shift to a different, pluralistic type of aesthetics.

I would like to take this to be the crucial argument which refutes traditional aesthetics and which justifies, and even requires the shift from aesthetics for example to art criticism as advocated by Prof. Danto.

c. Towards a broader design of the discipline

But the reorganization of aesthetic which we currently have to consider might reach even further. Thus far, I have only discussed the paradigm shift due within the classical frame of aesthetics, within artistics. We can't any longer be held captive by art's essentialistic picture. But it might be time to get rid of the traditional frame itself - to be no longer held captive by the equation of aesthetics and artistics. The inner pluralization of artistics - the shift from a mono-conceptual analysis of art to poly-conceptual art criticism - might have to be supplemented by an outer pluralization of aesthetics - by an opening up of field of the discipline to trans-artistic questions. This is what I will advocate in this paper.

In the first part I will try to develop the main topics of an aesthetics beyond aesthetics. In the second part I will try to clarify its conceptual admissibility and suggest how to rechart the territory of aesthetics. I will advocate aesthetics' opening out beyond art and the development of a cross-disciplinary structure of the discipline. This structure, of course, still includes questions of art, but now encompasses trans-artistic questions as well. And this, as we shall see, is important for the analysis of art itself. Art can more adequately be dealt with in the perspective of an aesthetics which is not restricted to the analysis of art alone.

I. Some Main Themes and the Relevance of an Aesthetics beyond Aesthetics

There are, generally speaking, two groups of reasons for a broadening of aesthetics: the first refers to the contemporary *fashioning of reality*, the second to the contemporary *understanding of reality*.¹⁴

I. Aesthetic fashioning of reality - embellishment

a. Globalized aestheticization

Today, we are living amidst an aestheticization of the real world formerly unheard-of.¹⁵ Embellishment and styling are to be found everywhere. They extend from the individuals' appearance to the urban and public sphere, and from economy through to ecology.

The *individuals* are undergoing a comprehensive styling of body, soul, and behaviour. In beauty salons and fitness centres they pursue the aesthetic perfection of their bodies, in meditation courses and New-Age-seminars they practice the aestheticization of their souls, and etiquette-training equips them for aesthetically desirable behaviour. The *homo aestheticus* has become the new role-model. In *urban areas*, as good as everything has been subjected to a face-lift over the last years - at least in the rich western societies. Take shopping-malls as an example. The *economy*, too, largely profits from the consumers' tendency not to actually acquire an article, but rather to buy oneself, by its means, into the aesthetic lifestyle to which advertising strategies have linked the article. Even *ecology*, often considered to be economy's opponent, is in aesthetic regards its partner. It favors a styling of the environment corresponding to aesthetic ideas like beauty or complexity. If rich industrial societies were able to do completely as they wish, they would transform the human, urban, industrial and natural environment in *toto* into a hyper-aesthetic scenario.¹⁶ *Genetic engineering*, which links ecological and individual styling, is another case in point. You know how much this technology is going to be used in order to adjust all kinds of life according to our wishes; it is also capable of providing just the type of children we want, according to our aesthetic expectations - and genetic technology is largely guided by aesthetic patterns. It's a kind of genetic cosmetic surgery. We people of today, thrown into the world as we are, have great trouble in attaining the ideal of *homo aestheticus*; future generations however should have it easier straight away: genetic engineering, this new branch of aestheticization, will have come to their aid ahead of them. There is certainly no need to expand further on these tendencies towards embellishment and a globalized aestheticization - the phenomena are all too obvious. Let me instead consider the relevance of these developments for aesthetics.

This phenomena do not actually constitute new domains of the aesthetic. Aesthetic orientation and activity has always borne upon the real world, however little the discipline aesthetics may have taken this into account. What's new today, is the extent and the rank of such aestheticizing activities. Aestheticization is becoming a global and primary strategy.

b. The impact on contemporary aesthetics

This tendency must, I think, influence contemporary as well as traditional aesthetics. The *impact on contemporary aesthetics* consists in making the reflexion on this phenomena obligatory, as they represent not only an expansion of the aesthetic, but at the same time alter the arrangement and estimation of the aesthetic. Hence aesthetics - as the reflective authority of the aesthetic - today must also analyze the state of the aesthetic in fields such as living environment and politics, economy and ecology, ethics and science. It must, in short, take the new states of the aesthetics into account. This in no way means that the current globalization and fundamentalization of the aesthetic is simply to be sanctioned, rather it belongs to the agenda for sufficient aesthetic diagnosis and critique today.¹⁷

c. The relation to traditional aesthetics

The *impact on traditional aesthetics* becomes evident when we ask whether tradition has ever advocated a globalization of the aesthetic. It cleraly has. Some prominent aesthetic programs of the past have definitively envisaged a globalized aestheticization, which they even expected to guarantee the final accomplishment of all our tasks on earth and the definitive happiness of mankind. Remember, for example, how the *Oldest System-Program of German Idealism* anticipated that the mediating power of the aesthetic, bringing together the rational and the sensuous, would make "the enlightened and the unenlightened [...] join hands", so that "eternal unity reigns among us", this being "the last, the greatest work of mankind". Or consider, how mediators of aesthetic ideas like the Arts-and-Crafts-Movement, Werkbund and Bauhaus - mediators insofar as they tried to realize aesthetic values advocated by aesthetics in the everyday world - were convinced that globalized aestheticization would altogether improve our world.

In this way, old aesthetic dreams are being realized in the present aestheticization. But the irritating fact - which requires explanation - is that the results are quite different from the original expectations. They are - say the least - disappointing. What was meant to endow our world with beauty, ends up in mere prettiness, and finally generates indifference or even disgust - at least among aesthetically sensitive people. In any case, nobody would dare to call the present

aestheticization an accomplishment. Something must be wrong with this realization of old aesthetic dreams. Either this realization misapplies the old programs, or these venerable and beloved programs themselves must have contained a flaw which has remained hidden so far, and which is now being revealed. Sometimes realizations - even partial ones - can be revealing. This, I suppose, is the case with the current aestheticization.

d. Some flaws in globalized aestheticization

So, what are the reasons for the disappointment in the present aestheticization? What are the critical points to be raised by an aesthetic reflexion on these processes? Let me mention three points.

First: Fashioning everything as a beautiful compromises the quality of the beautiful. Ubiquitous beauty loses its distinctive character and turns into mere prettiness or becomes simply meaningless. You can't make what's exceptional a standard without changing its quality.

Second: The strategy of globalized aestheticization dialectically falls victim to itself. It ends up in anaestheticization. The globalized aesthetic is experienced as annoying and even as terror. Aesthetic indifference then becomes a sensible and almost inevitable attitude to escape from the importunity of the ubiquitous aesthetic. Anaestheticization - that we refuse even to perceive the divinely embellished environment - becomes a survival strategy.¹⁸

Third: What arises instead, is a desire for the non-aesthetic - a desire for interruptions, breaks, and the axing of embellishment. If there were a task for art in public space today, it would consist not in introducing ever more beauty into already over-embellished environment, but precisely in stopping, in interrupting this aestheticization-machinery by creating aesthetic fallow areas and deserts in the midst of the hyperaesthetic.^{19,20}

e. Repercussions for traditional aesthetics

These critical experiences with the contemporary realization of the old aesthetic dreams of embellishing the world must in turn influence our assessment of traditional aesthetics.

Aesthetics used to praise beauty and embellishment and believed to have good reasons for this. But it never considered the consequences of the globalized embellishment which it advocated and which we are experiencing today. It never seemed even conceivable for traditional aesthetics that globalized embellishment might disfigure the world - instead of consummating, or even redeeming it. Moreover, traditional aesthetics' praise of beauty has provided effective support

for the current processes of aestheticization. And its passion for beauty prevented people from considering the negative effects of aestheticization, even after they had become obvious. The driving, legitimating and heroizing power of traditional aesthetics is at least partly responsible for the modern tendency toward aestheticization as well as for the blindness towards its counter-effects.

Hence triple criticism of traditional aesthetics applies. First : The simple praise of beauty calls for criticism. Either by distinguishing between lesser and greater beauty - the former being indeed so close to mere prettiness that it could be envisaged as a good common to both "the enlightened and the unenlightened", and be put into practice by the current strategies of embellishment; with only the latter being an exceptional and moving phenomenon - the one which Rilke called the beginning of what's frightening. Or, by considering that beauty is a value only in opposition to standard non-beauty, losing its distinctiveness however by its very propagation.

Second: One of the flaws of traditional aesthetics was to promote beauty alone (or predominantly), and to neglect other aesthetic values, or, in other words: to forget its own discovery that *variatio delectat* - and not a single aesthetic quality alone. This mistake becomes painfully clear through the present embellishment. Aesthetic - possibly the proper discipline of plurality - had turned monistic and failed to recognize that homogenization is - in aesthetic regards, too - systematically wrong.

Third: The efficacy of traditional aesthetics in the household of our cultural beliefs and desires, which seems to go without saying needs to be called into question. It is a task of current aesthetics to point out the mistakes in traditional aesthetic concepts vis-a-vis with their contemporary realization. Aesthetics has every ground to become critical of itself.

To sum up this point: The current aestheticization not only presents new problems and tasks for contemporary aesthetics, but also has critical repercussions for traditional aesthetics - this being partly responsible and broadly supportive of flaws in the current aestheticization processes. Therefore, the phenomena of aesthetics beyond aesthetics concern not only those who are willing to broaden the range of aesthetics, but are likewise an obligatory and revealing issue for those who still adhere to aesthetics' conventional frame. There is no way of ignoring the aesthetics outside of aesthetics if you want to develop a valid version of aesthetics inside aesthetics today.

2. Aesthetic comprehension of reality

A second group of arguments in favor of the turn to an aesthetics beyond aesthetics refers to the current comprehension of reality. This has, I will argue, become more and more aesthetic.

There is an obvious predominance of image and aesthetic features today not only in the current shaping of reality, but in the current mediation of reality as well. It stretches from the meditation of single objects or subjects and the meditation of our daily news to our basic understanding of reality. Think of the pictorial dominance in advertisement and in the selfpresentation of companies, or of your own photographic appearance in the World Wide Web. Consider how the pictorial requirements of television not only select what might count as news, but recently also influence the presentation of news outside television in the printmedia. And, finally, consider the change in our comprehension of reality. In earlier times, to count as being real, things had to be calculable; today they have to be aesthetically presentable. Aesthetics has become the new currency in the reality trade.

Again, I don't want to look at these phenomena in too much detail. They are all too familiar and have often been analyzed. Instead, I want to consider the impact of these developments on aesthetics and to point out some of the new tasks of aesthetics in face of these developments.

For reason of time I concentrate on just one point - on what I call the derealization of reality - and two of its consequences - the reconfiguration of *aisthesis*, and the revalidation of experiences outside the electronic media.

a. Derealization of reality

By "derealization of reality" I mean the fact that reality - as nowadays primarily mediated by television - is deeply affected by this type of mediation.²¹ Reality tends to lose its weight, to shift from compulsoriness, it undergoes a strange and momentous kind of levitation.

This is largely due to peculiarities of media aesthetics. These generally favor weightlessness and the free mobility of bodies and images. Think of the trailers for television programs. Everything is subject to possible manipulation, and within those media 'manipulation' is no longer a normative, but just a descriptive term. Whatever enters television, enters a realm of transformability instead of constancy. If there is a "lightness of being" anywhere, then it is in the electronic realm.

Furthermore, we not only know and see that everything is manipulable, but we also have knowledge of factual manipulations. Remember the Gulf War reports which sometimes showed technological fakes and never showed victims. Or consider our knowledge about pixel technology. You never know whether you are witnessing the real thing or a fake, and this, of course, affects our belief in the alleged reality. Well, "What You See Is What You Get", but you won't get what you shouldn't see, and you can never be sure whether the gift is reality's or just the channel's.

Experiences of this kind first of all engender a weakening of our belief in media-reality. The difference between the representation and the simulation of reality becomes less and less evident and tends to lose its relevance. Accordingly, the media increasingly present their pictures in modes of virtuality and playfulness.^{22,23}

All this, however, doesn't make us turn away from the media. Despite being aware that the images may be fakes, we nevertheless stay turned. We obviously prefer the consequence of changing our comprehension of reality and follow the road of derealization.

Secondly, this attitude towards media-reality extends more and more to ordinary reality too, this being increasingly presented, shaped and perceived according to media's features. With television being the main bestower and the role-model for reality, derealization spreads everywhere. Reality loses its impressiveness, and gravity, tends towards levitation and becomes less obligating. Already the importunity of media's presentation of reality obviously doesn't create affection any more, but rather its opposite: indifference. Seeing the same images - however impressively they may be arranged or intended to be - on different channels the same evening or repeatedly during a couple of days, reduces their impact. Sensationalism plus repetition creates indifference. Hence our attitude towards reality - inside and outside of the media - becomes more and more as if it were simulation altogether.²⁴ We don't take reality to be all that real any more. And amidst this suspension of realness we behave, judge and act quite differently. Our behavioral patterns are becoming simulatory and interchangeable. Many of the embarrassing phenomena in today's daily life are related to this ongoing softening of our comprehension of reality - but so is some progress in liberty, I would argue, as well.

Reflexion on this processes - as they are engendered by peculiarities of media aesthetics - is an obligatory theme for a contemporary aesthetics which doesn't want to ignore, but to actually take into account the present state and the relevance of the aesthetic.

b. Reconfiguration of 'aisthesis'

Let me turn to the next point, the reconfiguration of *aisthesis*. One interesting consequence of the current media dominance is a questioning of the primacy of vision, which has characterized occidental culture since the Greeks, and is culminating in the television age. Today's critique of this ocularcentrism is due to other reasons too, but the experience of media is a prominent factor in it.

Vision was traditionally favored for its hallmarks of distance, precision and universality, for its capacity for determination, and for its close link with cognition. From Heraclitus via Leonardo da Vinci to Merleau-Ponty, vision was considered our most excellent and noble sense.

But meanwhile, the features underlying this privilege - dominative features of perception and cognition - have been questioned by philosophers like Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Foucault or Derrida and by the feminist critique (think of Irigaray). And presently we are experiencing that vision is in fact no longer the reliable sense for contact with reality that it once was taken to be - not in a world indemonstrable physics, and no longer in the world of media.

At the same time, other senses have met with intensified interest (paralleled by the suspicion that the traditional primacy of vision might have done them injustice). Hearing, for example, is being appreciated more and more for its - anti-metaphysical - proximity to momentariness instead of permanent being, for its essentially social character - in contrast to the individualistic feature of vision -, and for its being linked to emotional experience and feeling - in opposition to the emotionless mastery of phenomena by vision.

Touch, too, has found its advocates, both due to new development in media technology as analyzed by Marshall McLuhan and Derrick de Kerckhove,²⁵ and to its highly bodily character - this again in contrast to the 'pure', uninvolved character of vision.

What has been taking place more and more ever since, is a breakdown of the traditional hierarchy of the senses - with vision on top, followed by hearing through to smell - and a recognition of the sensuous realm which no longer shows a definite hierarchy, but tends either to an equitable assessment of the senses, or - what I would prefer - to different, purpose-related hierarchical sets.

With regard to this rearrangement of *aisthesis*, we are living through an eminent change in cultural features and demands. Aesthetics - as the reflective discipline of the aesthetic realm - should consider the new states of *aisthesis*

and their connection with the change in cultural patterns. By analyzing these transformations, it could possibly also help us to enhance these processes in a appropriate way. Here lies one of aesthetics' proper contemporary tasks, which also offers the chance to move from being a rather dusty old discipline to being an interesting area of discussion and contemporary analysis.

c. Revalidation of non-electronic experiences

Another consequence of media experience and the derealization tendency consists in a revalidation of experiences outside electronic media. The general feature is the following: In contrast to the peculiarities of media-reality (or media-derealization) we begin to turn to a new appreciation of non-electronic reality and experience putting particular emphasis on those characteristics which are inimitable and unsubstitutable by media-experience.

The highly developed electronic world doesn't simply overcome or absorb traditional forms of experiences - as some media-freaks claim -, it also gives rise to a new evaluation of their peculiarities. What is taking place today, is a complimentary revalidation of ordinary experience in contrast of media-experience. This, to my knowledge, hasn't been sufficiently recognized in the discussions of recent years.

In contrast to universal mobility and changeability in the media-world we are to value anew resistability and unchangeability, the persistence of the concerts as opposed to the free play information, the massivity of matter as opposed to the levitation of imagery. In contrast to arbitray repeatability, uniqueness gains value afresh. The electronic omnipresence awakens the yearning for another presence, for the unrepeatable presence of *hic et nunc*, for the singular event. As opposed to the mutual social electronic imaginary, we are again learning to value our own imagination, unavailable to others. And the body possesses a sovereignty and intransigence of its own. Think of Nadolny's "Discovery of Slowness".²⁶ or of Handke's "Essay on Weariness".²⁷ - Altogether matter, body, individuality and uniqueness are gaining new relevance.

In order not to be misunderstood: Of course I don't intend these tendencies as simple counter-program to the artificial paradises of electronic worlds, but rather as a program complimentary to them. Neither do these values negate the fascination of electronic worlds - they do however come in as a counter-pole -, nor is the concern one of a simple return to sensuous experience, such as applied in pre-electronic times. The revalidations are far more tinted and etched by experience of the electronic world. And there are obvious interconnections between electronic and non- electronic experience. Sometimes natural experience is just

the thing electronic freaks are aiming at, too. My favorite example is the extraordinary Californian sunsets - beloved especially of the electronic freaks of Silicon Valley, who in the evening drive to the coast to watch these sunsets and then turn to the artificial worlds of Internet.

According to the prevalent media-tendency on the one hand and the revalidation of non-electronic experience on the other hand, our *aisthesis* is becoming profoundly twofold. It pursues, roughly speaking, both media-fascination and non-media-goals as well. And there is nothing wrong in this duality. On the contrary, this is an interesting case of the present turn to plurality in general. We are - and should be - able to wander between different types of reality experience. The present *aisthesis* is the domain where this is perhaps the most easily and successfully done.

d. Resume

Having, in my introductory remarks argued that the discipline of aesthetics should transcend the traditional equation of aesthetics and art, I have in this first part considered the impact of the current aestheticization processes on contemporary as well as traditional aesthetics, and meanwhile pointed to three specific domains of an aesthetics beyond aesthetics.

The derealization of reality, the reconfiguration of *aisthesis*, and the revalidation of ordinary experience are important issues for any contemporary aesthetics which tries to do justice to its name. Aesthetics would, I think, criminally hurt itself, if it left the discussion of these issues to sociologists, psychologists, or the feuilletons alone.

II. Recharting the Field of Aesthetics

In the second part of my paper I now want to address three remaining questions with respect to my suggestion to rechart the territory of aesthetics by opening it up beyond traditional aesthetics. First: Why is it conceptually sound for the discipline to comprehend all dimensions and meanings of the aesthetic? Second: Why does the opening up of aesthetics bring with it advantages for the discipline, even with respect to its narrower scope of analyzing art? And third: What would the disciplinary structure of an aesthetics beyond aesthetics be like?

1. Conceptual clarifications

a. The polyvalence of the term 'aesthetic'

Some colleagues object to the possibility of an aesthetics beyond aesthetics that the difference of meanings of the term 'aesthetic' inside and outside aesthetics

would make a discipline trying to cover all of them hopelessly ambiguous and a victim of mere equivocations.

There certainly exists a considerable variety of different meanings to the term. The expression 'aesthetic' can refer to art and beauty in particular, or to *aisthesis* in general, or it may designate a type of unobliged existence, or refer to an ontology of virtuality, fictionality, and suspension.

But does this polyvalent grammar of the expression indeed condemn it to being unusable? Ought one to drop the expression because inexactitude in a concept is synonymous with its unusability?

The problem of aesthetics' semantic ambiguity is as old as the discipline itself. Remember that Baumgarten defined aesthetics as the "science of sensuous cognition".²⁸ whereas Hegel understood it to be decidedly a "philosophy of art", and "of fine art",²⁹ to which Konard Fiedler objected: "Aesthetics is not the theory of art", and the "juxtaposition of beauty and art is the *protos pseudos* in the realm of aesthetics"³⁰. Almost every aesthetic theorist says something interesting, but each says something different. Wittgenstein once noted: "Anything - and nothing - is right", "this is the position you are in if you look for definitions [...] in aesthetics".³¹

Yet not even within the realm of recognized traditional versions of aesthetics has this ambiguity led aestheticians to despair of the usability of the expression and of the sense of a discipline devoted to it.

b. Family resemblances

And it didn't have to. Wittgenstein has shown a way out of the alleged conceptual difficulty. He demonstrated that, although coherence in usage is necessary for terms with variant uses, this coherence need not be thanks to a unitary property, but can come about in a different way: through semantic overlap between one usage and the next. The different meanings then have, as Wittgenstein said, "no one thing in common"³² rather their relationship results from overlaps alone. This is what Wittgenstein called "family resemblances".

It is in exactly this way that the term 'aesthetic' works. Family resemblance characterizes its grammar. In borrowing a passage from Wittgenstein, one could say: "Instead of producing something common to all that we call aesthetic, I am saying these phenomena have no one thing common which makes us use the same word for all, - but they are related to one another in many different ways. And it is because of this relationships, or these relationships, that we call them

all 'aesthetic'.³³ - In this quote from the *Philosophical Investigations* I have only replaced Wittgenstein's word 'language' with 'aesthetic'.

c. Aesthetics should cover the full range of the expression 'aesthetic'

The consequences are significant:

First: A coherence in the discipline of aesthetics is possible according with the family resemblances between the different meanings of the term 'aesthetic'. One has to sufficiently differentiate between these usages, but if one does so, one can profit greatly from their variety, analyze the overlaps connecting them and develop an aesthetics which comprehends the full range of the expression 'aesthetic'.

Second: Aesthetics should fully profit from this opportunity. It has no good reasons to restrict itself to artistics. One may, of course, do this in one's own research, just as other aestheticians may primarily refer to non-artistic aspect but as a discipline, aesthetics should comprehend the whole range of such endeavors. And the polyvalence of the term 'aesthetic' is rather a sign of its relevance. It is precisely those concepts which are important that like to be polyvalent, and with respect to such concepts a non-ambiguity commandment has never applied. How else, for example, could there have been an ontology when the expression 'to *on*' (as Aristotle showed in exemplary fashion) is all but hopelessly ambiguous? Or think of the different meanings of *logos* (language, relationship, reason) - ought have forgone the development of a logic on its account? The polyvalence of an expression can be no reason for hindrance to the developing of corresponding discipline, it's just that this must be in a position to distinguish the diverse meanings and to take account of *all* of them.

Hence, a comprehensive aesthetics - as I advocate it - is conceptually possible, and aesthetics should beware of taking selections as its point of departure. It would be wrong and antiquated to give, or want to dictate a single, ultimate concept of the aesthetic. The meaning of a word is not what enamors theoreticians or what they decree - "the meaning of a word is its use in the language", as Wittgenstein pointed out.³⁴

To decretorily exclude those parts which don't suit one's preferences, or to declare one certain meaning the basic amongst the diverse meanings of the aesthetic is an imperial gesture which suggests clarity, but de facto draws the field of the aesthetic incorrectly. Bad philosophy flirts with the traditional expectation that one must reduce the multitude of meanings to one basic meaning in all circumstances. But to perform conceptual bulldozing instead of a complex

analysis of the problems, means failing one's duty - in both philosophy and aesthetics.

2. Why the discipline should take advantage of an opening up beyond its traditional restrictions

Being conceptually possible, in what way will an opening up of aesthetics beyond its traditional limits prove advantageous to the discipline?

a. Interdisciplinary and institutional advantages

Becoming more complex, it may - admittedly - become more difficult, too. But in no longer being closed around a narrow set of questions, it would acquire contact and interchange with other discipline, and gain new fields of research. This, I think, constitutes an advantage not only on the level of content, but on the institutional levels as well. The type of aesthetics I advocate will meet greater interest, both for its breadth and its contribution to current problems, and it will meet greater support - also in terms of funding.

b. Advantages with respect to art - Art transcending the traditional limits of aesthetics

Ultimately an opening up of aesthetics beyond art is advantageous to the analysis of art itself. Because art always reaches beyond art, refers to extra-artistic phenomena and states of the aesthetics. Therefore transcending the aesthetics-artistics restrictions in favor of an aesthetics beyond aesthetics is obligatory even respect to the traditional nucleus of aesthetics, the analysis of art. - In which ways does art transcend itself?

aa. The work of art related to the world beyond it

Reference to the state of the aesthetic

Even when apparently being autonomous, art has always and quite consciously reacted to the state of the aesthetic outside of art, in the world surrounding it. Traditionally, in an aesthetically sparing world, it has championed the Elysium of beauty; when in the modern world sensibility has been under threat, art - heedful of its old bond with the sensuous - has understood itself as the harbinger and rescuer of the sensuous (Matise and Dubuffet being examples); where embellishment is rife, as it is nowadays, art can see its responsibility in countering this and behaving decidedly demurely (*arte provera* and *concept art* being examples).

Today's art in particular struggles with the dominance of media images. It can oppose their importunity, or succumb to it, or experiment with fictions

between traditional artistic patterns and current media perception³⁶. Whatever the relationship concerned may be, such artworks require understanding of their specific intervention in the artistic as well as non-artistic states of the aesthetic.³⁶ There is no sufficient description of art which would not have to include aspects of an aesthetics beyond artistics.

Art opening views of the world

Moreover, the energy of works always transcends their frame or the museum's threshold or the moment of their observation. The works open up perspectives on the world - not only by representing it, but above all by exemplifying new views of the world. It belongs to the key experiences with art (and conversely, to tests as to whether someone actually confers efficacy upon art or would like to banish it in eulogizing about its autonomy) that, upon leaving an exhibition, one is suddenly able to perceive the world with the eyes of the artists, through the optics of his works, in the light of his aesthetics³⁷. This is pretty much the natural and undistorted behaviour: to engage art's perceptive form in the perception of reality too, not to shut oneself off to the efficacy of artistic optics, but to operate and experiment with it. The elementary aesthetic experience is not that art is something closed, but rather that it is able to open one's eyes to unaccustomed views of the world.³⁸ Works of art are often above tools for an amended and intensified perception of reality.

Art and everyday perception

Consider further how forms of perception which today appear natural and self-evident originated historically in process in which art played a pivotal role - romantic art for example had a key role in the perception of the world of mountains. Some parts of our everyday perception are a sediment of generations of art experience. There are always interactions between natural and artistic perception.

Art providing models of existence

Beyond this moulding of forms of perception, works of art can also attain the function of a model for ways of living. This already belonged to the normative demands of classical art and carries on in modernity, after the dissolution of general norms, in the generation of potentials for individual planning - Rilke's description of the archaic torso of Appolo, which he concludes with the line "You must transform your life", provides an impressive description of this phenomena.

Certainly, the border between art and reality outside of art is not easy to lay down, but the entanglements and transitions between the two are no more to be ignored. An aesthetics of art always has to consider the dual character of artistics on the one hand of aesthetics beyond artistics on the other hand. Adorno once noted this in reference to Beethoven: "Nobody can, for example, claim to be conversant with a Beethoven symphony unless he understands the so-called purely musical events and the same time hears in it the echo of the French Revolution. *How* these two moments of aesthetic experience are related is one of the intractable problems of a philosophical approach [...].³⁹ Consistently this led Adorno to the observation that aesthetic experience is driven "beyond itself".⁴⁰

bb. Specific constellations of the various dimensions of the aesthetic in single works of art

Complexity

Let me, - after art's particular relation to the state of the aesthetic in the world surrounding it, and art's general potency in suggesting new kinds of perception and behaviour - also mention that art in itself always comprises a variety of types of perceptions, some of which are not specifically artistic. For example, one couldn't even recognize the objects in pictures without bringing in day-to-day perceptive competences. Furthermore, the most simple perception of whatever in a painting requires not only contemplation, but imagination and reflexion as well. What one sees during the internal analysis of a painting is never a *factum brutum*, but is perceived in a process which implies an imaginative bringing forth and depends upon preceding and subsequent interpretation. And there is always an interplay with aesthetic experiences of other artworks as well as with non-artistic aesthetic experience.

Modern breaks

Consider, finally, how modern art in particular has worked out reconfigurations of the perceptual field by questioning the time-honoured definitions and borders of art. Duchamp questioned the diktat of visibleness, Joyce the book form, Pollock the limits of painting, Cage the status of music. It was precisely the avant-garde's program to pass the narrow status of artistics and to open out into an aesthetics. It would be an anachronism to ignore or revoke this through an aesthetic-theoretical constriction.

cc. Consequences

Comprehensiveness of aesthetics

All this demands an aesthetics which - as distinct from traditional artistics - is willing and able to take the extra- artistic entanglement of art into account, and to consider all the dimensions of *aisthesis*, to reach out over the whole span of the aesthetic.

Potential consequences for art itself

An aesthetics of this type will prove fruitful not only for the purpose of understanding and interpreting art - not only for observers, but to some extent also for the creation of art - also for artists. It opens up a different perspective on what art is about. Once an artist has (for example following Schiller) discovered art's potency to develop models for what Schiller called "Lebenskunst", he may proceed very differently from the traditional search for the perfection of the artwork in itself - Beuys would be an example. Or once the artist (following Nietzsche) has recognized the constitutive role of aesthetic features in cognition, she may start thinking: "Hey, my proper task might not be to create art for art's sake, but to develop and exemplify possible views, ways of perceiving, to invent perceptual and conceptual patterns" - Eva Hesse is an example. In such ways, the type of transaesthetics I advocate can engender new kinds of art itself. It is a type of aesthetics which is of some interest to artists themselves, who - for very good reasons - are so dissatisfied with traditional aesthetics.

Aesthetics beyond aesthetics: for the benefit of art

To sum this up: An opening of the aesthetics, beyond aesthetics to the complete range of *aisthesis*, seems necessary not only for the benefit of art. This, I think, is ultimately the striking argument for an enlargement of aesthetics. The restrictive art- aesthetics however is not even capable of actually being an aesthetic of art. It far more restricts and fails the art which it purports to serve. It locks art within the golden cage of autonomy, with which neither traditional nor modern art complies. It practices aesthetic-theoretical ghettoization. If art isn't analyzed in the perspective of an aesthetics including viewpoints beyond aesthetics, it will necessarily be aesthetically misrepresented.

3. Recognizing the discipline

a. Cross-disciplinary design of the discipline

Finally, What will the structure of the discipline aesthetics, according with this opening, be like? My answer certainly isn't surprising: It will be interdisciplinary or transdisciplinary. I imagine aesthetics as a field of research

which comprises all kinds of questions concerning *aisthesis*, including contributions from philosophy as well as sociology, from art history, psychology, anthropology, neuroscience, etc. *Aisthesis* constitutes the frame of the discipline, with art being one - yet, no matter how important, only one - of its issues.

The following may sound more surprising: I imagine the *aisthesis*-related parts of the various disciplines I have just mentioned to be actual branches of the discipline of aesthetics, to be included in its institutional structure. Aesthetics should be cross-disciplinary or transdisciplinary in itself, and not just enter into interdisciplinary when occasioned by meetings with other disciplines. An Aesthetics Department, in my view, should have all these branches taught within itself; and the aesthetician should possess considerable knowledge of, and be able to teach at least some of these branches - and not only, let's say ontology of art or the history of taste.

b. Transdisciplinarity

This suggestion of an internally transdisciplinary structure to the discipline may appear strange, but such a structure is, I think, necessary in almost every discipline today. This is due to recent insights which amount to a basic change in our understanding of the structure of rationalities and, correspondingly, of fields and topics of research.

In modern times a differentiation and separation of types of rationality was advocated - these types supposedly being clear cut and essentially diverse. But recent analysis of rationality have shown that this is superficially correct at best, but basically wrong. The diverse rationalities don't allow themselves to be delimited from one another in some water-tight fashion, but exhibit entanglements and transitions in their core, which evade traditional departmentalization fundamentally. Such entanglements, transitions and interpretation have become the contemporary agenda.

c. Outlook

I cannot expand on this point further - I have done so in my recent book on reason.⁴¹ And though you may find this prospect interesting, you may in general remain doubtful. But with respect to aesthetics, I do hope the prospect of a cross-disciplinary design to the discipline as necessitated by its opening out, for which I have given some reasons - may appear plausible. Already in its history, aesthetics has experienced considerable paradigm shifts in its conceptual features, some of which I have mentioned. Indeed, such shifts don't happen every day, but they may - for good reasons - happen some day.

Wittgenstein, considering his own paradigm shift in philosophy, once wrote: "I still find my own way of philosophizing new, and it keeps striking me so afresh; that is why I need to repeat myself so often. It will have become second nature to a new generation [...]"⁴² - Of course, I am not saying by analogy: "The cross-disciplinary structure of aesthetics beyond aesthetics will have become second nature to a new generation." But this may well be the case. - Outside the discipline, it already seems to be the case.

Notes and References

- 1 *Academic American Encyclopedia* (Danbury Connecticut: Grolier Inc., 1993), vol. 1, p. 130.
- 2 *Enciclopedia Filosofica* (Firenze: G. C. Sansoni Editore, 1967), vol. 2, col. 1054.
- 3 *Vocabulaire d' Esthetique* (Paris: PUF, 1990), p. 691 and p. 692 resp.
- 4 *Historisches Worterbuch der Philosophie*, ed. Joachim Ritter (Basel: Schwabe & Co.), vol. 1 (1971), col. 555.
- 5 "Aesthetica [...] est scientia cognitionis sensitivae." (Alexandar Gottlieb Baumgarten, *Aesthetica* [Frankfurt a. d. Oder, 1750], I, 1)
- 6 Cf. *Die Aktualität des Aesthetischen*, ed. Wolfgang Welsch (München: Fink, 1993). the volume documents a congress which took place under the same title in Hanover in September 1992. It assembled experts in philosophy, aesthetics, sociology, political science, feminism, media, design, neurophysiology, epistemology, art and art history and attracted several thousands participants.
- 7 Wittgenstein said: *A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it to us inexorably.* (Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe [New York: Macmillan, 1968], p. 48e [115]).
- 8 All citations from the First Announcement in September 1993.
- 9 Letter to August Wilhelm Schlegel, September 3rd, 1802.
- 10 Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, *Philosophie der Kunst* [Lecture in Jena, winter term 1802/03] (repr. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1976). p. 7 and p. 124 resp.
- 11 "Die wissenschaftliche Aesthetik sucht nach dem Universalziegel, aus dem sich das Gebäude der Aesthetik errichten ließe." (Robert Musil *Tagebücher*, ed. Adlof Frise [Reinbek bei Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1976], p. 449) - Musil wrote this note around 1920
- 12 The result of this outset is that a philosophy of this type knows no way of saying anything about real art. When Schelling became Secretary General of the Munich Akademie der bildenden Künste, and was obliged through this office to give lectures about art, he lectured not once about art throughout his fifteen years in office. The hour of reckoning becomes the oath of disclosure for aesthetics.
- 13 I have discussed the problems of traditional aesthetics in more detail in: "Traditionelle und moderne Aesthetik in ihrem Verhältnis zur Praxis der Kunst" (*Zeitschrift für Aesthetik und Allgemeine Kunstwissenschaft*, XXVIII, 1983, pp. 264-286). My counter-concept was first developed in my *Aesthetisches Denken* (Stuttgart: Reclam, 1990. 3rd ed. 1993) and later in "Aesthetisierungsprozesse: Phänomene, Unterscheidungen, Perspektiven" (*Deutsche Zeitschrift für Philosophie*, 41/1, 1993, pp. 7-29; English version: "Aestheticization Process: Phenomena, distinctions, and Prospects", in: *Theory, Culture and Society*, in print).
- 14 I have more broadly developed these thoughts in "Aesthetisierungsprozesse: Phänomene, Unterscheidungen, Perspektiven" viz. "Aestheticization Processes: Phenomena, Distinctions and Prospects", and will partly rely on this article.
- 15 'Aestheticization' basically means that the unaesthetic is made, or understood to be, aesthetic.

- 16 In the United States, one of the most common arguments for providing help for the homeless is that you don't want to meet these people in the streets, because they are aesthetically offensive and disturbing.
- 17 For a discussion of the possibility of an aesthetic critique of aestheticization processes cf.: Wolfgang Iser, "Ästhetisierungsprozesse: Phänomene, Unterscheidungen, Perspektiven" viz. "Aestheticization Processes: Phenomena, Distinctions and Prospects".
- 18 I discussed this for the first time in "Ästhetik und Anästhetik" (in "Ästhetisches Denken, pp. 9-40).
- 19 I have developed this point specifically in "Gegenwartskunst im öffentlichen Raum Augenweide oder Ärgernis?" (in: *Kunstforum International*, vol. 118, 1992, pp. 318-320).
- 20 Well, in American cities you still have such desert. Their definition is ethnic and economic.
- 21 By "media" I will - in the following - always refer to electronic media, without suggesting that there might be any kind of experience independent of media of some kind or other.
- 22 And the viewers replace their former belief in media-reality with a desire for media entertainment.
- 23 I am referring here primarily to television which in fact is somehow an old-fashioned medium in today's electronic world. But it's the one which everybody knows and uses. And the effect of the more advanced technologies are not different, but enhance the derealization stimulated by television.
- 24 The usual objection to the simulation thesis, that the simulated and real would never really be mistaken, does not apply to the simulation thesis, for it doesn't assert anything like this. It intends to draw attention to something else: that behavioral patterns which are being practiced in the pilot electronic are increasingly impregnating everyday behaviour too. The virtualization of reality is a long-term effect of media worlds. The user is perhaps aware of the difference between simulation and reality. But the silent point is that this difference is coming to mean less and less. Simulation is being apprehended without further ado as reality's substitute, it is even being esteemed as more consummate version of reality. The experience of simulation is even being made more and more the matrix of real behaviour: deviations from the electronic ideal imagery no longer count as a sign of human nature, but rather as burdensome imperfections. Originals in media conditions - here as elsewhere, say, within art - are now just disappointing. The real is being more and more assimilated to the ideal media conception.
- 25 Cf. Derrick de Kerckhove, "Touch versus Vision: Ästhetik neuer Technologien", in: *Die Aktualität des Ästhetischen*, pp. 137-168.
- 26 Sten Nadolny, *die Entdeckung der Langsamkeit* (München: Hanser, 1983).
- 27 Peter Handke, *Versuch über die Müdigkeit* (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1989).
- 28 Alexander Gottlieb Baumgarten, *Aesthetica*, 1.
- 29 Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, *Introductory Lectures on Aesthetics*, trans. Bernard Bosanquet, ed. Michael Inwood (London: Penguin 1993) [I].
- 30 Konrad Fiedler, "Kunsttheorie und Ästhetik". in *Schriften zur Kunst*, ed. Gottfried Boehm, 2 vols (Munich: Fink, 1991), vol. II, pp. 9-24, here p. 9. Similarly, Barnett Newman noted: "The impulse of modern art was this desire to destroy beauty [...] by completely denying that art has any concern with the problem of beauty." (quoted after Arthur C. Danto, *The disenfranchisement of Art* [New York: Columbia University Press, 1986, p. 13).
- 31 Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, 36e [77].
- 32 Ibid., 31° [65].
- 33 Ibid.
- 34 Ibid., 20° [43].

- 35 I have discussed these different possibilities in more detail in "Artificial Paradises?" (esp. part IV), in: *Aesthetic Thinking* (New Jersey: The Humanities Press, forthcoming).
- 36 It is precisely where the energy of art intersects with the everyday tensions that enthralling forms of art come about. And paradigmatically in these cases, aesthetics has to be able to comprehend the interventionist logic of these art forms which operate on, or in transition between, the borders of art and the living environment (cf. Wolfgang Welsch, "Übergänge", in: *siemens Kulturprogramm 1990/91*, Munich 1991, pp. 29-33). Art is always art in context (cf. Wolfgang Kemp, "Kontexte. Für eine Kunstgeschichte der Komplexität", in: *Texte Zur Kunst*, Heft 2, 1991, 89- 101).
- 37 Goethe had already described and paid tribute to this. Upon entering a cobbler's workshop, he believed suddenly to see a picture by Ostade before him, "so perfect that one ought only really to have hung it in the gallery. [...] It was the first time that I came to notice in such high degree that gift, which I subsequently exercised with greater awareness, namely to see nature with the eyes of his or that artist to whose works I had dedicated a particular attentiveness. this ability has accorded me much enjoyment." (Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Dichtung und Wahrheit*, Part II, Book 8).
- 38 Such external references in artistic paradigms are not at all astonishing, since the artistic perceptions were themselves developed in contact and in the coming-to-grips with environmental as well as other artistic perception. Therefore, they are also able to intervene in the realm of our experience and to reconfigure our world's aesthetic nexus.
- 39 Theodor W. Adorno, *Aesthetic Theory*, transl. C.Lenhardt (London/New York: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1984), p. 479.
- 40 Ibid., 478.
- 41 Wolfgang Welsch, *Vernunft. Die Zeitgenössische Vernunftkritik und das Konzept der transversalen Vernunft* (Frankfurt a. M.: Suhrkamp, 1995).
- 42 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Culture and Value*, ed. by G.H. von Wright in collaboration with Heikki Nyman, transl. by Peter Winch (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1980), p. 1e.

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Aesthetics beyond/within Aesthetics :

The Scope and Limits of Aesthetics in Indian Antiquity

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Today the Hegelian definition of 'aesthetics' as the philosophy of art is questioned and proposals are made to extend the scope of aesthetics much beyond this limit so as to accommodate the areas of learning originally suggested by Alexander Baumgarten's definition of aesthetics as the 'science of sensuous cognition' which retains the meaning of its Greek original *aisthesis*. But the limiting of the scope of this science to the philosophy of art in the post-Baumgartenian intellectual history was due to Baumgarten's own illustration of the aesthetic perfection or the perfection of sensuous knowledge by the arts, particularly poetry.¹

Immanuel Kant made a three-fold division of cognitive faculties- understanding, judgment and reason, and observed that there are two kinds of judgment -determinant and reflective. The first kind of judgment applies a concept or a rule to a particular while the second kind of judgment discovers a rule from a given particular. A species of this reflective judgment is the aesthetic judgment, i.e., judgment of the beautiful, sublime and taste. Aesthetic judgment reflects on the particular facts of the beautiful, sublime and taste and this judgment is determined by the feeling of disinterested pleasure. Taste is the ability to estimate the beautiful, "to respond with immediate pleasure and unclouded vision to beauty in nature and art, and further, to communicate this pleasure to others who are capable of sharing it... and the exercise of this ability is the judgment of taste."² The aesthetic judgment, while calling something beautiful, does not simply feel that it pleases, but claims that it pleases necessarily, that it is an object of universal delight. Aesthetic experience or the experience of the beautiful as disinterested pleasure is for Kant an autonomous experience and is different from and independent of moral and cognitive experiences that are forms of determinant judgment.

The post-Kantian idealist philosophers such as Hegel, Bosanquet and Croce followed Kant in considering aesthetics as the autonomous branch of philosophy that establishes the relation between the sensuous and the beautiful, between the beautiful and the ultimate reality. Hegel defined the beautiful as the sensuous *semblance* of the idea (the Ultimate Reality) : "... the sensuous in works of art is exalted to the rank of a mere *semblance* in comparison with the immediate existence of the things in nature, and the work of art occupies the

mean between what is immediately sensuous and ideal thought ... the sensuous in the work of art is itself something ideal, not, however, the ideal of thought but as thing still in an external way. This semblance of the sensuous presents itself to the mind externally as the shape, the visible look and the sonorous vibration of things ... In art these sensuous shapes and sounds present themselves not simply for their own sake and that of their immediate structure, but with the purpose of affording in that shape satisfaction to higher spiritual interests, seeming that they are powerful to call forth a response and echo in the mind from all the depths of consciousness. It is thus that, in art, the sensuous is spiritualized, i. e., the spiritual appears in sensuous shape."³

According to Hegel, therefore, aesthetics or the philosophy of art is subordinate to metaphysics or the philosophy of the Spirit/Idea since he defines the value of art in terms of its expression of the spiritual significance. But Bosanquet and Croce, while accepting the Hegelian concept of beauty as the sensuous manifestation of the spirit, reject the Hegelian subordination of aesthetics to metaphysics. When Hegel observes that among the manifestation of the spirit—thought, beauty and moral goodness—thought is of the highest value, Bosanquet and Croce argue that all of them are equally valuable and individually constitute different realms of experiences; therefore the question of any qualitative comparison among them does not arise. If nature is not an elevation over art, metaphysics is not superior to aesthetics.

Bosanquet defines aesthetics in his preface to *A History of Aesthetic* (1892):

Aesthetic theory is a branch of philosophy, and exists for the sake of knowledge and not as a guide to practice. The present work is, therefore, primarily addressed to those who may find a philosophical interest in understanding the place and value of beauty in the system of human life, as conceived by leading thinkers in different periods of world's history. It is important to insist that the aesthetic philosopher does not commit the impertinence of invading the artist's domain with an *apparatus belli* of critical principles and prospects. The opinion that this is so draws upon aesthetic much obloquy, which would be fully deserved if the opinion were true. Art, we are told, is useless; in a kindred sense aesthetic may well submit to be useless also. The aesthetic theorist, in short, desires to understand the artist, not in order to interfere with the latter, but in order to satisfy the intellectual interest of his own.⁴

Since Kant and the post-Kantian idealist tradition, aesthetics has gained an autonomous status in the realm of human thinking for investigating the nature of art objects as creations of different artists, their relation to Nature and Ultimate

Reality, the value of the experience of their beauty by the audience in terms of disinterested pleasure and finally, for determining the criteria for their appreciation and criticism. Monroe C. Beardsley views aesthetics from the point of the critical statements about the works of art. While distinguishing aesthetics from criticism of the arts, he observes that aesthetics is not criticism, but philosophy of criticism or *meta criticism* :

As a field of study, aesthetics consists of a rather heterogeneous collection of problems; those that arise when we make a serious effort to say something true and warranted about a work of art. As a field of knowledge, aesthetics consists of those principles that are required for clarifying and confirming critical statements. Aesthetics can be thought of, then, as the philosophy of criticism, or *metacriticism*.⁵

As ethics is philosophy of moral statements or an examination of the meaning and proof of moral statements since, for example, it does not state "it is wrong to kill", but seeks for the meaning of 'wrong' and 'right' or as philosophy of science does not provide us with the theories of particles and electrons, but asks whether these particles really exist independent of human mind, so also aesthetics does not state "*Hamlet* is a wonderful play" but inquires into the meaning of 'wonderful' and into the nature of a 'play' as distinguished from the epic or the novel and so on. Aesthetics consists of value judgements. It does not simply state that Shakespeare is a better playwright than Webster, but states the criteria for a good or bad play.

The subjectmatter of aesthetics being more or less the same, the nature of its investigation and inquiries has changed on par with changes in the modalities of the different schools of thought that set the very ways of thinking during the whole of the 20th century. Idealism, Marxist Realism, Phenomenology, Existentialism, Pragmatism and Neo-Empiricism all have had their own modes of enquiry, as they thought, to fulfil the demand of their own quest. Thomas Munro, for example, summarises the need for a "programme of making aesthetics a rigorous and broad-gauged discipline" advocating for "a scientific, descriptive, neutralistic approach to aesthetics; one which should be broadly experimental and empirical, but not limited to quantitative measurement; utilising the insights of art criticism and philosophy as hypotheses, but deriving objective data from two main sources - the analysis and history of form in the arts and psychological studies of the production, appreciation, and teaching of the arts."⁶

But a call for broadening the gauge of aesthetics such as this, demanding a convergence of several disciplines on explaining the issues in aesthetics as defined by the Kantian tradition was not a call for emancipating aesthetics from

the boundaries of academic disciplines, allowing even a layman for participating in discussion on art and beauty. The 13th conference of the International Association of Aesthetics in Lahti, Finland (August 1-5, 1995) on the theme "Aesthetics in Practice" called for bridging the gap between academic research and phenomena of the everyday world, for extending the scope of aesthetics far beyond the philosophical or even all kinds of intellectual perspectives so as to include the issues other than theoretical, the issues of taste in all kinds of our cultural practices such as fashion in garments, costumes, preparation of food, maintenance of the body, preservation of the forest, gardening and expressiveness in everyday life of the common man and disciplines like biology, agriculture, forestry, horticulture, politics, law, economics, marketing and commerce were brought to bear upon the issues involved.⁷ To put it precisely, the thrust of the conference was not so much upon theories as on the practical or applied aspects of aesthetics as a science of beauty and taste, as a style of living, as a key to understanding and fashioning the contemporary reality itself. The *homo sapiens* is now the *homo aestheticus* and 'aesthetics has become the new currency in the reality trade.'⁸

Aesthetics today has gone beyond aesthetics in its traditional sense of philosophy of beauty in Nature and Art. But is this idea of man as the *homo aestheticus* the result of a historical necessity or a discovery of man's cultural differentia unnoticed earlier? The present essay intends to answer this second question in the positive by referring to a significant chapter of the Indian cultural heritage. Long ago, in the 3rd c. A.D. Vātsyāyana, the author of a treatise on erotics, viewed man as the *homo aestheticus*, and in understanding the reality of human life in terms of aesthetic behaviour he did not suggest to enlarge the scope of aesthetics beyond aesthetics, rather comprehended the whole of man's being within the area of aesthetics - considered man's life as a piece of art. This view of Vātsyāyana was not a determinant judgement in Kantian terms because he was not a philosopher. As a social scientist, his observations were based on the actual life-styles of Indians continuing for several centuries that preceded him. But before coming to Vātsyāyana we must note the exact area of Indian thinking that might be defined in terms of what the European tradition named 'aesthetics'.

Aesthetics as Philosophy of Art/Metacriticism

The earliest Indian text on art is a treatise on the drama ascribed to a mythical sage named Bharata who was tentatively a contemporary of Aristotle (4th c. B.C.). But the significant difference to be noted is that while the pioneering Western thinkers on art—Plato and Aristotle, are primarily philosophers and their

reflections on art form a part of their total system of philosophy, Bharata is not a philosopher. Like other two great thinkers of his age Pānini the grammarian and Kautilya the socio- political scientist, Bharata was also a descriptive thinker rather than a prescriptive theorist. Aristotle's method in his *Poetics* is descriptive too. But his observations on different forms of art are to be understood in relation to the system of thought that he developed in his treatises on several branches of knowledge such as metaphysics, politics, biology and rhetorics. Therefore he and his predecessor Plato may be called philosophers of art or aestheticians. But this is not the case with Bharata. As Panini did not prescribe the grammatical rules, but formulated rules as he found them in the actual usage of the Sanskrit language of his time, and systematised the language on the basis of such rules, so also Bharata systematised ten forms of the drama out of several other forms that were prevalent in his time. Simultaneously he also systematised the structure of the drama primarily as a performing art with its several constituents such as dialogues, music, dance, histrionics and costume. He also made observations on the drama as a literary form with its constituents such as plot, character and emotional contents. Aristotle, as a philosopher, builds up a definition of art and formulates a sister arts theory interconnecting these individual arts on the basis of a generalisation that comes under the framework of his philosophical system. As a philosopher, therefore, he considers spectacle, the theatrical aspect of the drama, insignificant in his theoretical perspective. Bharata's, on the other hand, is a comprehensive treatise, so exhaustive as to cover all the aspects of the drama as an object of art in itself and in its relation to the audience for whom it is composed and performed - in as many as thirty-six long chapters. If aesthetics is a philosophical system, then Bharata is not an aesthetician. Philosophical reflections were scattered all over the Vedic scriptures, particularly in the final parts of the Vedas called Upanisads. But the philosophical schools or systems developed about three centuries after Bharata.

Nonetheless, in defining the drama and determining the nature of its experience by the audience Bharata takes recourse to the terms and concepts as used by his predecessors particularly in the Upanisads. One such major term and concept is *Rasa* which forms the central issue of his own treatise and shapes the ideas and theories on different forms of art in posterity. The Sanskrit word *Rasa* literally means 'juice', primarily referring to the juice of a creeper named Soma famous for its gustatory delicacy and mild intoxication and for its use in the Vedic sacrificial rituals. Metaphorically this term is used in the Upanisads for describing the beauty of the experience of Brahman or the Ultimate Reality by a sage. Gradually, an epistemology of this experience is implied on the analogy of tasting or drinking the Soma Rasa, i.e., both of them are direct or

perceptual cognitions of the gustatory order; and finally the ontology of Brahman is also described in terms of this experience, the beauty due to drinking of *Rasa*. When the experience of Brahman is alike the perceptual experience of *Rasa*, Brahman itself is *Rasa*. The situation may be explained somewhat in a phenomenological language - Reality is nothing other than what is actually given in the experience itself or the experience of Reality defines the nature of Reality. Now, Bharata uses this term *Rasa* to describe the experience of the audience and finally describes the drama both as a form of literature and as a performing art in terms of this experience. The delightful experience of the drama by the audience is *Rasa* and, therefore the drama itself is also *Rasa*.

But Bharata does not develop any logical structure to systematise this peculiar experience differentiating it from other kinds of human experience as Kant does. At least on this point Aristotle and Bharata are on par insofar as Aristotle does not develop a logic for his catharsis other than implying its analogy with the catharsis in mystic rituals and medical treatment. Bharata also defines the drama as representation (literally *anukrti*, *anukarana* meaning imitation) of the events of the whole creation. But excepting for a few stray uses of the word *anukrti* in the pre-Bharata Vedic texts implying the creation of man after the image of God or Reality, there is no logic of imitation as found in Plato and Aristotle to explain the relation between Reality and Phenomena.⁹ Another key term used by Bharata is *Bháva* which means primarily 'existence' (Reality) or (state of) being (*bhavanīti*). In its causative it also means that which brings something to existence or reality or being (*bhāvayanīti bhávā*) and Bharata uses the word *bháva* in this causative sense meaning the phenomenon which brings *Rasa* into existence by means of acting.¹⁰ He counts *Rasa* and *Bháva* as two out of five elements of the drama and stresses the interdependence of *Rasa* and *Bháva*: "Without *Bháva* there is no *Rasa* and without *Rasa* there is no *Bháva*. In acting each is attained by the other. Even as the aggregate of different curries and spices makes food tasty or seed begets a tree and a tree bears flowers and fruits, so also *Bháva* brings *Rasa* into existence and vice versa."¹¹ The same point he repeats in a different language: "*Bháva* brings the aims of poetry (i. e., *Rasa*) into existence."¹² Poetry (*Kāvya*) does not refer here to any autonomous genre but the dramatic text (or the dialogues) which is to be read (*páthyam*) by the actors and actresses at the time of the theatrical performance. Bharata wants to say that the aim of the dramatic text is not to be read. Its aim is *Rasa*, and *Bhavas* bring this *Rasa* into existence through acting.¹³

Having thus defined *Bháva*, Bharata counts its number as eight : love, laughter, sorrow, anger, courage, fear, disgust and wonder, and now it becomes

clear that *Bháva* means a (permanent) mental state or emotion.¹⁴ It is in this sense that Bharata's commentator interprets *Bháva* as *Cittavrtti* (literally 'mental states')¹⁴. Corresponding to these eight emotions Bharata mentions eight *Rasas* and states that in the theatre when determinants (characters and situations), consequents (gestures and postures or histrionics) and transitory mental states (the facial expressions of different feelings) are combined *Bháva* (or *Stháyi Bháva*) brings its corresponding *Rasa* into existence (or generates *Rasa*,) i.e., *Bháva* (Emotion) of love generates *Rasa* of Love, *Bháva* of Anger generates *Rasa* of Anger etc. The sole aim of the dramatic performance is in fact the generation of this *Rasa*.¹⁵

Bharata describes the nature of *Rasa* as a direct perceptual experience on the basis of the nature of its sensory character. *Rasa* as a delicious juice is experienced by our gustatory sense organ. So also the dramatic *Rasa* is experienced by the audience, as it were, gustatorily. Bharata writes:

As people delightfully eat the food prepared with several ingredients (curries, spices etc.) and are therefore called *Sumanasah* (persons with delightful mind), so also the audience, who relish (or taste) the permanent emotion in combination with verbal, physical and mental acting are called *Sunmanasah*. (like the varieties of food eaten delightfully the permanent emotions are also relished in the theatre; these permanent emotions are) therefore called dramatic *Rasa*.¹⁶

The use of *Rasa* for the relishable permanent emotion or *Stháyi Bháva* in the theatre is therefore metaphorical. The language that Bharata uses is obviously Upanisadic i.e. the language of metaphor and therefore the whole of his composition contains descriptive accounts of the several constituents of the theatre and a poetic account of the emotional delight of the audience. His hedonistic account of the dramatic experience is also very clear in the very first chapter of his *Nátyasástra* where he describes the nature of the theatre by an analogy of toy -Brahmá, the proto-creator, devised the theatrical art as an audiovisual toy (*Krīḍanīyaka*) meant for an innocent enjoyment of the audience.¹⁷ Another purpose of the theatre is of course to provide an overall information about the human culture as a whole including the law of causality. But this is only secondary, the primary object of the theatre being wholesome delight. Viewed from another angle, Bharata's treatise was granted the status of authority (*Sástra*) because it aimed at a mass culture, at an enlightenment of all classes of the contemporary Indian society through the theatre. In other words, as an antidote to the enlightenment by the rigorous contemplation of the Upanisads and moral practices of the Pali Buddhism, the theatre as a mass medium served the purpose by harmless hedonistic means.¹⁸

Bharata's language was inevitably uncritical because he had no philosophical background to provide him with the tools for systematic critical vocabulary. By the time he composed his treatise there were only two sources of thought available: the Upanisads and the preachings of the Buddha in Pali language. If the language of the former was poetic, the latter had no impact upon the orthodox Hindu culture¹⁹. Among the orthodox philosophical systems Sāṅkhya is the oldest one which had its origin in the Upanisadic poetry and developed to a system two centuries after Bharata - in the *Mahābhārata* (2nd c. B.C.), Caraka (78 A.D.) and Iśvarakṛṣṇa (100 A.D.) - taking a course of three centuries for its sizable growth. Similarly, the Mahāyāna branch of Buddhism that exerted a great influence on the later orthodox systems of logic and metaphysics was born more or less five centuries after Bharata. It is therefore futile to expect any critical strength from the language of the *Nāṭyaśāstra*. However, Bharata's idea of a combination of determinants etc. generating the dramatic *Rasa* in the audience might have been an analogy framed after the Upanisadic creation of the world as a combination of different elements such as fire, water and earth and the Pali Buddhist idea of the five *Khandhas* or aggregates of physical and psychical states as categories of understanding.

The first critic who suggested a logic of emotions is most probably Patañjali (2nd c. B.C.) who in his axioms on the Yoga system thought of the mental states (*cittavṛtti*) in terms of psychospiritual logic. There are five mental states or the functions of the mind: valid cognition, invalid cognition, imagination, sleep and memory. Permanent emotions such as love, fear and anger are the memory-contents and are basically the impressions (*samskāra*) of the mind's experiences of different events and objects in terms of pleasure, pain and indifference. Patañjali believes in the cycle of an individual's births and deaths through which the mind remains constant in accumulating the impressions of experiences from eternity till date and this whole mass of impressions is called *Vāsanā* (lit. desire). Therefore it does not matter whether a man has experienced an emotion in a particular life time; an emotion is permanent in the sense that if not in a particular life, one must have experienced it in one previous life and therefore must have retained it in form of *Vāsanā*.²⁰

Although Patañjali does not deal with the theatre, his system of the mental states provides, perhaps for the first time, a critical support for the relishability of an emotion. He mentions that the five states of the mind may be either afflicted or unafflicted according to one's attachment with the experiences (as caused by ignorance or *avidyā*) leading to suffering, and detachment from the experiences (as caused by wisdom or *ātambharā prajñā*) leading to liberation.²¹

When applied to Bharata, Patanjali's notion of the unafflicted mental states illuminates the *Rasa* nature of a permanent emotion insofar as it explains that an emotion with an individual attachment, such as found in our day-to-day life, is afflicted and therefore causes suffering. If it is free from any individual attachment it is unafflicted and leads the limited ego toward the absolute consciousness which is wholesomely delightful. This is what Bharata wants to say precisely when his Brahma advises the demon audience to avoid their individual identity with the events and characters of the theatre.²¹

Patanjali's classification and criteria of mental states may be said to break the ground for an epistemology of aesthetic experience and as evidenced by history, Patanjali's philosophy of mind, consciousness and self was of great significance for the origin of aesthetics and for its later developments. Patanjali's own time was also of great importance for the rise of Indian epic in its oral form. *The Rāmāyana* and *The Mahābhārata* were composed during the 2nd century B.C. following which two great Sanskrit poets Asvaghosa and Kālidasa established the written epic tradition that continued till the end of the 7th century A.D. This was also the time when Sanskrit drama rose to its apex both in its literary form and theatrical performance. Besides, all the art forms—verbal, visual and musical—attained their autonomy freeing them from subordination to the dramatic art of pre-Christian era. Alongside, different philosophical schools of Sanskrit Buddhism and Orthodox Hinduism had their prolific growth and remarkable sophistication. But aesthetics as the philosophical inquiry into the conceptual issues in different art forms did not proceed beyond the inaugural hints offered by Patanjali. Of course poetics originated in its rhetorical form with Bhāmaha (7th c. A.D.) belonging to the age which marks the end of the great classical epic tradition of Bhāravi and Māgha. Far from being philosophical - searching the ontological, epistemological and linguistic issues in the art of poetry - Bhāmaha and his successors continuously for two centuries to follow engaged themselves only in enumerating the formal properties of the language of poetry. The beauty of poetic art, they thought, lies in the figures of speech or verbal ornaments (*alankāra*) relating both to the sounds (*śabda*) and the senses (*artha*) of language. Commenting on this situation professor S.K. De, an authority on the history of Sanskrit poetics observes :

Sanskrit poetics started as a purely empirical, and more-or-less mechanical study. It took the poetic product as a created and finished fact, and forthwith went to analyse it as such, without pausing to consider its relation to the process of poetic creation as the expressive activity of the human spirit. It chose to deal with what was already expressed, never bothering itself with the whys and

wherefores of expression..... never quite drew away from its analytic verbal formalism into a truly theoretic discipline of aesthetic.²²

From Professor De's further observations it is made clear that the poeticians' methodology was along the descriptive technique of the great grammarian Pánini who thought of 'words as natural, mechanical facts to be collected in their greatest possible variety and grouped in fixed classes and types.'²³ Professor De insightfully interprets the rhetoricians' conception of poetry framed on the analogy of painting that had already attained its culmination in the caves of Ajanta and Ellora and also found mention in the canonical portions of *Visnudharmottarapurána* (6th c. A.D.). It is not improper to think that the Sanskrit notion of 'picture-poetry' (*citrakávyá*) was construed on the formal similarity between poetry and painting. De writes :

The standpoint is similar to that of an art of painting which confines itself to a collection of information about the techniques of tempera, oil painting, water colour, and pastels about the proportions of the human anatomy, and about the laws of perspective, forgetting that a painted picture is more than a mere ingenious application of such knowledge or device. It regarded poetry as a more or less mechanical series of verbal devices in which a definite sense must prevail and which must be diversified by means of prescribed tricks of phrasing ... As the botanist or the zoologist labels and classifies every new representative of flora or fauna, the Sanskrit *álankárika*, pretending to find universals, calculates the particular species from the original four ornaments of Bharata to more than a hundred of Jayadeva.²⁴

The rhetoricians have, quite probably, adopted a joint method of Pánini's generative semantics and the combinatorics of painting. But while the generative principle is useful in grammar, it creates a chaos in poetry by exploiting the inexhaustibility of individual poetic expressions to an infinite number. "The universals of a formal analysis are of a doubtful theoretic value for explaining the principle of concrete individual expression itself."²⁵

A moment of reflection on the theoretical hints on the visual arts as made by the *Visnudharmottara* surprises the reader that while Bharata's notion of *Rasa* was applied to the visual arts,²⁶ the poeticians were completely silent about this application although they followed the formal techniques of the visual arts. One might be tempted to interpret the Sanskrit figures of speech in the light of the modernist account of poetry as painting. But before doing so one must remember that the imagist critics had a definite ontological perspective in attributing a spatial character to the verbal arts. The idea of poetry as figures of speech may refer to an epistemological system which advocates for man's

experience in terms of images and may argue for a theoretical base of the figures of speech in differentiating common man's perceptual knowledge from the poet's under the criterion that while the common man understands the subjects in their own terms, the poet understands the subjects in terms of analogues. Since the analogues vary according to the changes in various cultural complexes, the number of the figures of speech may change or increase infinitely. In that case the rhetoricians' idea of the figures of speech as ornaments warns the critic for an immediate approval of this epistemological view of the figures of speech. The whole notion of the rhetoricians is based on a presupposition that ornaments make a woman beautiful. If poetry is a verbal form, then verbal ornaments can only beautify it. Therefore poetry is a body of ornamental language. But when this major premise is rejected, as has been done long before by Kalidasa who viewed beauty as a unique form which does not need any embellishment - rather embellishes the very ornaments put on it,²⁷ the whole theory crumbles down. However, an epistemology of images did develop in the later course of Indian thought with which we shall be acquainted soon after.

When the ornament theory was found to be dissatisfactory later critics like Dandī (8th c A.D.) and Vámana (8th-9th c.) attempted some other theories which were once again based on the formal qualities of poetic language. Their attention shifted from only one aspect to another aspect of the poetic language, the method of their enquiry remaining the same. When Vámana defined poetry not in terms of words with various meanings but with different formal arrangements of words (*Rīti*) or Dandi defined poetry in terms of certain verbal qualities (*Guna*), they followed the same method of Pānini's generative semantics - falling prey to enumeration of infinite number of qualities or formal arrangements based on empirical data and arbitrary labelling. If poetry is defined in terms of formal arrangement of verbal expression peculiar or popular in a particular geographical zone then question will arise as to the number and justification of such zones. The point is that these critics failed to found a system of linguistics that would justify their claim that only particular type or types of verbal composition can be called poetry, not others.²⁸

From the failures of these critics in founding a system or systems of aesthetics what emerges as the most significant point is that these critics were already grappling with the relevant areas of learning that would constitute the branch what is termed 'aesthetics' in the contemporary vocabulary. These areas are ontology, epistemology, psychology, linguistics and cultural studies. Indian philosophical systems that started in the 2nd century B.C. the six major systems of orthodox philosophy along with philosophy of grammar fathered by Patanjali

and the different schools of Sanskrit Buddhism with their intellectual debates as well as esoteric practices in mystic rites contributed much to the foundation of an aesthetic system in the 9th and 10th centuries that finalised most of the significant issues concerning the fine arts—their nature, function and values in human society.

II

In the mid-ninth century a critic named Rájánaka Anandavardhana rose to prominence in Kashmir for his treatise on poetry popularly known as *The Light of Dhvani* (*Dhvanyaloka*). This treatise was also entitled *The Light of Poetry* (*Kávyáloka*) and *The Light of Sahrdaya* (*Sahrdayáloka*) which literally means 'The Light of a Like-hearted Man'. Besides this critical text, Ananda also wrote two narrative poems one of them being in Prakrt, one hundred hymns to the Mother Goddess (*Devísataka*), a commentary on the Buddhist logical text *Pramānaviniscaya* by Dharmakīrti (about 635 A.D.) and a philosophical text named *Tattvóloka* (*The Light of Tattva* lit. Truth or Reality).²⁹ The area of Anandavardhana's authorship is vast enough to cover both the creative and critical endeavours that engaged the Indian mind for the last one thousand years. As evidenced by the only extant text out of the several mentioned- the one on poetics, Anandavardhana was vastly erudite so as to be very well acquainted with the entire range of knowledge from the Vedic ages till his date. Particularly his knowledge of the non- dualistic school of thought called *Trika* (Triadic) system in contemporary Kashmir was profound. And it is on the ground of this system that he framed his poetics which he named significantly *The Light of Sahrdaya*. Poetry is no more a subject of descriptive linguistics dealing with the generation of meanings of individual words or of the meanings of the different arrangements of words. Empirical formalisation is abandoned in the emergence of a poetics with a strong value-loaded foundation constituted by several areas of human thinking at once-ontology, epistemology, linguistics, philosophy of language and human values that are determined in socio-cultural contexts. Following the Upanisadic model Anandavardhana sought for the reality of poetry not in its body but in its soul. Like all other types of discourse poetry is now considered a discourse dealing with the soul or the truth, the Reality and like all other schools of philosophy, poetics is now a school of thought that determines the way by which poetry attains the truth. Poetry is therefore defined by Anandavardhana not in terms of its body - ornaments or types of verbal expressions, but in terms of its soul "Dhvani is the soul of poetry". Appropriately speaking, this is the birth of Indian aesthetics in the modern sense of the term.

This new branch of studies, aesthetics in general and poetics in particular, is now given the name of *Sahrayatattva*. In his commentary on Anandavardhana's treatise Abhinavagupta (10th c.) describes the nature of poetics in the very introductory stanza - "Let this branch of learning called *Kavi-sahrdaya tattva*, Philosophy of Poet and the 'Man of like-heart' (or Reader), be victorious." To put it precisely, aesthetics means, in this (Indian) context, the Philosophy of Art and Audience.

Although initially there is a dualism between the artist and the audience i.e., the poet or artist is differentiated from the reader or audience, ultimately the basic non-dual metaphysics of the Saiva School fuses the dualism of the artist and the audience. A poet generates a poem by his specific non-sensuous cognition which is called *Pratibhá* or *Pratibhajnána* meaning literally a 'flash' or 'flash of intuition'. The epistemological status of this non-sensuous cognition was accepted by the great philosophers of language Patanjali and Bhartrhari and was maintained by the Saiva school with some modification. According to Patanjali *Pratibhá* is an extraordinary power of the mind by which it can cognise the non-sensuous objects. By this power one can know everything. But the Saiva school modifies the dualistic nature of this *Pratibhá* cognition of Patanjali in holding that it is not the function of the mind (*citta*) which distinguishes among the cogniser, cognition and the cognised. It is the function of consciousness (*citi*) that negates all sorts of dualism in the subject-object relations.³⁰ In this sense it is non-sensuous and is the only means of experiencing the highest Reality which is nothing other than pure consciousness itself. A poet's cognition is of this kind. He experiences the non-sensuous in its sensuous manifestation and this experience unfolds the evernewness of this non-sensuous consciousness which results in the world of poetry.

On the side of the audience, the same non-sensuous epistemology is also explained by the term *Sahrdaya*. *Hrdaya* or heart is an established metaphor for consciousness in Indian philosophy. Professor K.H. Potter rightly observes:

Indian philosophers use this term (the heart) to mean the place within the body where feeling, willing, thinking and so forth take place. It does not necessarily denote the physical organ which goes by that name in Indian anatomy.³¹

The primary Saiva texts such as *Vijnábhairava* and Vasugupta's *Siva sutras* state:

Hrdaya means the light of consciousness inasmuch as it is the foundation of the entire universe.

He whose mind together with the other senses is merged in the ether of the heart, who has entered mentally into the centre of the two bowls of the heart-lotus, who has excluded everything else from consciousness acquires the highest fortune.³²

Abhinavagupta finally clarifies the metaphor of heart in the following passage:

Hrdaya means mainstay or resting place. According to formerly established theory, the insentients rest in the sentient and the latter rests in the light of consciousness, with which it is one. The place of the rest of this also is the power, the free consciousness. Therefore, in different authoritative texts, the same is spoken of as the resting place of the universe, which ultimately rests in Parama Siva, the highest abode of all. The Heart, the resting place of all, is *Mantra*, which in its essence, is nothing but free-consciousness which also is simply the power of the transcendental speech.³³

The heart therefore is a metaphor of consciousness as the absolute Reality, highest level of language, the seat as well as the body of all-inclusive experience—both immanent and transcendental forms of willing, knowing and feeling. Abhinavagupta explaining the nature of audience as *Sahridaya* applies this Saiva concept of heart which connotes both the ontological and epistemological aspects of the metaphor. Ontologically it means pure consciousness, and epistemologically it is both subjects and objects of knowledge. Abhinavagupta writes: "They are *Sahridayas* who, by continuous practice of reading poetry, have earned the qualification for being one with the narration (of poetry) as reflected in the transparent mirror of their mind."³⁴ Mind is used for heart in this context and it implies the same epistemological situation, i.e., the subject-object fusion, as in the case of *Pratibhā*. Both the poet and the reader are in this sense *Sahridayas* and their cognition is non-sensuous in the sense that the word of poetry is independent of the external world of senses, its ontic entity being pure consciousness, and the reader also understands this world without any reference to the world outside. Language and consciousness being identified, the signifier and the signified lose their separation.

Suspending all details for some other appropriate occasion it is sufficient to note that the Saiva ontology and epistemology are specially qualified for founding a system of aesthetics which was not possible in the early phase of Indian history although different ideas remained scattered here and there. The Sāṅkhya dualism, the Vedānta monism and the Buddhist momentary existence could not explain the nature of art since a philosophy of art presupposes the truth of both an art work and the audience and finally explains the relation

between the two in logical terms. This has not been possible for the earlier systems which have failed to relate the dual realities, considered the world unreal and viewed its existence as changing instantly. But only Saivism has consistently argued for the truth of both the worlds - transcendental and phenomenal, the latter being a necessary aspect of the former.³⁵

Abhinavagupta the final exponent of this system made a historic contribution to Indian aesthetics by providing Bharata's idea of *Rasa* with a systematic philosophical foundation and correlating his idea of the audience (*sumanas*) with the reader of poetry on the ground of the Saiva concept of *Sahrdaya* - in a way extending its connotation to an art-audience unity in general. In identifying an aesthetic audience with *Sámájika* (social being) he has also strongly implied the social value of a work of art that educates a man finally for realisation of the supreme Reality. On an integrated aesthetic system by correlating Bharata and Anandavardhana he founded the arts of the theatre and poetry and criticised other arts such as painting and music. This he did by absorbing the philosophical schools of the last twelve centuries—the Sāṅkhya-Yoga, Buddhism, Grammar, Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā - without ever losing the consistency of his own system of which he was rightly considered the greatest master.

III

A successful correlation of ontology, epistemology and philosophy of language in the Saiva system of aesthetics is evident in its understanding of the art of poetry; and the credit for this correlation goes to both Anandavardhana and his commentator Abhinavagupta. Three alternative titles of Anandavardhana's treatise on poetry make his point clear that poetry is basically an experience of a *Sahrdaya*, i.e., the experience of pure consciousness or the highest level of language. This is the ontology of poetry and is named *Dhvani*. This theory is basically modelled upon grammar, but not on the descriptive grammar of Pāṇini as was the case with the rhetoricians. It drew upon the fundamentals of philosophy of grammar fathered by Patanjali. But eliminating the empirical, and therefore the dualistic, aspects of his theory it modelled itself upon Bhartrhari's philosophy of a transcendental language which he identified with the highest Reality; its nature being Pure Consciousness. Bhartrhari's system was highly influential on the Saiva metaphysics as a whole and Anandavardhana competently utilised the basic structure of Bhartrhari's system of language in building up his theory of verbal art.

According to Bhartrhari there are three levels of language (i) the highest one which is transcendental *Pasyantī* as opposed to (ii) the lowest which is purely physical or phenomenal *Vaikhari*, and (iii) the mediating one between

these two extremes (*Madhyamā*). The phenomenal world is known or understood by the phenomenal language and therefore the structure of this world is determined by the structure of this phenomenal language. In other words, the world is a linguistic construction the knowledge of which is determined by the language we use. The way we experience the world - by perception, inference and verbal testimony - is the way we construct it linguistically either by external expression or by internal thinking. Knowledge is a linguistic phenomenon: *Veda* (knowledge) and *sābda* (word) are identical both in the phenomenal and transcendental levels. Since the Veda (four Vedas taken collectively) is the virtual image of Brahman or the highest Reality, it is the source of all knowledge, of all the sciences and arts and of all the written traditions of human origin. Although Bhartrhari admits of preception and inference as the valid means of knowledge, the status of the Vedic testimony stands highest among them, particularly in experiencing the highest Reality.

Significantly, Bhartrhari considers another means of knowledge - the fourth one' i.e., *Pratibhā* or flash of intuition which is extremely necessary in understanding a text - both Vedic and non- Vedic. This is something non-sensuous as noted in human intelligence of a high order, instinct of birds, animals and spontaneous activities of the babies; and as such its degree varies according to the nature and the impression of the past lives of the being concerned. At one stage, Bhartrhari identifies this intuition with Pasyantī level of language as also with Prakṛti which is the source of the manifested world and the words that structure it. The highest stage in Bhartrhari's ontology is Parā Prakṛti the ultimate Reality which is pure consciousness that transcends Prakṛti or the manifested world constituted by three stuffs or qualities (*gunas* literally constituents or strands of a rope) such as *sattva* (intelligence), *rajas* (energy) and *tamas* (matter). Necessarily this Reality also transcends the three levels of language that correspond to the three constituents. Human enlightenment, as observed by Bhartrhari, refers to one gradual elevation from manifested world of phenomea i.e., world of matter, energy and intelligence/*vaikharī*, *madhyamā* and *Pasyantī/Vyākaraṇa*, *Vaikaranyā* and *Pratibhā* to the pure consciousness which is translinguistic and transphenomenal.

The central philosophy of Anandavardhana's poetics draws on Bhartrhari's ontology, epistemology and linguistics. He wants to say that poetry is basically a linguistic phenomenon. But the experience which it communicates does not refer to the worlds of matter (*Tamas/Vastu*) or energy (*Rajas/events/images*) corresponding to the *Vaikharī* and *Madhyamā* levels of language and therefore cannot be communicated either by denotation (*abhidhā*) or by tropes or figures of speech (*lakṣanā*). It refers to the experience of the third level, i.e., *Pasyantī* which requires

some other linguistic potency (*sákti*) or function (*vr̥tti*) for its communication, and this potency must be predominated by the *Sattva* (intelligence) stuff of Prakṛti since this stuff predominates Pasyantí itself. This third potency is 'revelation' or *vyānjaná*. The experience of this third level is essentially the experience of the ultimate Reality or Pure Consciousness; therefore perception, inference and verbal testimony of the denotational or figural order are not the means of this experience. Pratibhā, predominated by *Sattva* (and therefore identified with Pasyantí) is the only means for experiencing this, although, as Bhartrhari has observed, perception, reasoning and ordinary verbal activity may be interdependently complementary for such experience.³⁶

There is a difference between the experience of this Pasyantí level by a poet and that by a yogin who wants to transcend even this level in order that he may reach the fourth, the highest level of experience - Pará Prakṛti of Bhartrhari and Parama Siva of the Kashmirian Saivism. A yogin loses his personal identity in his struggle for transcending this level of *Sattva* stuff. But the poet, even while losing his individuality, experiences this consciousness as *coloured* (*uparāñjita*) by different emotions which are ordinarily constituted by three *gunas*, but in the Pasyantí level predominated only by *Sattva*. The peculiarity of these *Sattva*-emotions is this that they are wholesomely delightful, not painful or otherwise as in the lower levels where they are constituted by all the three *gunas*. Experiences of emotions in this third level is otherwise called *Rasa* or aesthetic experience due to verbal art. In poetry this *Rasa* is communicated by the tertiary potency of language called *Vyānjaná* and this *Rasa* is otherwise called *Dhvani*.³⁷

Anandabardhana borrows the word *dhvani* from Patanjali and Bhartrhari who have used this word to mean a "physical sound". They hold that an utterance of a word (*dhvani*) comprises several individual sounds. One may be sceptic about the acoustic unity of the sound of a word, because we do not hear it at a time. In the sequence of the utterance of the parts of the whole sound the totality of the acoustic image is lost. Therefore the necessary relation between the signifier and the signified cannot be established. But these grammarians say that the parts of the whole sound are not lost. They remain in a form which is called technically *Sphota* (from the root *sphut* = to manifest, to blow). As a bud is blown into a flower unfolding its petals, so also the word manifests itself when the *dhvani* or utterance of sound is completed.³⁸

Using this notion of a word analogically in the context of poetics, Anandavardhana and Abinavagupta hold that as *dhvani* manifests *sphota*, so also language in poetry unfolds the experience of Pasyantí by its specific power called *Vyānjaná* or revelation. By extension, *dhvani* is used both for the signifier and

the signified - for the language of poetry and the experience it signifies. *Dhvani*, *Pasyantí* and *Rasa* are identical in the context of poetry.

A poet experiences emotions in their *sattva* forms in Paśyanti level by his *Pratibhā*. When communicated, a reader shares the poet's experience (as a *Sahridaya* or man of like-heart) also by the same means, i.e., *Pratibhā*.

A point to note further: although *Sattva*-emotions are experienced by the poet, it is not that objects, events (*vastu*) and images (*alankāra*) are completely excluded. They may also be experienced in their *sattva* forms. But, Abhinavagupta observes, they aspire toward emotions.³⁹ The implication is that emotions are the final stuff of our experience. In other words, we experience objects and images of the world in terms of our emotional reactions to them.

Applied Aesthetics: aesthetics as treatment of the whole human world as a piece of art.

Both the views of aesthetics - as philosophy of art and the philosophy of criticism - treat aesthetics as an esoteric discipline, a philosophical inquiry into the nature, meaning and function of the arts with a presupposition that artworks are necessarily artifacts and as such are opposed to the natural world. But presently this opposition has been subverted in the wake of new disciplines called 'applied aesthetics' and 'environmental aesthetics' which prefer to go back to the traditional meaning of aesthetics - as proposed by Kant, Schelling and few others - appreciation of natural beauty and of the sublime in nature. Apart from the philosophical inquiries into and contemplative appreciation of beauty in nature and art, applied aesthetics proposes deliberate application of aesthetic values and principles to activities, objects and environment that practically matter for human life and existence - buildings, institutions, relationship, vehicles, media and behaviour and so on and so forth. It is an act of beautification of man's life and all that concerns it. In other words, aesthetics does not mean only an emotional experience and/or an intellectual analysis of this experience as well as the object of this experience; it is also an activity encompassing both the mental and physical dimensions that intend to improve the human existence as a whole - social, political, moral, technical, clinical and all such areas that contribute to human culture as a whole by a set of programmes and projects. Theories of beauty in nature and art are applied in such projects and programmes. Such a situation subverts the difference between the artist as creator of art and the audience as observer of art. The audience is no other than the artist who creates what he enjoys. It is a participation, an engagement in creation which is also the act of enjoyment itself.

Arnold Berleant, one of the exponents of environmental aesthetics, prefers to call it the "aesthetics of engagement" which, he believes, "leads to a restructuring of aesthetic theory ... in which the continuity of engagement in the natural world replaces the contemplative appreciation of a beautiful object or scene". He defines environment as "nature experienced, nature lived" and distinguishes environmental aesthetics from applied aesthetics from a strong theoretical perspective:

Environmental aesthetics, therefore, does not concern buildings and places alone. It deals with the conditions under which people join as participants in an integrated situation. Because of the central place of the human factor, an aesthetics of environment profoundly affects our social understanding of human relationship and our social ethics. An environmental aesthetics of engagement suggests deep political changes away from hierarchy and its exercise of power and toward community where people freely engage in mutually fulfilling activities. It implies a human family order that relinquishes authoritarian control and encourage cooperation and reciprocity. It leads toward acceptance, friendship and love that abandon exploitation and possessiveness and promote sharing and mutual empowerment.⁴⁰

II

Berleant's observation that all aesthetics is in some sense practical and that art as a man-made object must have had some use, a purpose to fulfil holds true of the history of Indian art and aesthetics. In Bharata's account Brahma's invention of the drama was primarily meant for the enjoyment of the audience - a 'toy' to play with. But this utility, when further explained by Bharata in terms of emotional experience, is not exactly what the applied aestheticians mean by aesthetics in practice. Emotional character of aesthetic experience is unpractical in the best sense of the term. There might have been another purpose behind this invention of the drama - a political one - a strategy of the Hindus to attract the *mass* (common people) withdrawing their attention to the popular preachings of Buddhism. When the highly esoteric practices of the Vedic rituals denied the mass an entry into those for their enlightenment, the Buddhists initiated them to their easily accessible ethical refinement. Under the plea for a mass culture, the Hindus contrived the drama, the fifth Veda, intended for the refinement of the mass through hedonistic experience which was even much easier a way than the Buddhist's moral codes of conduct. But, even in this sense 'Bharata's account of the drama is not an example of 'applied aesthetics' or 'aesthetics in practice'.⁴¹

What these recent movements demand was already in practice in India early in the Christian era. As evident from a treatise on erotics by Vátsyáyana a strong sense of environmental beauty was already established by the 3rd century

A.D. Vātsyāyana traced an erotic origin of the arts and considered the erotic sensibility the very core of human life and environment. In his thought aesthetic delight is a form of erotic ecstasy - a notion even endorsed by the authorities of the Vedas. According to his system, therefore, art or *Kalā* does not refer only to man-made artifacts such as literature, music and the fine arts. The word literally means a technique - a skill primarily for attracting the opposite sex. The erotic engagement being the paradigm art, the sexual behaviour must be guided by a strong sense of beauty and novelty. While illustrating several ways of erotic behaviour such as kissing, embracing, scratching including even the postures of sexual union, Vātsyāyana observes that they are all expressions of the couple's desire for enjoying each other as forms of art. He counts as many as sixty-four arts including even cooking, use of cosmetics, costume, theft, gambling, animal training, archery, gardening, mining, house keeping along with the fine arts, acting, dancing, literature and architecture. Any activity belonging to natural science or emotional behaviour, is called an art if it aims at making life delightful and worth living.⁴²

All these arts are, in a way, subordinate to the principal art of erotic union. According to Vātsyāyana, social status of a man is determined not so much by wealth or erudition, as much by his knowledge of and training in the sixty-four arts and their application in his erotic behaviour. The description of a standard citizen's (*nāgaraka*) residence, his conduct and life-style, and the detailed information about the civilized pattern of life in ancient India evince a strong awareness of environmental aesthetics and application of aesthetic principles in the matters of daily life.⁴³

The most important of all was the application of the fundamental principles of aesthetic experience to viewing the world with all its environmental perspectives - experience of the world, the whole creation as a piece of art.⁴⁴ This is in fact the central philosophy of Saivism where the ultimate Reality, Pure Consciousness named Parama Siva, is both the artist of the manifested world and the audience of his own art eternally immersed in experiencing its unending beatitude named *Rasa*. Once this basic attitude is accepted, aesthetics of engagement and application of principles of art in practical spheres of human life appear only as extensions of this attitude operating in different channels of relative importance. Vātsyāyana's aesthetic view of human relationship and of the existence of human life itself is a necessary outcome of the fundamental aesthetic attitude of Indian culture which was initially pronounced by the Upanisads, subsequently elaborated by Bharata and his commentators, particularly by the Śaiva critical theorists, determining the enormous implications and the vast scope of aesthetical thinking to be pursued

by generations to come. Aesthetics in India, therefore, remains happy within its limitless boudaries and does neither desire nor require to go beyond them.

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The Dangers of 'Aesthetic Education'

DAVID BEST

What is aesthetic education ? Which ability or potential in students is it the concern of aesthetic education to try to develop ? In this paper I want to suggest that the use of the term 'aesthetic education' may be misleading in ways which incur not merely terminological confusions, but errors of educational substance. I submit that at best it is not always clear which interests or activities are designated by the term, and that at worst it may be construed in ways which can be potentially harmful, in a practical sense, to educational policy.

The Aesthetic Attitude

I have considered elsewhere the common failure to distinguish the aesthetic from the artistic.¹ The artistic is still almost universally conflated with the aesthetic, or at least any distinction between the two concepts is blurred and confused. This is a complex issue which it would be too much of a diversion to elaborate here since I am concerned to draw attention to its consequences for education. It is sufficient merely to show that there are two distinct concepts which are often, and surprisingly, conflated. This conflation can be seen in the prevalent notion that there is, to put it roughly, a *general* aesthetic attitude which applies to and can be developed by experience of either natural phenomena, such as sunsets, birdsong, mountains and flowers, or the arts. For instance, Beardsley writes: "the concept of aesthetic value as a distinct kind of value enables us to draw a distinction that is indispensable to the enterprise of art criticism"², and later "many natural objects, such as mountains and trees.... seem to have a value that is closely akin to that of artworks. This kinship can easily be explained in terms of aesthetic value...."³. Carritt⁴ and Hepburn⁵ express the view that experience of natural beauty may be indistinguishable from that of art, while Urmson⁶ takes natural beauty to be the paradigm case from which the aesthetic attitude to the arts is derived. Wollheim⁷ takes the opposite view and criticises those accounts of the aesthetic attitude, such as those of Kant, and Bullough, which take as central "cases which are really peripheral or secondary; that is, cases where what we regard as a work of art is, in point of fact, a piece of uncontrived nature"

It should be noticed that all these views accept without question that there is only one concept or attitude involved. Disagreement arises over the question of whether the arts, or natural beauty, respectively, are the paradigm expression of it. Yet, as Beardsmore⁸ argues, in an interesting paper on this

issue: there are aspects of art appreciation which cannot be understood if one thinks of our reactions to a play as a complicated version of our reactions to a rose. And there are aspects of the love of nature which make no sense if one has before one's mind the way in which people respond to paintings and sculptures.

He also points out that it is possible to imagine a society in which there is no appreciation of the arts, yet still a love of natural beauty, and indeed that this is to some extent true, for example of children, in our society.

But perhaps the clearest way to show that there are two distinct concepts involved here, and thus that the notion of general aesthetic attitude, in this sense, is misleading, is to draw attention to the fact that almost anything can be considered from an aesthetic point of view, including works of art. Thus it is perfectly possible to consider at least many works of art from both an aesthetic and an artistic point of view. An example will illustrate what I mean. Many years ago I was privileged to attend a performance by Ram Gopal, the great Indian classical dancer. I was captivated by the superb quality of his performance, yet I was quite unable to understand it since I knew nothing of the significance of, for instance, the range of subtle and intricate hand gestures, each with precise meaning, characteristic of this mode of dance. It is clear that my appreciation was aesthetic not artistic. To take another example, an art lecturer of my acquaintance who had hung a painting he esteemed highly in a prominent position in his College was asked by the Principal to remove it since it did not blend with the decor. The Principal's concern was obviously with the aesthetic, whereas the lecturer's was with the artistic quality of the work.

This is not, of course, in the least to deny(a) that there are borderline cases, or cases where the two concepts are indistinguishable, and (b) that there is often a complex, interdependent relationship between them. For instance, where one *does* understand a dance performance, the aesthetic quality of the movements of a dancer is, perhaps usually, *intrinsic* to one's artistic appreciation of the dance. Similarly, considerations of the context in which it should hang are by no means irrelevant to artistic appreciation of a painting, and certainly an aesthetic appraisal of, for instance, the use of colours may be inseparable from artistic appreciation of a painting. Again, poetry may be aesthetically pleasing when it is read aloud even in a language one does not understand, yet clearly such aesthetic qualities as the sound of poetry are by no means irrelevant to an artistic appraisal of it. The works of Dylan Thomas and Verlaine are good examples, while this aspect of this work was so important to Gerard Manley Hopkins that he marked the syllables which he wanted to be stressed.

Aesthetic judgments may be made about anything. Hence a practical danger of the conflation is that it could be seen as legitimising a reduction, or even the elimination, of arts teaching in schools. 'Aesthetic education', regarded (unintelligibly) as the development of a general faculty, including the arts, could be achieved by taking children on nature-walks, watching sunset etc., without the unnecessary expense of arts resources, and teachers. That this is no abstract danger is shown by the examples in Primary schools cited by Rod Taylor.⁹

A further consideration of the distinction and relation between the aesthetic and artistic would seem to me to be of interest, and the issue would repay further thought (it is perhaps, especially important for the art form of dance) but it is beyond the scope of this paper. For my present purpose it is sufficient to show that there are two separable concepts here, and this can be achieved by pointing out that it is possible coherently to consider, from an aesthetic point of view, a work of art of which one has no understanding. The nature of the understanding involved raises an important consequence for the education which will be considered below.

Educational Justifications

With respect to education there are numerous examples of this elision of the aesthetic and the artistic, or the assumption that they are one and the same concept. Sometimes it is of no consequence that the terms are used interchangeably, or that 'aesthetic' is taken to be the generic term. But sometimes, as a consequence, justifications for the arts are assumed to apply equally to activities which are, or which are claimed to be, of primarily aesthetic interest. For instance, such a confusion is very common in the literature on physical education. example can be seen in Lowe¹⁰, while Anthony¹¹ and Reid¹² quote others. Often the arguments which incorporate this elision purport to offer an educational justification for physical education. It is assumed that there is no doubt about the educational credentials of the arts. (Some of us who, in the present hostile economic and educational climate, know what an uphill struggle it is to convince sceptics imbued with the prevailing materialism and scientism of the profound human value of the arts might be permitted a wry smile at such bland optimism - but that is by the way.) That is, the arts are taken to be unquestionably respectable educationally, and it is thought that, by showing the aesthetic value of physical education activities, it can be shown ipso facto that they have the same educational respectability. A classic case is a paper by Carlisle¹³, significantly entitled 'The concept of physical education'. Carlisle argues that the 'unifying concept' of physical education is the aesthetic, appearing to assume that, if his case is sound, the educational credentials of physical

education are as assured as those of the arts. (There are other confusions inherent in this way of thinking, which I have tried to expose elsewhere¹⁴.)

It is surprising that this distinction between the aesthetic and the artistic is so commonly overlooked. To say that a lady is beautiful is not to say that she is a work of art. Nor, despite the supposed aesthetic achievements of 'painted ladies', is the enterprise of trying to improve feminine appearances an art-form. Yet frequently it is assumed that because terms of aesthetic appraisal are commonly or normally applied to an object or activity that that is good reason for regarding it as an art-form. For instance, in support of her argument that sports can be classified as art, Ruth Saw¹⁵ writes:

Star performances in ice hockey, cricket, football, and sports generally are valued almost as much for their elegance as for their run-making or goal-getting ability... Sports commentators use the terms of aesthetic appraisal as freely as do art critics.¹⁶

I hope it is clear that I do not in the least wish to deny that there may be value in encouraging a developing interest in and appreciation of aesthetic aspects of sporting and physical education activities. My point is that it cannot be assumed that in doing so one is developing an attitude or ability which will necessarily contribute, or even have relevance, to one's understanding and appreciation of the arts.

Beauty

Some years ago a letter was written to a journal objecting to a paper in which I had argued for the objectivity of artistic appreciation. The author objected that my argument was a straw man, since, he insisted, the real issue, which has for centuries been the principal quest of philosophy of the arts, concerns such explicitly evaluative judgments as 'This is a beautiful painting'.

He was right that this has been the traditional quest of the philosophers, but the quest is thoroughly misconceived. It is the persistent conflation of the aesthetic and artistic which is the straw man: the traditional assumption that beauty (or, worse, Beauty) is the central issue is integral to it. Despite this still prevalent assumption (perhaps especially in continental Europe), questions of beauty are usually irrelevant to artistic appreciation. Imagine going to music concerts, plays, art-exhibitions etc with someone who says he appreciates these arts, yet who, when asked for his opinion of a work, always replies: 'It is (or is not) beautiful', or some similar comment. We ask his opinion of Shakespeare's *King Lear* and Dostoevsky's *The Brothers Karamazov*, and again he replies: 'They are beautiful'. If this were the only kind of response he made, that would

constitute good grounds for believing that he *lacked* the ability for artistic appreciation. One would be bewildered, for example, if, following a powerful production of Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure*, one were to be asked whether the play was beautiful. That may be an intelligible question about some works of art, for instance ballet, but for many it would make little or no sense. Even those with a high regard for Francis Bacon's works are unlikely to regard them as beautiful. Indeed, many artists would, justifiably, regard it as insulting to have their work discussed in terms of beauty. It has been said that beauty is what the bourgeoisie pays the artist for.

Artistic appreciation is rather revealed in the ability, for instance, to discuss, and purpose valid and perceptive interpretations, and to give reasons for what one values in a work.

In many cases aesthetic judgments may amount simply to individual preference or subjectivity taste, as, for instance, in the choice of ice cream, house-decorations etc. These may involve little or no rational or cognitive content. In other cases, such as gymnastics and other sports, valid aesthetic judgement certainly do require relevant understanding. Yet since aesthetic judgments can often be plausibly regarded as expression of mere subjective preference, to fail to distinguish the aesthetic and the artistic may be to connive in the perniciously prevalent misconception that artistic appreciation is also a matter of mere non-rational, subjective taste for preference, or that artistic values are merely a matter of individual psychology.

Thus, the failure to recognise the importance of the distinction between the aesthetic and the artistic may contribute largely to the trivialisation of the potential educational value of the arts.

Aesthetic Attitude

Even if, on the basis of the foregoing discussion, we now restrict our consideration to the aesthetic, properly so-called, the notion of general attitude of faculty may still be misleading. It cannot be assumed *a priori* the development of an increasing aesthetic appreciation, for instance of sunsets, mountain ranges and trees, will necessarily increase one's ability to appreciate the aesthetic quality of the movements of pole-vaulter or cricketer. To mention briefly just one important aspects of this issue, in order fully to appreciate the aesthetic aspects of an activity one frequently needs to have an understanding of it. One can intelligibly appraise the aesthetic quality of a movement only in terms of a context, although it may be implicit. For example, a movement which may be graceful in a ballet may be grotesque as part of a service action in tennis¹⁷.

And one can fully appreciate the elegance of a cover drive only if one knows something about cricket. Thus, at least in many cases, aesthetic quality is particular to a particular kind of activity, and may be recognisable or fully appreciated only by some one with some knowledge of that kind of activity.

Of course this is not to deny that the development of the ability of aesthetic appreciations may in some cases apply to more than one kind of activity. What the argument does reveal is that the notion of a general aesthetic ability can be misleading, and is obviously false if it is constructed as implying that the ability for aesthetic appreciation in one sphere will necessarily confer the ability for aesthetic appreciation in any other sphere - for instance of any object or activity.

Artistic Attitude

With respect to the arts, analogous notion, i.e. of a general artistic attitude, faculty or ability, is even more absurd. Again, this is not to deny that someone may reveal the ability to create or appreciate in various art-forms, or that, in particular cases, there may be a relation between one art-form and another, and thus, for instance, that to develop the ability to appreciate one may help in the appreciation of another. What I am denying is that such a relation can be assumed between any and all art-forms.

Some years ago I was invited to lecture at a college where I was asked to provide my student audience with general aesthetic criteria which they could apply across the board of the arts, as it were, i.e. to such diverse activities as dance, drama, music and the visual arts. There was some dismay at my arguing that the desire for such general criteria is fundamentally misconceived. Purported general criteria, such as unity, which were, and still are in some quarters, seized upon with relief as satisfying the seductive craving for a cross-artistic yardstick, can be seen to be of little value. For in some works precisely what is required is *disunity*. Virginia Woolf¹⁸ expresses the point in this view:

The mind received a myriad impression... Life is not a series of gig lamps symmetrically arranged; life is a luminous halo, a semi-transparent envelop surrounding us from the beginning of consciousness to the end ... Let us record that atoms as they fall upon the mind in order in which they fall, let us trace the pattern however disconnected and incoherent in appearance, which each sight or incident scores upon the consciousness.

It is this possibility of the arts which will almost always, and in my view admirably, frustrate attempts to draw up definitions and general criteria. For the artist's intention may be to express in his(her) work a conception which

contradicts any such proposed definition or general criterion. He may want to show that there are aspects of human experience which do not conform to it.

The classic, well-tryed move may follow, in order to defend the notion of a general criterion against such counter-examples. It may be said that even in disunity there is unity, in a certain sense. But the price of such a defence is high, since the criterion has been rendered vacuous. That is, the claim may certainly now be regarded as valid, but only at the cost of vacuity, since the re-defining of 'unity' in order to save the universal application of the criterion has removed the distinction between 'unity' and 'disunity'.

To cite a similar example, it was mentioned earlier that the aesthetic quality of the constituent movements is usually part of an artistic appreciation of a dance performance. But sometimes the point of a dance requires movements which are awkward or ugly, as, for example in Robert Cohan's *Cell*, which effectively expresses the choreographer's conception of the effects of the personal relationship of living in a competitive society.

I do not want to go so far as to insist that there can be no general criterion of artistic merit. That is, I do not wish to make the general point about art that there can be no general point of art. I am inclined to think that, to put it rightly, as a general criterion, it should not be possible to state comprehensively what the artist is trying to express except in terms of particular work of art. To the extent that this is possible, for instance where there is an explicit political or moral 'message' which is independently specifiable, then it is, in my view, necessarily, an artistic failing. But this is an issue which requires a separate paper. What is important for the present issue is that, in any case, it does not militate against, but rather supports, my main point that the notion of a general artistic attitude is misleading. For what it emphasises is that in order fully to appreciate the conception expressed in a work of art it is necessary to understand that particular art-form. One could not, as it were, be provided with some sort of 'ideal' external measuring rod which could be used to appraise the various arts.

This, of course, is the point of the so-called 'heresy of paraphrase', i.e. the notion that it is a 'heresy' to imagine that what is expressed in one work of art could be paraphrased in another. The same point is expressed in the aphorism that all the arts aspire to the condition of the music. What is meant by this is, I think, that in music more than in other art forms the inseparability of form and content is more often more immediately obvious, which is why it frequently sounds so odd to try to speak of the meaning of a piece of music (e.g. Bach's *Fifth Brandenburg Concerto*). Nevertheless, this characteristic is

equally, if less immediately obviously, true of other art-forms. As I suggested above, to the extent that the meaning can be expressed independently of the particular work of art, the work is a failure.

A qualification is necessary, as I indicated above. For I do not want to say that there is no relation at all between different art-forms. The arts grow out of and contribute to the life of people in a society. The emotions expressed in art, for instance, could not be understood without an understanding of the emotions of life generally. Hence different art-forms from the same socio- historical context may well reveal certain similarities or affinities, in a relatively broad, undifferentiated sense. And understanding one art-form may contribute to some extent to understanding another, since each has grown from a cultural ethos in isolation from which the arts would be incomprehensible. But ultimately, artistic appreciation is concerned with particular discrimination. The more deeply one becomes immersed in art- from, the more specific becomes one's capacity for appreciation, and thus the less does it make sense to conceive of general artistic attitude.

The Dangers

I have tried to indicate some of the ways in which the term 'aesthetic education' may tend to mislead. I hope it is clear that a consideration of the issues involved does not consist merely in an exercise in arid philosophical hair-splitting, perhaps of some esoteric academic interest, but of no practical relevance to education. It is relevant in at least two principal ways. First, where the term is taken to designate a general attitude or faculty, one consequence may be, as we have seen, the explicit claim, or implicit assumption, that by encouraging an aesthetic enjoyment or appreciation of, for instance, natural phenomena, or athletic movements, one is, or can be, helping children to develop ability for artistic enjoyment or appreciation. Such a confusion is quite natural if the distinction between the aesthetic and the artistic is overlooked. Although not explicitly formulated in this way, it seems fair to suggest that the underlying conception is that each of us has something like a general faculty which includes not only latent ability in arts such as music, poetry and painting, but also the potential for appreciating sunsets, birdsong and graceful movements. That is, the notion seems to be of a faculty which can be developed in any of these ways, rather as a muscle may be developed by various forms of exercise.

The conception only needs to be spelled out as explicitly as this to be revealed as absurd. for, to repeat the point, it could surely never be seriously supposed that increasing a child's awareness of the aesthetic quality of a gymnast will *ipso facto* increase his (her) capacity for the appreciation of poetry or music,

or that to develop an understanding of one art-form will necessarily give an understanding of others.

Unfortunately, it is not always explicitly spelled out, and this can have serious consequences, especially at this time of economic exigency in education. To take just one instance, I was told of the Principal of one college who, even in the relatively halcyon days before the onset of the current educational siege, was seriously considering the economy of closing down the visual arts teaching in the college on the grounds that the students' aesthetic education was catered for in their dance. Similar misconceptions are, unfortunately, by no means uncommon.

Of course one recognises that any school is limited in what it can teach. There is neither the time nor the available expertise to teach all the subjects which may be desirable in order to give students the breadth of experience which one would like ideally to offer to them. But at least let us face frankly the character of the problem. A single, general aesthetic or artistic faculty might be very convenient economically, but it is a myth. This is not to deny the meaningfulness of ascribing to someone a general understanding of the arts. But what it means is that he received a broad education in, for instance, music, sculpture, drama, poetry etc. There is no short cut through one of these avenues, which will somehow compensate for the lack of artistic experience and understanding in other art-forms.

Learning and Understanding: Art and Life

It is the second consequence of the distinction between the aesthetic and the artistic which seems to me by far the most important aspect of the issue educationally. For a failure to distinguish the two concepts might well incur a failure to recognise that the notions of learning and understanding are far more complex and wide-ranging for artistic appreciation than for aesthetic appreciation.

Let us approach the question by considering again the common misconception that the aesthetic and the artistic are aspects of the same, 'aesthetic' concept. For instance, as we have seen, Beardsley¹⁹ writes that:

many natural objects, such as mountains and trees... seem to have a value that is closely akin to that of artworks. This kinship can easily be explained in terms of aesthetic value...(p.746)

This seems to me much a remarkably implausible thing to say that one immediately suspects the influence of a deeply embedded, unquestioned preconception. For how, otherwise, could it be seriously supposed that Bach's *Goldberg Variations*, Ibsen's *A Doll's House*, a Japanese Noh play, and an Indian *raga* are 'closely

akin' to mountains and trees. Is there a 'kinship' between the oak tree in my garden, and the film *Schindler's List*? Can this supposed kinship be explained *at all*, let alone easily? The striking thing is that it never is explained, except by obviously unsatisfactory resort to vague metaphysical notions such as Forms of Beauty, a mysterious transcendent Aesthetic etc. There is just an unsupported assertion: no reasons are offered for a very implausible claim. Clearly, this is a consequence of bizarre crossing of conceptual wires, i.e. *two* concepts are being confusedly run together. Aesthetic appreciation of nature cannot intelligibly be regarded as falling within the same concept or category as artistic appreciation of a performance of Chekhov's *The Cherry Orchard*, of James Joyce's *The Dead*, of George Eliot's *Middlemarch*, of the Brahms *Violin Concerto*. Yet the distinction, although obvious when pointed out, is almost universally ignored, and it is very far from being a mere quibble. Implicit in it, and in the examples I have adduced to reveal it, is by far the most important issue for the value of the arts in education. For to put it starkly, by the contrast with the aesthetic, it is a central feature of the arts that they can have a subject matter²⁰. For example, through his work, an artist can give expression to an immensely varied range of conceptions of aspects of life generally. Obviously, it would make no sense to attribute this possibility to aesthetic judgement of nature: flowers, autumn leaves, mountain and birdsong, however beautiful, cannot intentionally raise questions about social issues. Thus a further danger of conflating the two concepts is that it contributes to the notion that the arts are entirely autonomous, cut off from the life of society, isolated from significant human concerns. Of course, not all works of art can intelligibly be said to have a subject matter. But it is a central and important possibility of all the art *forms*. It is this characteristic of the arts which explains their powerful significance in almost all societies. Throughout the centuries, for instance, the arts have deeply enriched religious feeling, and have raised seminal, influential, often profoundly disturbing, questions on moral, social and political issues. That is, a central aspect of the values intrinsic to the arts is their inseparable relationship to and influence on the life of society.

This characteristic of the arts, is poignantly illustrated by the reported visit to Picasso of a German officer during the occupation of France during the last war. He noticed *Guernica*, which Picasso had painted as an expression of his revulsion at the bombing of the little Spanish town of that name by the German fascists. Impressed by the painting, the officer asked 'Did you do that?,' to which Picasso replied, 'No, you did'.

In view of this deeply significant possibility, is not remarkable that there is such a striking ambivalence about the arts? On one hand, as we know to our

cost, the arts are commonly regarded as peripheral, expendable in education. It is assumed that they are merely for entertainment, enjoyment or catharsis, from which nothing of significance can be learned. Hence the arts are marginalised in the curriculum."

Yet, on the other hand, the powerful possibilities of learning from the arts are clearly conceded in the frequent nervousness about the arts exhibited by the authoritarian regimes. It is all too common for artists to be censored, banned, imprisoned, tortured and executed. *Why*, if there is nothing of significance to be learned from the arts? Mathematics and the sciences, the core subjects, do not normally frighten such regimes.

Does this not show unquestionably that the values implicit in the arts are of profound human significance and thus that the arts should be given a far more central place in the curriculum.?

It may be, as I argued earlier, that the conflation of the aesthetic and the artistic contributes to this trivialising of artistic values, and to the emasculation of their powerful educational potential. It should be emphasised, too, that I use the term 'education' in its broadest sense, since through involvement with the arts one can continue to learn, in a deep, humanly important sense, all one's life.

I do not wish to deny that aesthetic appreciation can be progressively developed. But it seems to me clear that there is far less involved, for instance, in learning to appreciate natural beauty than in learning to appreciate art. Moreover, the most crucial aspect of this issue is that artistic appreciation, at least in the case of most art-forms, requires not solely a grasp of the traditions and conventions of the art-forms, but also, very often, insight into, and understanding and experience of life. This is the characteristic of the concept of art and it largely explains why it is so difficult for school children to appreciate the great works of literature, such as those of Shakespeare. In such case it is obvious that artistic understanding intelligibly be regarded as distinct from an understanding of life generally. To learn to appreciate the arts very often requires a reference to, for instance, moral dilemmas, personal relationship, social, political and emotional issues, the difficulty of learning to recognise the truth about oneself. Indeed, many would be inclined to say that this aspect is or should be the most important contribution of the arts education. It emphasises the remarkable absurdity and short-sightedness of the current tendency to undervalue and disregard the arts, as superficial luxuries, expendable if necessary in favour of the supposed 'basic' in education. Such an attitude reflects the dangerously prevalent misconception that the arts are simply for entertainment, pleasure, recreation, from which unlike, for example, the

sciences, there is nothing of significance to be *learned*. (With characteristic perception, Geroge Eliot exquisitely captures this conception of the art when she refers to the artistic accomplishment of the educated young ladies of the Victorian era as 'small tinklings and smearings'.) Yet, especially in view of the tension and frustrations which are so destructively evident in so many countries, it is hard to understand how it *can* be seriously believed that, for instance, arithmetical or mathematical skills, important though they may be, are obviously more 'basic' than the kinds of understanding, for example of emotional and moral issues, which can be gained from the arts.

These days there is far too dominant an emphasis on vocational skills and materialism. While such aspects are important, they need to be balanced by at least an equal emphasis on the *quality* of life - the development of creative attitudes, through the arts, personal relationship, moral and emotional education. To continue with the present attitude to the core curriculum could be seriously counter-productive, for *unless* people have learned how to direct their creative energies, and how to develop their emotional potentialities, there will be explosions of violent frustration in some, and degeneration into vegetating apathy in others. The evidence of these effects is all too clear, in many societies.

For instance, one of the most important contributions of education through the arts is to develop the possibility of increasingly discriminating expressions and responses. It is undoubtedly enormously difficult to oppose the conformist pressure, such as those television advertising, and so-called pop-culture, towards a bland, superficial uniformity of cliché expression. But a person with only trite forms of expression is a person with only trite possibilities of experience- and this includes emotions and personal relationship. Simone Weil²¹, castigating the escapism and romanticism of much literature, makes the point:

But it is not only in literature that fiction generates immortality. It does so in life itself. For the substance of our life is almost exclusively composed of fiction. We fictionalise our future; and unless we are heroically devoted to truth, we fictionalise our past, refashioning it to our taste. We do not *study* other people; we *invent* what they are thinking, saying and doing. (My italics)

How profoundly, and sadly, true it is that we do not study other people, to learn to recognise what is objectively there, in them. We approach them, as we approach other aspects of life, with the blinkers of our clichés. And our feelings about them are inevitably as limited to superficial generality as the possibility of our understanding them.

It is one of the main contributions of the arts to open the progressive integrity of vision, which will identify a deeper integrity of feeling.

Conclusion

The aspect of the distinction to which I am trying to draw attention gives a rationale for the claim that some of the most important aspects of education can be achieved through the arts, and thus that the arts have a legitimate claim to be regarded as basic, or part of any 'core' curriculum.

It seems to me that this characteristic marks a distinction between the aesthetic and the artistic which is of particular significance for education in that, to repeat the point, the notions of learning and understanding in the arts cannot be intelligibly regarded as distinct from learning and understanding in life-situations generally. This is not to say that the aesthetic is autonomous, with no relation to the rest of life. On the contrary, an aesthetic appreciation of nature may be internally related to, one expression of, a conception of attitude to life in general. Nevertheless, it could much more easily be supposed that the use of aesthetic terms could be learned in isolation from a general experience of life, than that artistic appreciation could be so learned. The educational implications are both obvious and important, since most of the arts can give expression to conception of the *whole range* of the human condition.

So perhaps the principal danger of the use of the term 'aesthetic education' is that such implications may be obscured, and artistic criteria may be assumed to be the same as aesthetic criteria. For where the aesthetic is concerned there is no place for taking such subject-matter indeed, the very *notion* of any subject-matter makes no sense with respect to the aesthetic, which is what gives the humorous point of Oscar Wilde's description of a sunset as only a second-rate Turner. The danger is that criteria may be employed which either are inappropriate or, more likely, although to *some* extent appropriate, fail to take account of his crucial characteristic of the arts. For instance, in many of the arts, in contrast to the aesthetic, an important criterion of artistic merit may often be, to put it roughly, the extent to which a work gives an original and perceptive vision of nature, of contemporary society, or of some other aspect of the human condition. That is, such a fresh, imaginative, incisive vision of an aspect of life may be of the central criteria of artistic merit. And that is to say that, through the arts, it is very often possible to encourage a fresh, imaginative and incisive of and attitude to life itself.

There could hardly be a more important aim in education.

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The Aesthetic Right as a Human Right

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Aesthetics and human rights appear worlds apart. While human rights are advocated as essential to human fulfillment, and hence as standards for judging society, polity, and culture, aesthetics seems to deal with side issues, inessential to fulfillment, a refinement or ornamentation that goes beyond what is basic to our lives. The aesthetic is something solitary, private, individual, while human rights are matters for public defense and extensive solidarity. We work together on human rights as philosophers and citizens of the world. We work apart, and at our leisure, on aesthetics, as theorists or cultivators of the arts. Human rights require action. Aesthetics merely requires appreciation.

In two major areas aesthetic concerns are freely admitted into the domain of human rights. (1) Artistic treasures may be regarded as belonging to the culture that produced them. A right exists to safeguard and assure access to the products of our culture's creative labor. This is a claim against (and rights may be understood as claims against) destruction or forced exportation of a cultural heritage. (2) A people has the right to free cultural expression in the use of its language, in religious observances, customs, dress, theater, dance, and music. This is a right to a cultural identity as shaped by a people for itself. Hence, it is a claim against subjugation to a foreign culture. Even a politically subordinate people may claim such a cultural right against the ruling power.

These rights to our cultural treasures and our cultural expression are clearly part of the broader right of a people to respect for its integrity and its freedom. This is a principle of cultural self-determination. The cultural dimension of the identity of a people is what counts in the claims for these rights. The aesthetic is not laid claim to in its own right; it enters the rights talk because of its contribution to the cultural. The cultural—as shared values, modes of expression, common possessions, important traditions—may have little in it of the aesthetic in the usual Western sense of the beautiful or sublime. The aesthetic is but an element in the larger dimensions of cultural existence. What takes priority is the human right to ethnicity: the free exercise of continuing to be a distinctive people.

But let us go further to posit for every individual an intrinsic aesthetic right. What are the components of the right, each of which requiring philosophic argument? First, following from the recognized ethnic rights, is the right of every

individual of access to that person's cultural heritage with its aesthetic elements. But this is not the beginning and the end of the aesthetic right. For each individual, I assert, has the right of access to the *human* heritage with all its aesthetic elements. This is a right to go beyond your culture to experience the fullest humanity. Concomitant to this right is the right not to be simply a member of your group; you have the right to reject identification with your supposed people. This freedom from ethnicity is a valuable claim that individuals may make in a world of increasing authoritarianism, proliferation of nation-states, racial separation, religious intolerance, and ethnic aggressiveness.

Thus, the right in the cultural domain is double-edged: a right to what you claim as your heritage as member, and a right not to be limited to the heritage of a group to which you are assigned by birth or otherwise. Both rights must be respected, else serious deprivation and mutual destruction will continue throughout the world.

Something is marvelous about this proposed right of access to the whole world's culture, past, present, and even future, namely, that of all the cultural components the aesthetic is most readily appreciated, assimilated, and communicated. The aesthetic, because it speaks to imagination, is the open door to world culture. It affords immediate access. The works of imagination of others are available to us through our own imagination. Hence, a recognition of a shared humanity occurs; indeed, the humanity of each of us is expanded in the process. Human beings surely have the right to the fullest expansion of their humanity if this is accomplished in a way non-injurious to others. Imagination is humanity-expanding, and it operates by means that are pleasurable, socially harmonious, and nonviolent.

A strong case already can be made for your right of access to the *national* museums, performing arts, literary works, cityscapes, and even natural beauties. But we need equally to argue that the individual have access to the arts of others. In practice this means freedom to read works in all literatures and of all languages. Freedom to see foreign films, paintings, illustrations. Freedom to hear the music and song of others, which might well become your own music and song. To ship national treasures around the world for every culture to experience may not be easy, and this scarcely can be attempted with architecture, cityscape, or landscape. Yet access is possible through mass-produced pictures, video and film, broadcasting and recording. André Malraux's insight that publication of art works within the bounds of books allows us to have museums unbounded by walls, must be expanded to all media, until we have cultures without walls, cultures without boundaries. The world may be experienced as you sit in your study or in your village. Granted, some filtering will occur at the borders,

especially of political overtones, religious matters, and sexual treatments, yet in principle a free flow of the arts should—and easily may—occur across the world.

Some cultures, however, do not recognize the arts as a separate category of human activity. Aesthetics is interwoven in the life experience of the people. Other cultures distinguish, intellectually and in living, the aesthetic realm from the practical, scientific, and religious domains. Suppose such different cultures were to exchange music, dance, carvings, and stories. The integrated culture stands to gain a heightened sense of aesthetic potentiality in itself, while the departmentalized culture may gain a fresh sense of the aesthetic penetration into other areas of life. Discovery is occasioned by sharing. This discovery is of the creative legitimacy of others, but also of new-found values within yourself. Curiously, a culture strengthens itself by such openness to the discovery of what others are. It may be both proud and tolerant, both expressive and attentive, both traditional and responsive.

Hence, humanity has the right to a pluralism of artistic cultures. Diversity of expression, values, and cultural force is to be preserved, celebrated, and enhanced. Such diversity need not engender divisiveness. One humanity underlines the variegated world of imagination. Each person may grow with the gift of others. To close the borders of art, to force down upon the imagination of individuals the crown of a single "authentic" culture, to crucify peoples on a cross of culture, is to illegitimately divide humanity into different species. This is the fundamental crime of humanity. The fundamental human right is to the fullness of humanity. The individual has the right not to be divided from that community of beings which is our species.

The right of access to the heritage of imagination implies a right to visit in person those treasures which cannot be sent on tour or simply duplicated. Thus, the architecture and ruins, frescoes and murals, cityscapes and villages, festivals and performances, nature and gardens, must be opened to foreigners as part of their heritage as fellow humans. Though we face problems in transportation and communication, and restrictions may legitimately be applied that are political and economic, this right to aesthetic tourism is to be recognized as a universal one. The scenic wonders of nature, such as the Himalaya Mountains or the Falls at Niagara, belong to us all as residents of the earth and are not simply the possessions of the states in whose territory they may be found. I am not convinced that Canada has met its obligation to humanity in allowing rampant commercial development at Niagara. The ruins at Copán in Honduras, at Tikal in Guatemala, and at Chichén Itzá in Mexico are the Mayan heritage of all America—and of all the world. National parks, those great programs for preserving nature which

have spread throughout the world, are really humanity parks, where every human being, regardless of nationality or wealth, may experience the deepest beauty, wonder, and sublimity. How I dream of visiting every national park in the world, for that would be paradise on earth.

The right of aesthetic tourism, that is, universal access on site to the heritage of imagination of every people, poses obligations upon communities and governments. Preservation is a priority. Access should not be allowed to debase sites, sights, values, or life. To tear down the jungle in order to make jungle culture conveniently available is to offer not access but annihilation. The right to preservation of each culture must balance the universal right of access to every culture. Inevitably local culture changes in response to the access that it gains to outsiders who come to savor its very difference from their outside world. We all stand to lose a little in authenticity, but we all stand to gain much in enriched diversity.

Programs of identification are necessary. Every political and cultural authority should conduct research as to what and where the imaginative heritage is that demands protection. Furthermore, authorities should enhance and extend that heritage, keeping it alive or reviving it by creative programs for its people. "Heritage" is a misleading term insofar as it suggests the passing on of inanimate possessions. In the life of the imagination, the heritage is the activation of creative experience. The works of the imagination are the workings of imagination, the imagination at work. In sum, the obligation of preserving and making available the past is an obligation to the vitality and growth of the present. States must serve the human right of aesthetic fulfillment.

The individual, if we follow the argument to its base, has the right to the enjoyment of the creativity of all humanity, to the exercise of one's own creativity, and to the fulfillment of aesthetic experience. These are not luxuries. They are essential to being human. These are not to be postponed until "underdeveloped" countries become developed, for imagination may be as developed in the economically poorer countries as in the richer; indeed, the proper guidance of an industrial civilization requires a developed imagination, not simply a developed technology or economy. Industrial societies which have lost their soul may learn much of value from agrarian, village, or forest cultures. The aesthetic right is not to be regarded as the exclusive prerogative of a cultured class. We are not talking about a fine art, reserved for refined experience of the few who have had the leisure and wealth to develop themselves by means of expensive activities. Creativity, joy, imagination know no class or caste. All have the right to these, for all have human faculties.

The aesthetic human right is a right to literacy, for this is the principal door to our own and all the world's literature. It is the right to the practice of our language by reading, speaking, listening, conversing, and singing. Language is the most plastic medium of aesthetic expression and impression.

The aesthetic right is the right of access to the works in parks, museums, and concert halls. These need to be subsidized as a public duty in order to allow entrance of the poor. The Smithsonian Institution, with its 14 museums open free to the public in Washington, and its travelling exhibits, is a model of cultural access. The aesthetic right demands appropriate elementary schooling not only in language and literature, but also in the plastic and visual arts, in music and dance, in the appreciation of architecture and cityscape, in the recognition of folklore and village crafts, and in the enjoyment of nature. These are basic skills of being human, for with them we are able to respond to the world, human and natural, as beings with alerted sensibility, appreciative involvement, and liberated imagination.

The right is also to experience aesthetically in the world, and this is not limited to experience of artworks. To experience aesthetically in life generally is to be free of pain and the drives of desire, free from fear and oppression, and free from the constant calculation of the practical and necessary. It is, in a word, the freedom to enjoy being. This is freedom to be joyful. This is the joy of freedom for human beings. Such experience is an ennobling pleasure, value-impregnated, active and participatory while appreciative, uplifting and tonic even in the encounter with the simplest things such as sunset or moonrise, and, finally, benevolent.

Experiencing aesthetically does put you in that agreeable mood which is an open disposition of goodwill towards the world. A world of individuals experiencing aesthetically is a world of persons each in tune within itself yet open to harmony with one another. Experiencing aesthetically is that *joie de vivre* which is the realization of the worth of living. It is the fertile field from which sprouts that intuition which respects the worth of our fellow living beings. Both religious experience and ethical recognition are tied to this joy-in-being, this being-in-joy.

Hence, the aesthetic right is a *human* right to joy. Social and economic arrangements owe this to us. Programs of education and development must give this priority. And the human-made and natural environment must permit this. This is a claim against pollution and neglect, against spoliation and oppression. A clear sky and clean streets are needed, as are a clean body and clear mind. The environmental crisis that besets the world has largely been discussed in terms

of health and economics. We must recognise here the claims of the aesthetic right as well. A befouled natural and urban world is a blight on the human potentiality for joy.

This aesthetic analysis carries us from the *cultural* to the *imaginative* to the *joyful*. The precise terminology does not matter. What we are invoking is a faculty, or a universal experience, or an essential dimension of being human. If this is given full attention, as by right it should, then the world will be transformed. Humanity would reshape the world by its imagination to fulfill its right to enjoy. What is at stake is not *merely* the artistic, not an inessential product of culture, but the whole life which is to be cultivated by humanity. A culture of humankind may arise from the universal exercise of this right.

And then what shall happen in the domains of the economic, political, scientific, and religious? These too will be transformed by intercultural respect, the spirit of sharing in our humanity, and the benevolence which accompanies joyful being. The *merely* aesthetic may become the regenerative power—that we have too long neglected—for the human community.

This analysis is only an outline of claims, a manifesto of rights, that needs arguing. The duty of the philosopher is to test such claims by the discipline of reasoning. Let us argue them out, for and against, no matter how utopian or melodramatic they sound. For often the visions of imagination provide the truths not yet thought of by mere reason.

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The Importance of making Art : A Reply to the Institutionalists

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In his excellent book, *Definitions of Art*, Stephen Davies presents an important and original objection to what he calls the functionalist definition of art. The objection is intended to show the falsity of the doctrine that our concept of art may be defined primarily in terms of an aesthetic function, and one of the main targets is Monroe Beardsley, who has done more than most to explain and popularize this traditional view. It would be wrong to think, however, that Davies wishes merely to attack what he takes to be a false doctrine, for he wishes to advance the claims of an institutional or proceduralist definition of art and thereby demonstrate its greater cogency, especially in the light of modern-day developments in the visual arts such as Duchamp's Readymades and conceptual art. This objection of Davies' goes to the heart of the matter, and touches upon some of the fundamental differences between a functionalist and an institutional approach to art, and is worthy of the closest attention.

In this paper, I will argue that the objection in question does not establish the falsity of the functionalist definition of art. I hope to turn the objection round and by means of a detailed discussion of Davies' arguments expose the methodological flaws in the institutionalist's own approach to art. In particular, I shall argue that where the institutionalist feels himself to be strongest, namely in his philosophical dealings with the avant-garde, he is in fact at his most susceptible and weakest.

1 Use of Terms

It would be as well to begin with an explanation of how the terms 'functionalist' and 'proceduralist' are to be understood. Davies defines the first term in the following way : 'where it is the case that what makes a thing an X is its functional efficacy in promoting the point of the concept in question... then...X is to be defined *functionally*'.¹ He is not interested in just any kind of functionalism, however. His objection, as I have said, is directed at a particular brand of functionalism, namely that which defines art in terms of a primary aesthetic function. (This does not, of course, rule out the possibility that art has other significant, though secondary, functions). In its most basic form, functionalism of this variety classifies artefacts (understood in an extended sense of the term) as artworks on the grounds that they provide aesthetic satisfaction. However, this is rather too basic on a number of counts. It might be objected, for instance,

that we treat some paintings and sculptures as art despite the fact that they are not aesthetically rewarding. With this and other considerations in mind, some functionalists, including Beardsley, have produced more sophisticated versions which by alluding to the maker's intentions allow for the possibility of artistic failure. In his later writings, Beardsley characterized an artwork, as Davies puts it, as 'either an arrangement of conditions *intended* to be capable of affording an aesthetic experience with marked aesthetic character, or (incidentally) an arrangement belonging to a class or type of arrangement that is typically intended to have this capacity' (my italics).² Hence a bad painting could be classified as a work of art. It is this more sophisticated view that I wish to defend against the objection Davies puts below (see section 2).

The best known example of a proceduralist theory is George Dickie's institutional theory of art, which Davies himself supports, though not without qualification. Although a proceduralist would agree that the concept of art has a point, he or she would not define the concept in terms of its function. It is the procedures intimately associated with the concept that are thought to be of crucial importance. As Davies puts it: 'if the concept is essentially procedural, then all those things produced in accordance with the given procedure instantiate the concept, whether or not they also serve the function that those procedures originally were set up to meet'.³ On this view not only bad paintings could count as art but also things that were not intended to meet the point of art and which may even have been designed to undermine its function.

It should be plain from even these brief remarks how much functionalism and proceduralism differ. What may be less clear is how these competing definitions of art raise issues that are important both within and without philosophy. This should become clearer as our discussion unfolds, but what I wish to do next is to outline Davies' objection, which is derived from the writings of Arthur Danto. Danto's witty though sometimes-obscure writings deal with the ontological status of objects having visually indistinguishable counterparts. After looking at Davies' useful summary of Danto, I shall set out the anti-functionalist objection as a formal argument so that it may more easily be assessed.

2. Danto's Ontology and the Anti-Functionalist Objection

Davies introduces his summary of Danto's complicated argument by pointing out that 'the aesthetic properties of pieces are affected by their being given art status. Hence such properties are said to depend on 'the categorization of the objects in which they are instantiated as art or nonart'.⁴ Although something may already possess aesthetic properties before attaining art status, it will acquire additional ones as a consequence of acquiring that status. These new aesthetic

properties may be 'of a quite different order' from any the piece already possesses; in such cases where there is a visually indistinguishable counterpart, the newly-acquired properties will, certainly, be unique. It is the aesthetic properties the piece acquires upon *attaining* art status that enable it to fulfil art's function rather than any such properties it possessed *prior* to its becoming an artwork.

The objection that Davies derives from the above argument is stated with admirable clarity. 'The functional view of the definition of art', he writes, 'holds that aesthetic properties exist mainly prior to, and provide the basis for, a piece's attaining the status of art. It is apparent, however, that it is art status that is prior to, and a determinant of those aesthetic properties of artworks by virtue of which they serve the function of art'.⁵ With this objection firmly planted in the reader's mind, Davies develops the points made by Danto in greater detail. Although we do not have space to examine many of these points, we shall look (through Davies' eyes) at a few of Danto's more important examples.

The first example Davies discusses is Duchamp's *Fountain*, which has bedevilled philosophical literature. Danto thinks that though the urinal shares its properties with other porcelainery the artwork *Fountain* shares *its* properties with marble statues and especially its aesthetic properties. The Readymade owes its existence as an artwork to interpretation, and insofar as it meets the point of art it does so by virtue of the aesthetic properties and meaning it acquired upon becoming an artwork, i.e., properties that identical looking urinals lack. The point that may be drawn from this case, Davies claims, is that 'taste is not a matter of discerning aesthetic properties that were always present, since learning that a piece is a work of art entails recognizing that the piece has properties its untransfigured counterparts lack'.⁶ Danto makes much the same point, using a hypothetical example, *Can Opener*. We are asked to imagine that at the very moment when a sculptor independently and for the first time brings into existence a purely abstract object having this particular form, his next door neighbour, coincidentally, designs the world's first utilitarian can opener and opens up a can of beans with it. We are told that the objects would have quite different aesthetic properties and the difference, in Davies' words, 'would depend upon the status as art of the one piece and, hence, its location within an art-historical tradition of sculpture'.⁷

We are now in a position to state the anti-functionalist objection in a more formal manner. For convenience, I shall present Danto's argument and the objection derived from it separately.

Danto's Ontological Argument

(P1) 'Aesthetic properties [henceforth APs] depend on the categorization of the objects in which they are substantiated as art or nonart (and within those categorized as art, on the genres, periods and so forth to which they belong)'

(P2) A piece acquires new APs upon attaining art status, in addition to any it may already possess.

(P3) The newly-acquired APs of a piece are different from the properties, including APs, of the piece's visually indistinguishable counterparts, and may be of 'a quite different order'.

(C) Therefore 'the APs by virtue of which the piece meets the point of art are those it acquires on attaining the status of art rather than those it possesses prior to its attaining that status'.⁸

The above conclusion serves as the premise of Davies' objection to functionalism.

Davies' Anti-Functionalist Argument

(P1) The APs of a piece 'by virtue of which it meets the point of art are those it acquires on attaining the status of art rather than those it possesses prior to its attaining that status'.

(C) Therefore the functionalist doctrine, 'which holds that APs exist mainly prior to, and provide the basis for, a piece's attaining the status of art'.⁹ is false.

Before we begin to discuss the arguments we should establish how broad their scope is intended to be. I think it is safe to assume that Danto's argument, despite (P3), is supposed to accommodate development in the visual arts from post-impressionism onwards.¹⁰ If this is correct, then Davies' anti-functional argument must have the same scope. Were we to shrink that scope to hard cases only, the argument's force and interest would be correspondingly diminished. Let us assume, then, that the arguments are intended to cover modern art in its entirety, and assess them accordingly.

3 The Functionalist's Counter-Objection

Although the functionalist would want to object to several of Danto's premises, the most important objection of all hinges on how we conceive artistic creation. The functionalist and the proceduralist picture this in very different ways, and Davies himself identifies this as the main issue at stake. He rightly says that the functionalist can concede, without compromising his basic doctrines,

that art-making takes place within an institutional setting and can, moreover, allow that aesthetic properties may sometimes be dependent upon this context. But what the functionalist cannot accept is the conclusion of Danto's argument and its implicit model of art creation.¹¹ Let us, then, tease out the implications of the latter.

We may begin with Davies' own characterization of the art creation model. 'A piece that is not an artwork exists with some aesthetic properties', he writes. 'Without modifying it in any other way, an artist confers art status on the piece. This conferral of art status alters the work's aesthetic properties, so that it now has aesthetic properties it previously lacked. The piece serves the function of art by virtue of its possessing these new properties'.¹² He remarks that this 'chronological' model of art creation is derived from such cases as the Readymades but adds the important rider that it is 'intended in some nonchronological version to cover also the orthodox case of art creation'.¹³ (In the light of this it seems reasonable to suppose that orthodox cases of art creation are covered by the anti-functional argument.)

With typical acuity, Davies has anticipated the functionalist's objection to the above account. He illustrates the form such an objection might take by using Danto's example of *Can Opener*. The objection is essentially that '*Can Opener* is made by the artist to have those aesthetic properties, and there is no sense in which its acquiring art status predates its acquiring those properties. Its achievement of art status coincides with its gaining those properties, and had the generated properties not merited art status, *Can Opener* would not be a work of art, despite its creation within the Artworld and the dependence of its properties upon its creation within that setting... the setting alone does not guarantee the creation of aesthetic properties that merit art status'.¹⁴ Having so clearly stated the functionalist's position, Davies might be expected to have a forceful reply to it up his sleeve. If so, it is still to be found there, for he does not spell out what is wrong with the functionalist's counter-objection. Immediately after putting the objection, he mounts the proceduralist's hobby-horse— the Readymades—and digresses from the main point by discussing these non-standard cases of art creation. But what is required is a detailed rebuttal of the functionalist's account of *Can Opener*, i.e., the *standard* case, where a work is made to have aesthetic properties. To talk about the Readymades, hard cases if ever there were ones, at this juncture is beside the point.

Perhaps owing to this *idée fixe*, Davies fails to explain how the proceduralist's model derived from the Readymades and the like can be adapted so as to cover orthodox cases of art creation, i.e., the remaining 99% or so of artworks. He

criticizes functionalists for having rejected 'out of hand the proceduralist's approach of showing how Duchamp's actions are continuous with the use of the institutionalized conventions by which art status has been conferred in the past'.¹⁵ However, he does not show *how* those actions are supposedly continuous with traditional practice. Revealingly, he takes it for granted as a proceduralist that there must be such a continuity and that it would be a simple thing to demonstrate. In the absence of such a demonstration, however, the functionalist is entitled to remain sceptical. Since this is such an important matter, let me elaborate upon it.

What I think the functionalist finds most puzzling is why it should be thought that there is more to be said than has been said in the above account of *Can Opener*. Once we have said that an artwork in the standard case is something made by an artist to have rewarding aesthetic properties, what else do we need to add? A number of things, it might be retorted. For a start, the proceduralist would insist that many instances of aesthetic properties are context-dependent. As Davies remarked, however, the functionalist can happily accept this point. Indeed, the functionalist might argue that concepts of genre, medium, and style do not merely have a bearing on the interpretation of a work but also play an important role in the making of a work. That is to say, the very process of art-making is informed by such considerations. It would be absurd to suppose that an artist creates a work *ex nihilo*, however much a conceptual artist might wish it were so. The particular medium, style and artistic form in which the artist is working will affect the aesthetic character of what is produced. To give a simple example, composers need to make an initial decision as to whether they are going to write a string quartet or piano quartet, a concerto or symphony, and such a decision is likely to affect the aesthetic character of what is produced, even where the musical ideas exist in embryonic form. (And it is interesting in this regard to compare works that have been adapted to meet the requirements of different musical forms or different instruments.) It is true also that a modern artist's work is likely to be informed by an understanding of art history. The sort of things that Danto mentions, then, enter into the making of the work, and not merely the interpretation of it.

As we have seen, the functionalist can accept also that art-making takes place within an institutional setting without compromising his or her position. However, the functionalist would not accept that the concept of art should be *defined* in terms of those institutional procedures. (A parallel is to be found in how proceduralist while agreeing that the concept of art has a point does not define the concept in functional terms.)

Let us expand our account of a standard case of art creation in the light of the remarks above. A work of art, typically, is made in an institutional setting with the intention that it should have rewarding aesthetic properties. The way in which it is made is subject to a number of constraints, which include those imposed by the chosen medium, the adopted style, and the genre to which the work belongs or the artistic form in term of which it was conceived. The work's aesthetic character may be shaped by other considerations as well such as the artist's awareness of tradition or allegiance to certain artistic doctrines. Now why should we say of a work that is made to meet the point of art in this way that it is not truly a work of art until art status has been *conferred* upon it? Surely, the notion of conferral has no useful role to play here, and adds nothing to our understanding of what it is to create a work of art in the standard case. In short, it is merely an idle form of words; an empty philosophical formula. But this is hardly surprising, since the proceduralist is trying to apply the wrong model here.

As we have noted, the model was derived from such things as the Readymades and conceptual art. What these examples have in common is a dedication to flouting traditional practices of art-making. Duchamp, for instance, used the Readymade to repudiate a traditional notion of art as artifice, while the conceptualists went one step further and, in a gesture of the utmost economy, attempted to dispense with the art object altogether. If this is correct, then it is paradoxical to look to the Readymades and the like, for a *general* model of art creation when they reject orthodox artistic practices.

Let us sum up how matters stand regarding Davies' objection to functionalism. I would suggest that several of the premises of Danto's ontological argument are false, and that we can find counter-examples to them if we turn to standard cases of art-making and do not confine ourselves to unorthodox cases. In short, the premises are based upon a defective model of art creation, one to which the functionalist has a very powerful (and unanswered) objection. Since some of the premises are false, the conclusion does not obtain. Indeed, as we have seen, the conclusion is false. If so, the premise of Davies' anti-functionalist argument is itself false and the conclusion is unproven.

I have argued that Davies has failed to produce a strong objection to the functionalist definition of art. But how well does a proceduralist definition of art fare itself in the light of our discussion? Does it emerge as being better equipped to deal with the more extreme manifestations of avant-garde art or modern art generally than its main rival, functionalism? In what follows, I shall argue that the maladroitness in which proceduralism typically handles hard cases such as the Readymades and *objet trouvé* expose it to a number of serious

criticisms in terms of its methodology. In effect, I shall be claiming that proceduralists have been badly misled by certain avant-garde practices and that, consequently, their definition is insecurely based. I shall not, however, attempt to demonstrate the falsity of the definition in the way that Davies attempted to falsify the functionalist definition.

In order to press home the criticisms I wish to make about the proceduralist's handling of hard cases, I must first say something about the way in which Davies characterizes them, and the special meaning he attaches to the term. As we will see, Davies attempts to claim a certain kind of immunity for the Readymades and suchlike.

4 More than a Question of Terminology

To begin with, Davies makes the point that both functionalists and proceduralist are guilty of producing arguments that sometimes beg the question. The functionalist, for example, typically refuses to allow the proceduralist's claim that the Readymades are works of art owing to how they allegedly fail to meet the point of art.¹⁶ Hence the functionalist begs the question against proceduralism, which claims to have explained how something can be art even though, in the extreme case, it may not meet the point of art. On the other hand, a proceduralist may fall into the error of favourably *prejudging* the status of hard cases (in terms of his own theory) and beg the question against functionalism.

Davies believes that owing to a fundamental divergence in how the two parties define art, they think of hard cases in quite different ways. For the functionalist, a hard case is one where it is not clear whether it can truly be said to meet the point of art; it is, at best, a borderline candidate. But such perplexities do not beset the proceduralist, who is prepared to accept such things as driftwood and conceptual art without further ado. Hard cases for the proceduralist are 'artworks that in one way or another fall into the gap left by the separation of the function of artworks from the procedures used in their creation'.¹⁷ For the proceduralist, then, a hard case is not one whose status as art is ever in doubt but rather one which sets up 'a tension between the point of the concept of art and actual instances of art'.¹⁸

This is an ingenious move on Davies' part. The very way in which he characterizes hard cases puts the onus on the functionalist to produce an argument to show that a given piece cannot be counted as art *without* arguing that it is dysfunctional. i.e., fails to meet the point of art. According to Davies, the functionalist would be guilty of begging the question if he or she appealed to such functional considerations in framing the argument. Were this move to

succeed, the ground would be cut from under the functionalist's feet. However, the move is open to challenge.

To begin with, we should ask how Davies reaches the conclusion that hard cases are valid works of art without prejudging the matter himself. He remarks that it is 'beyond question' that hard cases, such as the Readymades, are *bona fide* works of art owing to the fact that

Fountain is generally credited as being Duchamp's work, even if he did not make the urinal he appropriated in creating that work. Art historians and critics talk about the piece; it is constantly pictured and referred to in books on the history of modern art and in courses on recent art history. Moreover, artists have been influenced by Duchamp's Readymades and frequently allude to them, not only in their manifestos but also in their own artworks. In brief, *Fountain* and its kin are treated as artworks (indeed, as important artworks).¹⁹

I would suggest that Davies is mistaken when he claims that the Readymades are generally credited as being artworks by members of the Artworld. If we examine the matter more closely, we find that critics and art historians are divided on this issue in much the same way that philosophers are. The late Harold Rosenberg, a distinguished art critic, remarked of Duchamp that 'since their first public appearance, his creations have possessed an inherent capacity to stir up conflict. Sixty years ago, he entered the art world by splitting it, and he still stands in the cleft, wearing a grim smile...'²⁰ This judgement still holds good. In a recent overview of *Fountain*'s history and aesthetics, the art historian, William A. Camfield, neatly summed matters up: 'Some deny that *Fountain* is art but believe it is significant for the history of art and aesthetics. Others accept it grudgingly as art but deny that it is significant. To complete the circle, some insist *Fountain* is neither art nor an object of historical consequence, while a few assert it is both art and significant—though for utterly incompatible reasons'.²¹ So much for consensus.

Davies is right, of course, that many artists have been influenced by Duchamp's work, including the Readymades. (Whether they have understood Duchamp's work is a different matter.) However, this in itself does not have a direct bearing on whether we can justifiably assume that *Fountain* is a work of art. Let us suppose that Picasso's 'assisted' Readymades, *Bull's Head*, which is generally credited as an artwork, was directly influenced by Duchamp's example. Obviously, it would be wrong to infer from this that Duchamp's Readymades are works of art.

Similarly, we are not entitled to infer from the fact that Duchamp's Readymades have very recently become part of art historical discourse²² that they are art. There are many things that figure in that discourse besides artworks.

It is true, then, that we treat *Fountain* in some of the ways we treat paradigm works of art. That is to say, it is put on display in art museums, it is discussed by art critics, etc., etc. But there are many other significant ways in which the Readymade does not resemble the paradigm, as soon becomes evident when we look more deeply into the different discourses of art criticism and art history. What we find therein is a deep-seated disagreement about *Fountain's* meaning, value and status. In short, the Readymades are hard cases in the normal sense of the term and not in some special philosophical sense.

Given that many members of the Artworld and the public at large continue to find such things as conceptual art, *objet trouvés*, and the Readymades perplexing and disconcerting, the functionalist is right to ask whether such things can be classified as art. It is not simply a matter of dispute among philosophers—a purely local dispute - as Davies would have us believe. I would suggest, then, that the burden of proof lies with the proceduralist, who has to show how such problematic cases can be claimed for art and how they can be reconciled with traditional practices of art-making.

5 A Flawed Methodology?

This brings me to the criticisms I wish to make of the proceduralist's own philosophical procedures. The first error, which I believe the proceduralist has made, is to draw upon a very one-sided diet of examples. The diet consists almost entirely of one kind of example. Wittgenstein described such an error as a 'main cause of philosophical disease'.²³ Since I have written about unhealthy philosophical diets elsewhere²⁴, let me pass onto what I see as a second, more grievous error. This is to do with the highly idiosyncratic nature of the examples upon which proceduralists base their theories. And anyone who alights on the writings of Danto, Dickie, *et al*, for the first time is likely to be struck by a curious obsession with urinals, brillo boxes and pieces of driftwood - in short, the *bric-à-brac* of the avant-garde..

Given that all of these things raise difficulties of one kind or another, we should begin by asking whether we can treat them as art rather than assume that they are 'beyond doubt' works of art. This would involve a careful, case by case discussion of the various ways in which a given piece both resembles and differs from a paradigm work of art. The crucial point is that we should

be guided in our deliberations by such a paradigm. Let me enlarge on the importance of this.

In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein invites us to consider whether 'it would be imaginable' for someone to learn to do sums in the head without ever doing them aloud or writing them down. He comes up with what he calls 'a limiting case', and poses the question whether there could be a tribe who knew only of calculation in the head and no other kind. In this way, he gets us to reflect on whether we would be prepared 'to use the concept of "calculating in the head" here - or 'whether in such circumstances it has lost its purpose, because the phenomena gravitate towards another paradigm'.²⁵

It seems to me that some of the hard cases with which the aesthetician has to deal are rather like Wittgenstein's 'limiting case' insofar as they appear to gravitate toward some alien paradigm. The closest parallel is to be found in conceptual art, where it is sometimes claimed that a work of art is, strictly speaking, a concept or proposition as opposed to a physical object, least of all one having aesthetic properties. The conceptualist, Robert Barry, specified as one of his pieces the non-conscious contents of his mind at a particular moment in time. Such a case requires us to consider whether it could possibly fall under the concept of art. This question becomes even more pertinent when we take into account how the significance of Barry's piece lies in its playful refusal to provide a spectator with the customary aesthetic satisfaction. In other words, the piece sets itself up in *opposition* to the paradigm. This would be rather like Wittgenstein's tribe claiming that not only do they do all their calculating in the head but that they have invented also a new kind of arithmetic in which the sums are not supposed to add up. Here we have surely reached a point where we have to ask whether the concept has any possible application. (And if we were to use the concept quite freely in such cases, then the concept might eventually cease to be of use itself.)

For the most part, proceduralists do not discuss puzzling cases in the context of a paradigm. They rarely stop to consider whether such pieces can be claimed for art, and often they treat the hard case *as if it were* a new kind of paradigm. By a strange inversion, the inscribed urinal not the painted canvas becomes the standard case for an institutional theory of art. Hence Dickie's oft-repeated view²⁶ that the Readymades and the like most clearly reveal the institutional nature of art. Hence Binkley's claim²⁷ that Duchamp demonstrated with the Readymades how art could be severed from aesthetics. And hence Danto's doctrine²⁸ that artworks owe their existence to interpretation. The pro-

ceduralists have invented their own canon of works, a small but colourful one, to which they return over and over again in their writings.

There is more at stake here than the question of faulty methodology, for some proceduralists are prepared to entertain as art that which they think may well undermine the institution of art. To his credit Davies makes this clear, when he remarks that the 'readymades and their avant-garde equivalents in the other forms and categories of art' are hard cases precisely because they challenge and *perhaps even undermine the function of art*'. (my italics)²⁹ However, as we have seen, Davies believes that such things are unquestionably works of art and pose no philosophical difficulties in this respect.

For my own part, I think that works that seek to undermine the place of art in our culture raise questions of the deepest and most urgent philosophical importance. I hope to have shown that Davies is wrong to claim that those who are engaged in the task of definition can justifiably put aside such questions in the belief that they have somehow been settled by members of the Artworld. These are not matters the philosopher can shrug off or delegate to others; they are, quintessentially, philosophical questions. If philosophical aesthetics is not to be allowed to degenerate into the worst kind of scholasticism, we should ask more searching questions of what we expect of both art and philosophy.

Notes and References

- 1 Stephen Davies, *Definitions of Art* (Cornell University Press, 1991), p.27.
- 2 Davies, *ibid*, p. 52. Davies has reservations about whether functionalism can be qualified in this way without being seriously compromised. For the purposes of this paper, I shall assume that a reference to intentions does not involve inconsistency.
- 3 Davies, *ibid*, p.37
- 4 Both quotations are from Davies, *ibid*, p.66
- 5 Davies, *ibid*, p.67.
- 6 Davies, *ibid*, p.67
7. Davies, *ibid*, p.68
- 8 Davies, *ibid*, p.66.
- 9 Davies, *ibid*, p.67.
- 10 The arguments in Danto's famous paper, 'The Artworld', seem to be concerned with the whole of modern art and not just a small part of the avant-garde.
- 11 See Davies, *ibid*, pp. 70-71, for a discussion of these matters.
- 12 Davies, *ibid*, pp.70-71.
- 13 Davies, *ibid*, p.71.
- 14 Davies, *ibid*, p.71.
- 15 Davies, *ibid*, p.73.
- 16 Davies inaccurately cites my writings as an example of such a functionalist view. In fact, I argue that the Readymades defy simple classification and that while some may be claimed for art

- others, including *Fountain*, belong not to art but rather anti- art. Owing to their intrinsic complexity and ambiguity, the Readymades are likely to trip the unwary and especially the theorist. See my paper, 'Duchamp's Readymades: Art and Anti-Art', *British Journal of Aesthetics*, Vol.22, No., 1982.
- 17 Davies, *ibid*, p.39.
 - 18 Davies, *ibid*, p.40.
 - 19 Davies, *ibid*, p.74.
 - 20 Harold Rosenberg, 'Duchamp: Private and Public' in his *Art on the Edge* (Secker and Warburg, 1976), p.17.
 - 21 William Camfield, 'Marcel Duchamp's *Fountain*: Its History and Aesthetics in the Context of 1917' in Rudolf Kuenzli and Francis Nauman (eds.), *Marcel Duchamp: Artist of the Century* (MIT Press, 1990), p.64.
 - 22 Owing to the recent upsurge of interest in Duchamp, it can easily be forgotten how for most of his life he was ignored by art historians, who attached little importance to the Readymades.
 - 23 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. F. Anscombe (Blackwell, 1968), p.155e.
 - 24 See my 'Marcel Duchamp : "Chess Aestheta and Anaartist Unreconciled", *Journal of Aesthetic Education*, Yorthesing.
 - 25 Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G. Anscombe (Blackwell, 1968), p.118e.
 - 26 For example, see George Dickie, *Art and the Aesthetic* (Cornell University Press, 1974), pp. 32-33.
 - 27 See Timothy Binkley, 'Deciding About Art: A Polemic Against Aesthetics' in Lars Aagaard-Mogensen ed.), *Culture and art* (Humanities press, 1976), p.92.
 - 28 For example, see Arthur Danto, 'The Artworld', *The Journal of Philosophy*, LXI (1964).
 - 29 Davies, *ibid*, p.75 for the first part of the quotation, and p. 76 for the second part. See also p.41 for an elaboration of this point.

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Aesthetic Disinterest

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A while back I bought a record, *Songs and Sounds of Orcinus Orca*.¹ It is a collection of the sounds made by whales, specifically "killer whales." There are twelve "cuts," each a recording of the whales during a particular activity or a particular "mood." The recording was made by a scientist, but the descriptions that he attaches to the sounds on his album range from scientific study to music. Now the question is, are the sounds on this album music? Are they simply scratchy, rubbery, whistling, popping noises? Are they fantastic *songs* made by creatures of nature? Are they *communication*? Are they like the sounds we hear when we listen to an opera in a language we do not understand?

Whatever the initial answer, it seems clear that the answer is in large measure dependent upon *how we wish* to be listening to the sounds, dependent upon our subjective focus in attending. If we are zoologists, we might be listening to these sounds in order to predict whale behavior as correlated with the sounds. If we are linguists, then we might be listening to find patterns. If we are appreciators of interesting music, we might be listening to the sounds purely for aesthetic enjoyment. Furthermore, besides listening with various foci dependent on particular vocations, we may also change our focus of attention in a single occasion of listening to the whales. Such would probably be the case if while the album were playing, I were to suggest to the listener that he might try to listen for ----- (patterns, the similarity to a faulty synthesizer, the sublimity of the sounds of the largest creatures on earth, et cetera).

The importance of the question about how one is listening to these sounds lies, for this paper, in whether the experience of listening to these sounds is aesthetic in character or not. Moreover, is it the case that whether our experience of these sounds is aesthetic or not — whether in some broad sense they are music or not — is dependent in great measure, maybe completely so, on how the listener *chooses* to listen to the sounds? If the experience is aesthetic, it seems clear that it is not aesthetic because of something the *whales* are doing (except in the sense that it is to the *whales* that we are listening). It seems clear that if one is listening and having an aesthetic experience, it is because the listener is attending to the sounds in some manner *so as to render* the experience aesthetic. Since we are in the position to listen to the sounds in different ways, some of which seem patently unaesthetic and some (one?) which seem to afford us an aesthetic experience, then the question about whether the sounds are

constitutive of an aesthetic object seems to have something to do with what the subject is doing, something to do with what *attitude* the subject is taking toward the object or event.

Indeed, whether or not we believe that the aesthetic attitude is necessary for aesthetic appreciation or not (many attitude theorists do, but I am a bit skeptical), it seems a denial of common experience to suggest that there is simply no such thing as an aesthetic attitude. We do have the ability to view any object we please as aesthetic in one instance, or nonaesthetic in another. I can view the flower in the court as a botanical entity or as an aesthetic one. I can see the movements of honey bees and see communication or see dance. I can consider the Picasso as a great work of art or as a financial investment. All of these views, it seems, are completely in my control. I can turn my point of view "on or off," "aesthetic or not."

It is part of aesthetic attitude theorizing, or, more specifically, the subjective control of aesthetic experiencing, that I want to discuss here. The aesthetic attitude has figured centrally in aesthetics, from the enlightenment until the present, with the strongest tradition being that of *disinterest*. In this paper, I want to explore (I) the two most prominent definitions of the notion of "disinterest"—that of Kant and that of Jerome Stolnitz—to determine if definition or interpretation is trouble-free, and (II) whether the aesthetic attitude really is disinterested or not. In both cases, I believe the answer is no.

I

Let's start with the Kantian interpretation.

Kant says that interest is what we call the liking we connect the presentation of an object's existence.... In order to play the judge in matters of taste, we must not be the least biased in favor of the thing's existence but must be wholly indifferent about it.²

Kant's central edict is that we must attend to the object without any care to its actual existence. It is the contemplative- image that we are to consider, how the object is represented in our imagination and understanding. Possession of an art object, then, is neither important nor encouraged.³ Although this sort of position has a large history (Saftesbury, Hutcheson, Addison and Allison each used the idea of possession as their chief expression of interestedness), it is nonetheless rather counter intuitive.

Let's take the above quotes as Kant's chief expression of disinterest. There is good reason to do this, since these quotes are the most prominent and

forthright characterizations of disinterest in the *Critique of Judgment*, and are not taken back or altered significantly in the rest of this *Critique*. The counter-intuitiveness lies in the call to be completely unbiased towards the existence of the object itself. We are not to value the objects but only it's contemplative image. But surely are interested in having continued access to the object which gives rise to, or grounds in some tangible way, our aesthetic experience of its contemplative-image. Surely we would like to possess aesthetic objects (and have the object we do possess candidates for aesthetic appreciation in some degree).

Now, one might object that Kant is not discussing possessions of objects but is only discussing the correct frame of mind to judge objects aesthetically. This is true. However, we ought not to lose sight of two points: first, access to the physical object, in whatever way, is a prerequisite to consideration of object's merits. It seems artificial to suggest that we ought merely to disregard the physical nature of the object. Kant's call to this disregard is only made against his claim that the aesthetic judgment made might be better were the existence of the physical object ignored. This claim is the subject of the second paper.

Second, Kant says that aesthetic judgments are particular only. However, if we read this to mean that our judgments are particular vis-a-vis the instance of our viewing, then the force of Kant's claim is lost. Insofar as each instance-of-viewing is different, then it will be impossible for us to compare one viewing with another. I will not be able to question my companion about *this particular rose* since his viewing of *this particular rose* will be different from mine (his angle of view will be different, he may register the colors of the rose slightly from me, he may have something unpleasant on his mind, perhaps he has a toothache. All sorts of items will alter the experiential instance of his viewing from mine). If we read Kant to mean that the judgment is about this particular object or this particular event — that is, about something objective and stable (as objective and stable as anything else in Kant's phenomenal reality) — it will be necessary to make reference to the real existence of that object which grounds the judgments. That is, there must be something objective there for our judgments to be about if we are to make comparable judgments. To suggest that we judge without allusion to the physical object grounding our judgments is to tear down a crossed-bridge so that we can build one up ahead. It is artificial at best.

Kant's advice, taken strictly, puts us in the odd position of believing the image or thought-representation of the object to be more valuable than the object itself. Two odd scenarios follow: (1) if one day we are able to project into someone's brain the mental representation of an aesthetic object, or an art

object, then would that projection (which might be constituted by a series of neuron-simulators) be as valuable as the object itself? Perhaps we could do away with the Louvre in deference to having a bunch of machine like this one? (2) The second scenario goes like this: perhaps everyone on earth has a clear memory of Monet's *Water Lilies*. Is it the case then that the object itself, which is only instrumental in providing the mental image for us, is no longer valuable? Would we, if the National Gallery were to burn down, not mourn the loss, given that we all recall the object? This should follow if the object itself is not "the point," but the image is important for judging or experiencing. Now, Stolnitz's conception of 'disinterest' is, I believe, less problematic than Kant's. This may be because it is more straight-forward (at least for twentieth century analytics); it does not fit into a metaphysical system; and it does not directly relate to aesthetic judgement (as Kant's conception does). Stolnitz defines the aesthetic attitude as:

disinterested and sympathetic attention to and contemplation of any object of awareness whatever, *for its sake alone*.... Disinterested means that we do not look at the object out of concern for any ulterior purpose which it may serve. We are not trying to use or manipulate the object.⁴

The problem is this: is it possible to consider an object aesthetically and strictly "for its own sake alone" or as an end in itself? One might object to Stolnitz's accounts that paying aesthetic attention to an object for the purpose of having an aesthetic experience is paying attention with a particular purpose of mind. Stolnitz himself suggests that the aesthetic "response" of the perceiver functions as a touchstone to whether "knowledge about" the object is relevant (whether, for instance, the object's moral point of view or certain critical-review information is relevant).⁵ As the response or, to use my word, the experience, serves to determine what may be included in the aesthetic focus, it serves also as a goal adoption of the aesthetic attitude in the first place.

Since the aesthetic attitude of "disinterested and sympathetic attention" can be easily differentiated conceptually from aesthetic experiencing, it is difficult to see how the aesthetic attitude could avoid being purposeful in the sense that its purpose is to foster aesthetic experiencing. The purposeless viewing cannot itself be the having of an aesthetic experience, since we are instructed to (consciously and voluntarily) view purposelessly. The only reason for us to adopt this attitude is to experience aesthetically, so there is a purpose behind the aesthetic attitude: having an aesthetic experience. An interpretation of 'disinterest' focusing on attention to the object "for its own sake alone," or as an end in itself, is problematic.

My conclusion finds further evidence in the consideration of a position such as Vincent Tomas'. Similar to Stolnitz, Tomas believes that the aesthetic point of view differs from all other points of view in that the aesthetic point of view is characterized by purposeless viewing. Indeed, for Tomas aesthetic viewing is viewing without "labeling" or "conceptualizing" the object in question at all. It follows from this that one could accidentally "fall into" aesthetic viewing. If I simply or merely apply no label or concept to an object, then, according to Tomas, I am viewing that object aesthetically. But I seem to viewing in this way on many occasions when I am not viewing aesthetically. For instance, if I am very tired, I may view an object without considering what it may be used for (et cetera), but fail to receive from that viewing any experience remotely aesthetic. This lends support to the view that pure purposeless viewing is a mistaken cashing out of aesthetic viewing. One has a purpose in viewing aesthetically, and that purpose is to experience aesthetically. The opposite, to "view it for its own sake alone" or "as an end in itself" is too close to viewing the object mindlessly.

II

Now to the second question: is the aesthetic attitude really disinterested? My argument for the aesthetic attitude not being disinterested begins at one step back: at the aesthetic experience. I want to suggest that the criterion against which we may test any aesthetic attitude formulation is whether that attitude will, on the whole, or in the majority of cases, or always *promote* the most rich and rewarding aesthetic experiences. If a formulation fails to do this, then it is suspect. If one formulation does this better than another, then the former ought to be accepted over the latter.

I want to suggest that occasionally being *interested* can *contribute* to the aesthetic experience. Take the following example: say I am watching a horror film, and (incidentally) having an aesthetic experience. This particular film is based on the Biblical accounts of the "last days" of the world. Perhaps the film is the *Omen* or something like that. Now, I might be able to appreciate the film well while still maintaining an attitude of disinterest. I might even be able to appreciate the film more if I take moral even religious attitudes towards it. And, given that these ancillary attitudes do no harm to my aesthetic experience, they may be sanctioned even by the proponents of disinterest (Stolnitz agrees). But what if I take a personal interest in the film? What if I take the very personal and (it would seem) very interested attitude that what I am viewing is *really* what will happen in the final days? Now, suppose that I am a devout Christian, and naive, perhaps, to the embellishment that the director or writer engages in. I may

well feel that I am looking at a "pre-record" of what will actually take place at the end of the time. I submit that I would be rather more terrified than I would be were I simply following the disinterest prescription. If the success of a horror film is based on how frightened it makes its viewers, and the greatest aesthetic experience regarding a horror film is to feel maximally frightened, then to be disinterested towards the film—disinterested *at all*—might be to arm the power of the film, and "settle" for a less robust aesthetic experience.

Here I do not treat the object as an "end in itself," but treat it as a means to something else: I treat it as an historical record (albeit of some point in the future). Now, some may argue that the attitude that I am experiencing or adopting is simply not aesthetic. But I find this enormously implausible. First, I would be bothered if the reason for saying that I am not in the aesthetic attitude is that I am not treating the objects as an end in itself; this would, without further reasons relating to the example above, be tantamount to making experience fit the theory, rather than the other (and correct) way around. Second, however we cash out the aesthetic experience, I can hold firm to my (phenomenal) belief that the experience I am having is an aesthetic one. If I believe that part of the aesthetic experience of watching the horror film is to get "good and scared," then my getting very frightened adds to my overall enjoyment of the film. My interest in the film as an historical vehicle might add to my fright, and as the fright is in this instance an important part of the aesthetic make-up of the film, that interest would enhance my aesthetic experience of that film.

A second sort of example against a disinterested formulation of the aesthetic attitudes comes through a consideration of the power of interpretation and meaning. Many, especially those who place aesthetic value in the experience, tend to believe that the point behind offering critical interpretations and exploring the meaning(s) of artworks is to enhance the experience of viewers who will see, or have seen, or are seeing the works of art in question. Now, it might well be the case that a certain meaning of a work, which seeks to enhance the aesthetic experience of the individual, might also call for the explicit interest of the individual in the object. Take the following example: Suppose that I am a devout Christian (again), specifically an Anglican. Suppose too that I am in attendance at St. Paul's one Sunday. I aesthetically appreciate the formal qualities of the Cathedral, the historical relations, the relations it bears to others of its kind (cathedrals, or cathedrals with domes, or buildings designed by Christopher Wren), and the significance, in Christendom, of the Cathedral. Now suppose that the music begins to play, I see the colorful procession, I smell the cold stone and the hard chairs; soon I feel the kinesthetic sense of standing, kneeling and

sitting in unison with the rest of the congregation, and then I taste the "elements." Now, so far in our description two things are going on: first, I am appreciating or experiencing everything from an aesthetic point of view, I am attending to the aesthetic features of everything that is going on around me and with me; second, I am using all of my senses, experiencing in as full a range as possible.

Now, suppose that instead of being a disinterested attender I become an *interested* participant; that is, I experience or take serious note of the *meaning* behind the ritual characteristic of the act of worship. I experience the "elements" as having the significance that the priest means them to have, et cetera. The question now is this: If my aesthetic experience then becomes greater in the face of the addition of my interest (my "purposeful" engagement in worship), who is to say that my interest does not indeed add to my aesthetic experience? Since disinterestedness is measured in efficacy against the fullness or greatness of the aesthetic experience, the result is that disinterestedness is *not* the appropriate attitude for having the best experience.

Now, one could object that what is happening is that I am experiencing two attitudes at once: one of aesthetic appreciation of the experience, the other of the interest in worship. The problem with this is that (1) I can stand fast in my belief that the attitude I am experiencing is singular, that this engagement *includes* my aesthetic appreciation of the experience (which is, I believe, the position of the Church on this), and (2) if when I become completely focused on the act of worship, my aesthetic experience of what is going on is then heightened, there is the "interested experience" and the "aesthetic experience".

Another example of where disinterest may be hazardous to aesthetic experiencing, and one which also involves meaning, is the view we take to such works as Duchamp's piece, *In Advance of a Broken Arm*, an object which was, before it became an art object, a snow shovel. Here, as in many instances of Dadaist, Modern or Post-Modern art, the meaning behind the phenomenal object seems rather important, to both the establishment of the objects as an art object and to its appreciation as such. In the case of Duchamp piece, it would seem that the function of the object — that it may be used for shoveling snow — plays an important role in the meaning behind the work. I do not mean to suggest that Duchamp is celebrating snow shoveling or anything of that sort. However, without the recognition of the objects as a snow shovel, the meaning of *In Advance of a Broken Arm* as a presented art object would certainly not have the force or engender the interest that it does. Where I to consider the object with no regard for its "purpose" I would find little of interest about it:

it is starkly symmetrical, the red of the paddle and the green of the shaft complement one another, but that's about it.

So how, one might ask, do I deal with the plethora of examples that are offered which are designed to identify attitudes which are both interested ("instrumental" or "purposeful") and non-aesthetic? Very simply: sometimes an attitude characterized or inclusive of disinterest may lead to the best aesthetic experience to the object (or event) in question. And I am willing to go so far as to say that this may be the case in the majority of the instances. However, I contend that disinterest cannot be a *necessary* ingredient in the (or *a*) correct formulation of the aesthetic attitude. It may work some of the time, but it does not work all of the time.

Notes and References

1. Recorded by Dr. Paul Spong; produced by Ralph Harding; published by Total Recording of California, 1989.
2. Immanuel Kant, *Critique of Judgment* (Indianapolis : Hackett, 1987), first sentence of section two of Book One, 45.
- 3 By "Possession," I do not strictly mean "ownership." I have in mind a matter of "continued access."
4. Jerome Stolnitz, *Aesthetics and Philosophy of Art Criticism* (New York: Houghton Mifflin, 1960), 35 (emphasis mine).
5. Stolnitz, *Aesthetics*...., 53.

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Heidegger's Late Address on Art

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Heidegger delivered an address on art in Athens on April 4th of 1967 to the Academy of Arts and Sciences in Athens.¹ An enigma created by its theme concerns the time of delivery. It is obviously a very late address, when Heidegger was 78 years old. It is also late because Heidegger speaks again on art. Why does Heidegger return to this theme at so late an hour, especially after works such as the *Holzwege* essay "Origin of the work of art", which involved the destruction of the history of the ontology in relation to aesthetics? In what work, by raising the question of the aim and the density of art, one was immediately led to Hegel's claim that for us art is, on the side of its highest vocation, something past. Heidegger saw Hegel's lectures on Aesthetics as the most comprehensive reflection on the essence of art that western thought possesses. To recognize that the governance of subjectivity over art is not an invention of aesthetics but merely its expression of the principle that reigns over our entire modern era is to confirm Hegel's aesthetics, which is aesthetics in its most metaphysical form. Given the increasing skepticism on Heidegger's part of their being any emancipatory role for art within technological metaphysics, why return to art? After the Nietzsche and Holderlin lectures, and the remarks Heidegger gives regarding art in its relation to language in his later works, what does Heidegger say in relation to the claim that art is something past?

One typically comes to such a work as Heidegger's Athens address with such questions. What does the address add to the existing Heidegger's thinking on art? And is it too late for Heideggerian view of art? Or is it in some sense too late for art? I have already characterized the Athens address as late. What temporality do I have in mind when I speak of "late" here? Perhaps the first formulation of the question is simplistic. It opposes quantity and quality as if a quantitative transformation—the crossing of certain thresholds within the general machinery of culture, with all its techniques for handling and recording. As if our every reading had to add something measurable to the store of knowledge and information, and speed up the process of acceleration in the hope of avoiding the consequences of being too late, or being able to arrive on time for whatever we are late for. But what does saying this amount to? Why is the hour getting so late with Heidegger regarding art, such that it merits returning to in a thoughtful manner at this time? I am wondering at what speed we have to deal with the problem of art. In this paper I only have time to make basic conclusions. I will

spell out what the issue is for Heidegger regarding art at this time, and what the Athens address has to say in regard to the basic project of Heidegger's thought.

The Background of Heidegger's View of Art

In *Being and Time* Heidegger asked about the meaning of being in a new way.² He reproaches the philosophical tradition with having understood being from a single mode of time, the present. Being was thought as a constant presence, hence, thought from the onesided perspective of presence. But with that the true meaning of being, the question of being itself, was already forgotten. In contrast to the tradition, Heidegger attempted to think being from all three modes of time and thus to think being in the horizon of the temporalization of time as historically. Towards this "ground" all the different kinds of beings -ready-to-hand, present-at-hand, Dasein- are oriented by analogy. But soon after the publication of *Being and Time* Heidegger recognized that this enterprise was aporetic: he criticized the tradition for having sought a last principle and ground in the conceptions of *ousia* and substance. Yet he himself established with the concept of historicity something like a principle that, since it was historical, could not serve as a principle or foundation of being in the former sense.

The attempt to come to an adequate understanding of history drove Heidegger's thinking further. He now saw that the essence of being cannot be grasped by thinking it through a leading meaning. Truth is, rather, of such an essence (*Wesen*) that it conceals some meanings while opening up others. Truth is not only the realm of pure disclosedness; to the truth of being belongs essentially what Heidegger calls the *mysterium*. Truth discloses only on the abyss of its concealing: truth is *Un-verborgenheit*, its essence is also untruth. Truth is characterized by its *wesen* (in the verbal sense). That means that truth itself is an inexhaustible history and as such is posited by Heidegger as the truth of a people. Truth happens in history as great art does. As Heidegger now formulates the matter, following Herder and Holderlin, it is poetry, thinking, and acting that put the historical truth- each in its specific way- into works as the truth of a people.

It is in his lectures in 1934/35 on Holderlin's "Germanien" and "Der Rhein" that the shift begins to take place, where he takes poetry as the leading force in the happening of truth, as the truth of a people. Poetry here becomes a kind of disclosing in an exclusive way, for it is determined as a showing in which the gods manifest themselves. Thus one can speak of the poet as founding the truth of being. In the present metaphysical crisis of the Occident, the poet, the thinker and the founder of a state are to give a ground to the historical

dasein of a people. Poetry is the original discourse and thus the origin of language by which man is set out into being.

In particular Heidegger sets out these thoughts in the course of his lecture - following Holderlin - with regard to the historical role of "Germanien." Can Germanien again become a priestess, the counter of a new day of the gods? To gain this possibility again, it is necessary that the godless situation be experienced and borne out. In this situation temple, picture, and custom are unable to take over the historical sending of a people. "There will be no priests if the lightnings of the gods do not lighten, and they will not lighten, unless the native earth and its whole people as such do come to stay in the realm of the thunderstorm."³ It will, however, never enter this realm, as long as it, as a whole, in its historical dasein as such, does not bring the innermost crisis of the gods to an essential and sustained experience.

To have this experience means nothing less than to decide for the actual time of poetry. In the metaphysical crisis it is the poet who can transform the history of the people by guiding it into the sacred mourning, but prepared affliction. For in this basic mood the opening of being as such first happens, and that means for Heidegger that the truth of a people occurs. Poetry originally founds this basic mood, and with the truth of dasein of a people. In so doing poetry is the preliminary stage to the thinking and founding of the state. By way of Holderlin's hymn "Der Rhein," Heidegger now asks the question about the half-gods who, placed between gods and me, can make the country habitable, as does the river: Heidegger interprets Holderlin's thinking of the half-gods as the thinking of destiny, destiny in its uniqueness. In thinking the being of the half-gods, however, the poet discovers being as a whole. In this his task finds its fulfillment. By founding being poetry renders it possible, first of all, for man to become historical, and this means ultimately to be a people. Again, as in his interpretation of "Germanien," Heidegger sees a unique relationship between Holderlin's poetry and its task. For Heidegger regards Holderlin not only as the greatest poet, but in particular as the poet of the Germans. Holderlin is the founder of the German being, who finds in such a founding of being his metaphysical place. This role of poetry provides the necessary preparation for the leading thoughts of Heidegger's major work on art, "Origin of the Work of Art."⁴

In this work, Heidegger takes the basic conceptions he developed through his encounter with Holderlin: art has little to do with aesthetics but instead is to be thought as the setting-into-work of truth which happens in an exclusive way in poetry. The essence of art is poetry, according to Heidegger. And this

opening up of the realm of truth as *aletheia*, unconcealedness, is preliminary to the setting -into- work that takes place in the act of founding a state and in thinking. When Heidegger determines art as the setting-into-work of truth, the historical dimension of art is already implied. Art is a becoming and happening of truth, of the up of this openness which breaks through as great art in certain epochs of world history. Art is historical not only in the sense that it takes place in history but also in this original sense that only it founds history. Thus art as it happens in the work of art is the origin of the historical *dasein* of a people. Poetry is the exclusive way in which truth happens in the work of art perhaps in its being the essence of a historical people, and this means their belonging to world history. The work of art establishes by its saying a new *mythos* which first of all reveals the historical essence of being, wheather this be truth of things, equipment, or of a people.

For Heidegger, the history of the nature of western art will correspond to the changes in the nature of truth, since within any given social formation what art is will be governed by the concept of an object of that formation's center. It is thus a matter of understanding how the art is for us now where the center is determined by the essence of technology, for it is that which is the center of the present world.

When Heidegger says in that essay that "Art is truth setting itself to work," what does this mean? It is in the sense of truth as unconcealment, as an openness, an opening up so as to make visible. It is neither a property which attaches to the work of art nor is it the contribution of an apprehending and appreciating aesthetic consciousness. It is resident within the work itself. The work of art provides its own self-disclosure. Heidegger's conception of truth in art as bringing into unconcealment is perhaps analogous to a productive conception of truth in science. A work of art reveals a world in a way analogous to the way in which a paradigm or research program institutes an object domain, providing a concept of an object in general, and hence unifying scientific practice by providing guidelines for inquiry, criteria, for the evolution, and so on. A work of great art can reveal the horizons of a world in just the same way that a scientific framework institutes the horizons of a scientific world. Great art transports human beings out of their ordinary realm, in a negative way.

For Heidegger, *techne* must be understood not as producing something, in the manner of an agent using force to push material together into a specific form: it must instead be understood in terms of the deeper meaning hidden in its Greek understanding, the disclosure of something for its own sake, like giving birth. The great work of art is the disclosure or letting-be which enables people

to relate to entities in a way which respected their self disclosive capacities (*physis*). Art today is peripheral, its significance limited to pointing to or gesturing at the normative center without being able to invade it. Art is at the periphery and technology is at the center because the human understanding of *techne* has now constricted and calcified into a mere instrumentalism. A nature poem by Holderlin, the painting of a pair of peasant shoes by Van Gogh; these works claim and solicit us to a mode of revealing that we cannot validate or sustain. the value of art for Heidegger seems to be just this distance, the gap between solicitation and validation. He is not merely archaizing, merely pining for a return to worlds that works of art can still present. Rather, art enacts a world disclosure it cannot deliver; it lives in its failure to attain its ownmost possibility of revealing. *Art's essential impossibility within technological metaphysics reveals the totality of that metaphysics.* Through its failure we come to experience the sense of the periphery, and thus the meaning of the sway of the center. In other words, art's present distance reveals metaphysical closure in that we experience art as a mode of understanding unavailable to us. This unavailability itself signifies and is meaningful to us.

Heidegger's later reflections on art, poetry and language point already in different directions. Holderlin is still the partner of his thinking, yet in a constellation which is much different from his lectures on Holderlin's hymns and the "Origin of the Work of Art" essay: the place of art in the technological world now becomes dominant in Heidegger's thinking. He had come to see that it is not the great individual artists or a people who establish truth in the modern times, but that this epoch, on the contrary, is characterized by a limitless kind of totalitarianism and by the self-assertive humanity as the functionary of technology. Poetry is for Heidegger in the destitute age of fled gods just this creative activity that can bring mankind to a turning. Poets are the mortals who sense the trace of the fled gods. In the unhealing and unholy modern technological world, it is the poets who by their saying are the only ones who are able to bring salvation, to reveal the lost trace of the holy; poets alone are supposed to initiate a countermovement to the age of technology in which man sets himself in opposition to the openness. Poets can achieve the conversion of the parting from and against the openness which is organized by the world-night of technological production.

Heidegger's thinking on art is directly related to the poetic. At the end of the *Holzwege* essay, he makes the claim that all art is essentially *poetic*. This *poetic* is to be understood not in the narrower sense of poetry, the poem as a particular linguistic work. Rather, the *poetic* is now to be thought of as just that

form of thought which thinks non-technologically. As commemorative and responsive, it is a "letting-be" of a primal reality. It neither objectifies nor manipulates the primal reality. *Techne* understood as the disclosive occasioning that makes presencing possible corresponds to the nature of *poiesis* as art and producing. Thinking the "poetic" antedates the split between subject and object and the increasing technification of thought. It is neither localized in an epistemological subject nor is it geared to an objectification of its thought. Such a thinking furrows an opening to the encountered realities and keeps these realities from being congealed into scientific objects. Nor is it to be thought of as a kind of couch-potato passivity, but rather a difficult posturing or comportment that makes possible a disclosure other than that of godless technology.

A final theme to be brought forth to complete this explication of the later Heideggerian liturgy on technology is the role of language. In the *Holzwege* essay, we are told that to comprehend the essentially poetic character of all art we need the "right concept of language". This "right concept" will demand of us a surmounting of the traditional functional and linguistic approaches to language. Language understood as a vehicle of communication, or as an object of linguistic science, although containing its own legitimacy, is not the language of the poetic. Language as communication is the verbal and written exchange designed for the imparting of information. This is language approached in terms of its function and viewed as an instrument for defining, explaining, deducing, and drawing inferences pertinent to objectifiable matters of fact. The linguistic and metalinguistic approaches to language are of the same cloth as in the instrumental approaches to language. In the science of linguistics, language becomes an object with a complex of morphemes, parts of speech, and syntactical and semantic rules. Language understood in this way is an especially complicated and powerful tool, making possible the improvement of numerous cooperative practices that constitute human culture.

A further transformation is made in the still-later Heidegger's thinking about language and poetry. Here Heidegger maintains the sequence of poetry and thinking, but mere things now garner the world-opening capacity. In the essay *Language* this development in the direction of Heidegger's thought occurs for the first time. In his interpretation of Trakl's poem "A Winter Evening" Heidegger asks how and where the speaking of language occurs. The speaking of language which lets thing-world and world-thing come to the between of the difference is expressly what is spoken in the poem. Thus the speaking of the poem brings things and world into their own and calls them into the simple onefold of their intimacy. Following Stefan George, Heidegger states the word of the poet lets

the thing appear(*anwesen*) as thing; in its saying the word "bethings"(*be-dingt*) the thing to the thing. Thus the belonging together of world and thing is now the new subject. Meditating on language can give insight into poesis such that not only pre-eminent things like artworks, but everyday things like bridges can provide insight into the non- technological mode of disclosure.

Technological Metaphysics

We have already made many references to Heidegger's views on technology as a metaphysical crisis. What is meant by this, and how is it related to his views on art? In many respects, the extremity of his thinking along these lines regarding technology serves as a skeleton key by which to unlock his views on art in general. For Heidegger, our age is the one at the end of metaphysics; it is marked by the planetary and universal reign of technology, which is the metaphysics of our time. Its domain neither limits itself to the production of more and more sophisticated machines, nor to the science that this production presupposes and never ceases to re-introduce. It englobes in totality the environment, culture, the fine arts, politics, all of our discourse, learned or otherwise, all of our relations to things, and all human interaction. According to Heidegger, this reign no longer offers to thought any path than the one of the calculation, in regards to which it has exhausted itself in its responsibility to all types of manipulations and plans. Rather than fulfilling its claim to ameliorate the human condition, technology has delivered us over into a different form of captivity. The seamless extremity of technology thus provides for Heidegger a vivid testimony for a peculiar kind of paralysis of thought, and is one of Heidegger's strongest arguments against metaphysics.

The "essence" of technology, its demanding, extracting, setting up in advance to promote something else, in an economy of regulation and security control, entails not so much a process of protection and preservation, but for Heidegger almost the opposite: a loss of shelter, an abandonment, a disclosure. For such a securing movement to be able to take place, there must already be insecurity. As the military connotation suggests, where there is shelter, a harbor, a securing, it is always in response to or in anticipation of a danger, a threat. Heidegger will come to see that the essential movement of technology, the obsession with securing, with placing him to safety, is a response to the unsecuring in which technology as such as well continues to take part. This unsecuring foregrounds the decisive question that emerges from Heidegger's thoughts on technology: how a movement of unsecuring comes to evoke as a response its diametrical opposite, the frantic effort to establish control. The effort is all the more furious because it is constantly goaded on by the unsecuring tendency of

technology as such. That such movement, involving the effort to control and secure, should at the same time be a way of unsecuring, is what must be accounted for.

Later, Heidegger uses this conception of both science and technology as his launching point to describe modernity as the technological age which sees everything as materials for use, ready to order. To say that something is real is to say that it is available for that subject. To be an independent object means that a thing has the kind of reality that allows it to be proposed in objective fashion to the subject. Its whole reality can be made open to objective inspection, lying as it does in a field of entities able to support a set of objective facts. It is constantly available to be represented in a vigorous way. This is not to say that things will be easy to find, or that tough research is not needed; the point has to do with the meaning of reality the object is projected to have whether it is discovered or not. Heidegger eventually understands this ordering to have no focus, no will by which it is imposed, no subject before which it stands. Users themselves belong to the field of resources available for ordering and ready for use. this is modernity as universal imposition.⁵

There is a peculiar completeness to the leveling accomplished in the age of universal imposition. Even the dominant subjectivity Heidegger talked about earlier disappears into the general availability of things to be ordered. There is no first being that grounds all the rest. Everything is functional. This for Heidegger is the culmination of the west's metaphysical drive: the meaning of reality is pure available presence. Everything is in plain view, humans included. There are no hidden dimensions that are anything more than a lack of information.

Universal imposition appears to be the stable mutual availability of all things for ordering. But under the seeming calm is the constant shaking urge to enlarge the reach of order. In a context of subjectivity Heidegger would have attributed this to humanity's need for selfcertainty and then gone to ask where this need comes from. In discussing the situation he is more direct: humanity just belongs within it and is not its source. Humanity acts within possibilities and mode of temporality that solicits and challenges it to further activity.

What is at stake in technology is not simply an order, in the sense of a disembodied command or demand. Rather, it is driving forth out of which a different kind of topology emerges. To name this distinctive topology of modern technology Heidegger uses the word *Gestell* which points to a strange mixture of movement and stasis that distinguishes the goings-on of modern technology and upon which Heidegger places considerable emphasis. *Gestell* is installation, emplacement, imposition, the assigning or appointing of a definite place.

The notion of imposition, of emplacement, collects and assembles the various ways in everything, human beings included, is cornered and set in place. But since the places thus set up are the results of emplacement, they can never be taken for granted, once and for all. As imposition, the goings-on of modern technology thus display a markedly ambivalent character: they arrest, bring to a halt by setting in a place; but this placement itself gives way to a new setting, that of an incessant re-placing of orders, through which new places are set up. The name that Heidegger assigns to the result of this incessant, long-standing placing of orders is: *Bestand*, a "standing-reserve" or "stockpiling". Under the pressure of the standing order, objects lose their distinguishing traits and become stockpiled in the business of ordering.

The irony of the goings-on of emplacement is that there are no secure places. Imposition itself remains tributary of that movement of unsecuring that it ostensibly seeks to escape or ignore. The danger involves forgetting entirely the dependence of imposition upon the displacement of a kind of "poetic ground-breaking". What is dangerous is not technology, but the secret of its going-on, and they are secret inasmuch as they inevitably tend to efface their own heterogeneity: they set in place, but the fixity of such place-setting turns into a placing of orders that can never stop. The more it seeks to place into safety, the less safe it becomes. And since it is a way of emplacement, it really goes nowhere, neither forward, nor backward, but simply on in its machinations and plans, total, repetitive, aimless, circular, and frantic.

The Event

At times Heidegger is unremittingly pessimistic about this state of affairs. Universal imposition is thought to be a nihilism so dark that it lacks the light even to see itself as darkness and instead conceives itself as Enlightenment. His thinking is quite clear on the negative point about human incapacity in this regard, that any such effort produces a new form of objectification. And his thinking is quite unclear about how we might escape from the interlocking systems of technological thought and practice in which our lives are enclosed. In places, the only hope he offers lies in the possibility that the danger by which man is threatened may come to be understood as danger.

Universal imposition affects us immediately and overall, but it is not the last word. There is a possibility that our experience of being challenged within technology could turn us toward something more basic. Heidegger wants to locate this imposition in the place where it is made possible. the universal imposition of technology is not ultimate; something more primal speaks through it. What Heidegger is getting at is perhaps the most obscure idea in all of his

later thinking, but with the preliminary sketch given of what is at stake, Heidegger's views on art, poetry, and language can be seen as attempts to "get at" this obscure idea.

For Heidegger, the epoch of technology is complete in itself. There is no dialectical tension to be resolved by a move to a larger world. There is no ultimate realm, no place beyond technology that we can investigate purely on its own. There is to be no romantic return to some pretechnological skin of this world. In contrast with Hegel there is no final coming together, no logic of an absolute form that is its own content. Still there must be something more to say than just describing universal imposition. Heidegger says: "what we experience in universal imposition as the constellation of man and being through the modern world of technology is a prelude to what is called the event... In the event the possibility opens for us overcoming the simple dominance of universal imposition in a more original happening."⁶

Because the modern world presents everything as open to view and available to understanding, because it takes nothing to be hidden that cannot be revealed by getting more facts, we are ironically in a better position to recognize the conditions that make any world possible. We find ourselves already in a world that presents reality and ourselves in a certain way. Our possibilities are limited to this world. How does this world come to be? What makes it possible? If we think everything has been made present and available, then nothing remains hidden or beyond our world to account for it. In this situation, we can recognize that there is nothing to ground our world but its happening, the happening of a world. There is only the emerging, the event, the coming into unconcealment, the clearing that opens a space for humans to live a certain way of being human. Recognizing this is "emancipatory" - we can know the limits of our world and can refuse to accept as ultimate any of the grounds or measures of principles it offers. there is no future age in which the deeper way things are will be revealed. The event shows the limits of the present world, and any future one will be so limited. The event is that from which the furious movement of technological modernity can be confronted.

In other words, because of the dominance of universal, which plays out and levels out the metaphysical impulse to search for causes and grounds, we are especially situated to experience the event on its own. But this is the most dangerous of situations, for that which most threatens is also the necessary key to overcome that threat. What is troubling is that it is not far from this view to a view which holds that the greater the threat, the better chance there is of recognizing it. It is the very extremity which allows the possibility of its own

recognition as such. Universal imposition can lead us to the event as an effect leads to its cause nor as a content leads to its form. Instead, just how we are led to an understanding of the event is the motor for Heidegger's thinking taking the form of a kind of negative theology on this issue. Art and poetry are always through which the event is intimated.

The most important thing to say about the event, taken on its own, is that there is almost nothing to report about it. Heidegger speaks of it as "withdrawing" and as the "photographic negative of the *Gestell*." The opening of this free space for the appearance of things is not some event that happens elsewhere. It happens not beyond or behind being but, as it were, in front of them. Yet that happening is not obvious. The forgetfulness of the event that Heidegger finds throughout the western tradition is not due to inadvertence on man's part. The very nature of that event is to make beings open and available but not to intrude itself. The event is hiddenness itself. It is therefore not surprising that the event has nothing to show for itself. This is so in several senses. As an opening of the space for the encounter with beings, the event allows things to rise out of the darkness of universal imposition. If the event had qualities of its own, they would need to be made available, unconcealed. It would be some kind of entity among other entities, and the event of unconcealment would be missed. The event itself cannot be an entity or relation among other entities. To think it as an entity is to perform the metaphysical transposition of the wonder of unconcealedness into the question about grounds and causes.

If it is not an entity in its own right, the event does not have a structure, inner necessity, or law, or anything about it that could come to presence on its own. This means there is nothing in it or related to it that serves as a foundation for its occurrence. Therefore there is nothing about it to understand, as the word "understand" is commonly used. There is nothing hidden in it to be ferreted out, nothing to be analyzed, nothing to be used as a first principle or ground or as basis for explanation.

The Athens Address

Heidegger in places indicates that art may yet hold out the possibility of extricating civilization from the extreme danger inherent in the technicity that characterizes our world—historical situation. The extreme danger is that of an oblivion where the poetic nature of our existence is, in effect, paralyzed by the measurable and the calculative in such a way that we can no longer avail ourselves of the dynamic of the poetic nature of our existence. The mode of world-apprehension characteristic of the modern epoch accelerates this extreme debilitation in so far as it seizes and submits any and every entity to a systematic

order that is thoroughly accessible to measure and calculation. Technicity establishes a network within which any and every entity is already integrated into the measurable and the calculative. This supports the research methodology characteristic of modern science. This also results in the relegation of art to the status of the "merely aesthetic." Thus Heidegger is giving his spin to the Hegelian thesis of the "end of art." According to Hegle's philosophy of the evolutionary advance of human spiritual life, in the modern era art has forfeited its former role as the pre-eminent vehicle for the sensuous expression of spirit, the role it enjoyed in ancient Greece. The ideal balance between the moments of sensuousness and truth, represented in Greek sculpture, has been surpassed in the modern world in which the higher, more non-sensuous intellectual expression of truth, the concept, has come to prominence. The death of art for Hegel refers not to the literal disappearance of art, but rather to the fact that the classical symmetry of the "Ideal" has been irretrievably lost, that the old guidelines or artistic creation have entered into a state of crisis, and thus the superior form of spiritual expression represented by the philosophical concept. Heidegger agrees that art is something past, but for different reasons. In order that art may succeed in providing a possibility for extricating civilization from the extreme danger of our world-historical situation, the relegation of art to the status of the merely aesthetic must be brought to an end.

With this, we can look again at the Athens address. Heidegger begins his address to the members of the academy by stating that he wishes to think with his audience about the ancient Greek world, the world which once constituted the beginning of our western art and science. Historically this world has obviously passed. Yet from the viewpoint of the destiny of being one can say that this world, provided we make an effort to experience it as our destiny, is still present and continues to come-to-presence. As such this world is something that still waits for us (*Gegenwart*) so that we think towards it. For that beginning is the greatest which has the character of a destiny that flows from being's sending. For such a beginning governs over all that will come later.

This world is certainly, for the historian, a world of the past. But for history, if we experience it as that which is destined to us, it still remains and it will always remain a present existing new one: something which expects from us that while thinking we move towards recognizing it, and that we thereby place on trial our own thought and our own artistic creation. Because the beginning of a destiny is what is greater. In advance it holds all that comes before it in its power.

We are meditating on the origin of art in Greece. We are trying to glance into domain which before any art already is exercising its power which alone accords to art that which makes of it what it is.[p.360]

Thus we must try to reflect on the origin of art in Hellas. In Heidegger's view, we must do this by making an effort to look into that domain which governs before all art and grants to art what is proper to it. In so doing we are obviously not concerned with just giving a definition of art: nor are we interested in a scientifically historical description of the origin of art in Greece. What can we learn from the manner in which the Greeks conceived of Athena, the goddess of the sciences and the arts? What are we to say about contemporary art in light of its origin in the Greek world? What determines our thinking which tries to reflect on the origin of art? Heidegger in many ways replays in miniature his entire thinking on art.

...let us bring before us the sacred relief from the museum of the Acropolis. On it Athena appears as the *skeptomenon*, the one who meditates. Towards what is the meditative glance of the goddess turned? Towards the edge, the limit. The limit is certainly not only the limit but the frame, not only the place where something stops. The limit means that by which something is brought together into what it has of its own, to appear thereby together into its full plenitude, to come into presence. Meditating on the limit Athena already has in sight that towards which human action must be directed in order to be able to carry what she has been in the visibility of a work. Still more, the meditative glance of the goddess not only penetrates the invisible from the possible works of men. Athena's look lands above all on what by itself allows to appear in the seal of their presence the things which do not have to be produced by man. That the Greeks call from all antiquity the *physis*. The Roman translation of the word *physis* by *natura* and finally, being with it the concept of nature become dominant in the thought of western Europe completely hides the sense of what *physis* designates: what appears by itself in the limit which each time is its own and which has in this limit its stay.[p. 368]

For the Greeks Athena was the daughter of Zeus. Homer calls her *polumetis*, the one who gives counsel in many ways: she is the goddess of many counsels. In the temple of Zeus in Olympia she is portrayed as the goddess who makes pottery and utensils, as the goddess of the *technites*. *Techne* refers to a form of knowing that one encounters in the philosopher, the scientist, the artist, and the orator. Athena is also *glaukopis*, the one with gleaming eyes, the one

with eyes of a night owl. She is equally called *skeptomene*, the one who looks carefully, who looks at the boundaries, but also at all that is, at *physis*, at that which emerges and as emerging abides. According to Heraclitus, *physis* likes to hide (*kruptesthai philei*): it is the mysterious. All art originates from *physis*, but this does not at all entail that art just imitates nature.

Finally, *techne* and *physis* belong together. The Greeks were convinced of this. Yet the element of the domain in which these two belong together, i.e., the coming-to-pass of the truth of being and the ontological difference itself, the Greeks did not yet think explicitly. The same is true for the domain with which the arts concern themselves, i.e., being as the holy. Yet in classical Greece both the thinkers and the poets have often touched on this domain and this mystery. Heraclitus is said to have stated that everything is steered by the lightning flash (*ta da panta oiakizei keraunos*). According to Aeschylus only Athena has the key to the house in which the lightning flash is sealed and rests.

But what about today, now that all the old gods have fled? Is there today, after 2.000 years, still an art which stands under the same demand as once the arts did in Greece? And if this is not so, from where then does this demand come to which all arts today try to respond? The modern art works no longer originate from the form-giving boundaries of a world which is the world of people and of a nation. Today they all belong to the university of a world-civilization which is governed and dominated by science and technology.

One is thus inclined to think that the domain from which today for the arts this demand has to come, is the scientific and technological world. Heidegger hesitates to affirm this. For what does the expression "scientific world" mean? Heidegger cites Nietzsche's claim regarding the victory of the scientific method over the sciences. What is meant here by method is not just the methodical procedures that can be determined by principles and rules; rather it is the entire process of projection and thematization which implies the staking out the relevant domain, the establishing of the aspect under which things will be viewed henceforth, the typical objectification, the methods taken in the limited sense of the term, the adequate language, the relevant conceptual framework, the proper conception of truth, etc. From such a thematization it follows that for each science only that truly is, that can be scientifically measured and experienced. One finds the extreme form of this scientific method in modern cybernetics and information and communication theory.⁷

The method is the project which in advance has a hold on the world, establishes that in which only it can be submitted to research. And what is this project? Answer: that anything which is accessible to experimentation

and controllable by it be subjected to calculation. To this project of a world the individual sciences remain subject in their pace. That is why the method thus understood is the victory over science. Victory in itself comprises a decision. It affirms: only that which is scientifically demonstrable, that is to say, calculable, is worthy of being truly real. Thanks to calculability, the world becomes, always and especially, subject to the mastery of man. The method is victorious provocation thrown at the world in order that it might be in general at the full disposition of man. The victory of the method over science took its departure in the 17th century, thanks to Galileo and to Newton, in Europe and nowhere else on this earth. [p. 371-72]

Heidegger then gives a brief summary of the basic ideas proposed by cybernetics and futurology. He also explains how it is possible today to develop a self-regulating and self—correcting mechanism, which makes use of information input, feedback, and autoregulation. He then shows how these ideas are now used in microbiology and genetics and how it is argued there that in principle man in his interaction with his environment, on the basis of gene-coding(DNA), can be understood in cybernetic terms, even though one admits at the same time that today man is still considered to be an element of disturbance in the overall environment system.

The victory of the method is developed today in its most extreme possibilities as cybernetics. The Greek word *cybernetics* is the name of that which holds control. The scientific world is becoming a cybernetic world. The cybernetic project of the world supports in its preliminary foreclosure that the fundamental characteristic of all the calculable processes of the world is control. The control of one process by another is made possible by the transmission of a piece of information. To the degree where the control process sends messages back to one in control thusly informs him, the control has the character of acting as feedback of the information. The regulation in both directions of the process in mutual contact therefore brings about a circular movement. That is why the circularity of regulation is the fundamental character of the world which cybernetics projects. On it rests the possibility of autoregulation, the automation of the system motor. In the cybernetic representation of the world, the difference between living beings and automated machines is abolished. It is neutralized by the information process, which makes no difference. The cybernetic project of the world, the victory of the method over science makes it possible for the animate and inanimate world to

be submitted to a generally equivalent calculation and in this universal sense, to a calculation, that is to say a mastery. Man also has his assigned spot in this uniformity of the cybernetic world. To such a degree that this place of man's is completely individual. Actually, on the horizon of the cybernetic representation, man has his place in the widest possible circuit...The penetration of the genetic structure of human sex-cells by biochemistry and the tissue of the atom by nuclear physics both rest on the same path, that of the victory of the method over science. [p.372-73]

As we earlier spelled out, for Heidegger the being of entities in the technological age knows nothing other than the goal of its own totality, a presencing which compels humanity to organize everything in an endless quest for power for its own sake. That the technological system is not under human control can be determined in the self-referential, cybernetic systems. The cybernetic character of the modern technology distinguishes it from the Machine Age. The great iron works and mills of the Industrial Revolution were still owned and controlled by self-interested human subjects striving for power. In the twentieth century, however, the technological disclosure of entities mobilizes everything, humans included, into the project of increasing the power of the technological system itself, all under the guise of improving the human estate. In his *Spiegel* interview in 1966, when asked what has taken the place of philosophy, Heidegger replied "cybernetics." Earlier in that interview, when asked why he thought modern technology should be overcome when in fact everything was functioning: power plants were being built, production was at a peak, and people in the industrialized world have a higher standard of living. "What is missing here?" Heidegger replied, "Everything is functioning. That is exactly what is so uncanny, that everything is functioning, and that technology tears men loose from the earth and uproots them".⁸ He says as much again here: "We only measure the total extent of the cybernetic futurological science of man if we take into consideration the presupposition on which it is based... The anonymous authority of science is considered untouchable." [p.374-375]

In the third section of his Athens address Heidegger turns to the question about the domain from which the demand comes to the arts today. Is this the cybernetic world and the futurologically planned industrial society? As Heidegger sees it the basic trait of the entire cybernetic projection of the world is to be found in the *Regelkreis*, in that circular process in which the information flows back to its source via some feedback mechanism. In the final analysis this circular process also includes man and his world. But this means that all relations of

man to his world, and thus man's entire social existence, are included in the domain of domination determined by the cybernetic sciences.

One finds the same enslavement and imprisonment in futurology. It appears that the future which futurology is able to bring to light is no more than a present that it just prolonged indefinitely. Thus here, too, man remains included in the domain of possibilities which has been so made available. As for our industrial society, it has made itself the measure of all objectivity. Thus our industrial society exists today only and exclusively on the ground that it itself is included in the "things" which it itself has made.

In the art address, Heidegger expands on the cybernetic character of modern technology. The victory of method over science means the way in which the sphere of the objects to be investigated gets demarcated in advance. Scientific method is a projection of the world which determines that the real is what can be calculated in mathematical terms. This victory of method achieves its utmost possibility in cybernetics. The word derives from the Greek word meaning helmsman. According to the cybernetic world projection, the basic trait of all calculable world processes is steering.⁹ Information provides the meditation necessary for one process to be steered through another. To the extent that the steered process provides information which affects the steering process, steering has the character of informational feedback. Cybernetic processes thus have a circular dimension, an ordering circuit. And humanity gets taken into the cybernetic project in a particularly powerful way. Having become the subject for whom the entire world is its object, technological humanity becomes an element in the gigantic feedback circuit in which information about the object alters humanity. As science discovers more about the genetic structure of the human organism, this information can alter the way in which humanity treats its own organic body. Humanity becomes its own object: biochemical engineers define human life in terms of the genetic structure of the germ cell. Learning the alphabet of the genetic code may eventually enable scientists and engineers to produce and breed humans. Heidegger says as much in the Athens address, suggesting that technological man has been inspired by Nietzsche's remark that "man is the yet uncompleted animal." Guided by the technological principle of total self-control, man will be the only animal capable of steering its own evolution. While humanity cannot yet manufacture itself in factories, it is moving in that direction. Certainly "futures" represents the impulse to planning and control which foresees a totally micro-managed world.

How does art stand in the heart of the industrial society whose world is beginning to become cybernetic? Are the expressions of art becoming

a kind of datum in this world and for it? Will its productions thereby be destined to satisfy the process character of the individual control circuit and its permanent possibility of accomplishment? Can the work of art, if it is so, remain a work of art? Is not its modern sense that from the outset, it is already exceeded to the advantages of the progressive completion of the process of creation, which is ruled only by itself and thus remains enclosed in itself. Does not modern art appear as a feedback of data into the control circuit of industrial society and of the technico-scientific world? [p.376]

Heidegger's questions resound here. What then can we still say about art in our industrial societies? Is it possible for a work of art to remain a genuine work in such a world? Is art in our industrial society not just one link in the feedback loop which sends information from society to world and from world to society, in a manner that is determined by modern science and technology? Is art not just one element in a large culture industry? And what is one to say about the fact that man himself has also been included in his scientific and technological world? Is this being-included in this world not the explanation of why man is closed off from that which has precisely sent him into the destiny that is proper for him? Is this perhaps the explanation of why man tries today to have control over himself and his world by means of science and technology, instead of orienting and ordering himself to what has been apportioned to him by that which has sent him in his particular way? Is a hope that is understood in a scientific and technological manner not the unconditioned selfishness of human subjectivity?

But can man, who stands in our modern world civilization, still overcome this being-closed-off from what has sent him? Certainly not, if he were to try to do so with the help of scientific and technological means only. Can man pretend and assume that he himself can overcome this being-closed off from what has sent him? This would be *hubris*. Man can never do this; yet that which has sent man will never be disclosed without man either. What kind of opening-up and disclosing are we then talking about here, and how can man still prepare himself for it? What is necessary is a step in reverse, *ein Schritt Zurück*. Back to the origin to which the goddess Athena points.

It is necessary to take a step back. Backward towards where? Back towards the beginning which was announced to us when we referred to it with the goddess Athena. But this step backwards does not mean that it would be necessary in one way or the other to make the world of ancient Greece live again and that thought should look for its refuge in

the presocratic philosophers. A step back means that thought recoils before the world and taking its distance vis-a-vis it, not denying it at all, it is introduced into what must remain yet unthought at the beginning of western thought, but which is already also named, and thus said to our thought. More yet the meditation which we have just attempted, already had in sight this unthought, without explaining as such. By the returning to Athena, the counselor of multiple resources, and who with her clairvoyant sight meditates on the limit, we have been made attentive to the mountains, the islands, the forms and figures which appear beginning with their presence of things in this famous light.[p.378]

This does not mean a passive return to the Greek world; nor does it mean that our thinking should limit itself to a mere remembrance of pre-Socratic thought. The step in reverse should be a step back from our actual world civilization, an effort to think that which in our entire western tradition remained unthought, even though it was often named mentioned, the belonging-together of *physis* and *techne* and about the coming-to-presence of things in an appropriate manner. There are no roots to be found in a different, deeper revelation of the being of the things that is somehow "underneath" the technological world. There can be for Heidegger no historically constant basic revelation of things that is then covered over. If the *Gestell* is what truly clears the space for us to be now, then it is not covering some deeper and fuller revelation of things. There is nothing under the cybernetic skin but finitude and what will be seen as the mutual need of man and the event. Heidegger is not claiming that things first come to presence. Such a view would violate Heidegger's thought about the finitude and historicity of all unconcealedness. If the pronouncement concerning the Greek experience of *aletheia* is not about some historically constant basic revelation of things, what is Heidegger doing? He is describing not some previous world that is becoming lost to us, but the "worlding of any world." The failure of art today reveals the worlding of a world in any age; not a deeper but a different way to experiencing the preconceptual and prepropositional inhabitation of the present world. It is a kind of formal description of the belonging together that is the event in any of its dispensations.

Let us meditate again on this in a more thoughtful way, the light can only illuminate what is present if what is present is already opened in an opening and disengagement, and by this fact can already be extended. This opening is certainly illuminated by the light, but in one way it is formed and produced by it. Because even the dark needs this opening

without which we could not advance through the darkness and clear a part through it. [p. 379]

Yet the light mentioned can illuminate that which comes- to- present only when the latter has already emerged in something that is open and free. The light illuminates this openness yet it does not bring it forth or even bring it close. For darkness and that which is dark also need this open "place." Without this openness no space could ever make room for things, give them their place, and order them to each other. Without this openness time could never temporalize. The openness thus grants both time and space as well as their belonging together. The release of what is free, which grants the open for the first time, is called in Greek *aleiheia*, non-concealment, because the latter needs the former; *physis kruptesthai philei*. The mystery of the light belongs within the domain of non-concealment and within the revealment that governs in this domain. Non-concealment belongs to concealment; and it itself conceals itself in order that things may manifest themselves.

Heidegger then asks the question of wheather there is perhaps some relationship between our being closed-off with respect to the sending, and the non-concealment which remained thus far unthought? Is this being-closed off perhaps the withholding of non- concealment which has been governing for so long? This hint which points to the mystery of the unthought non-concealment, does it perhaps at the same time point to the domain from which art originates? Must the work of art not point to that which conceals itself, i.e., the domain of the holy, in order that the work not just say what one knows already? And must the work not also keep silent about that which hides itself, so that the human being can approach what hides itself with the proper respect and reverence as something that cannot be planned or steered?

The secret of the famous Greek light recoils in revealed being, in the uncovered which reigns in it. It behooves taking cover and it itself takes cover, but in such a way that thanks to this returning of self, it leaves to things their sojourn, which appears right from the delimitation. And if there reigned a tie hardly suspected between the closing vis-a-vis the destiny and the uncovered being who is still in thought who is still holding back? Is the closure before destiny the reserve which has lasted a long time, of the uncovered being? And what if the sign which introduces us to the secret of the *aletheia* still unthought, introduces us at the same time into the region from which art comes? Is it from this region which comes the need for the production of works? The work, as a work, must it not beckon towards what is not available to man,

towards what takes over, in order for the work not to say what one already knows, already recognizes, already practices? Is it not necessary for the work of art to remain silent about what takes over, about what, in covering up, reveals modesty in man, before that which does not allow itself to be planned, nor directed, nor calculated, nor done? Will it still be given to the man of this earth to find, remaining in it, a place in the world that is a home, which is defined by the voice of the revealed being covering up? We do not know. But we know that the *aletheia* which is taking cover in the Greek light and which agrees right off that the light is older, more original, and thereby more durable than any work of figure imagined by man and worked by the hand of man.[p.379]

Is it still possible for contemporary man to find a place of sojourn in this world, a dwelling place, which will be determined by the voice of the non-concealment that hides itself? According to Heidegger, we do not know this. In the Athens address, he makes the claim that even hoping for this possibility is an expression of metaphysical subjectivity. Yet we do know that *aletheia* is older, more primordial and original, and therefore also more permanent than whatever humans can fathom. We also know that for our scientific and technological world non-concealment is that which is most insignificant and the least important. Is it indeed significant, or is it not? In Heidegger's opinion a saying by Pindar is relevant here. The word, because it is further ahead in time than every deed, determines life, provided language makes it emerge from the depth of the pondering heart with the favor of the three Graces.

The non-technological language of the poetic plays an indispensable role in the event: indeed, only insofar as our language is the language of the poetic are we able to witness and participate in the event appropriately. The character of discourse provides the horizon for the possibilities of understanding everything out under technology, because the contextual place opened up and articulated by the event is a *language*d place. The language and expressions of metaphysics, logic, and technology, operate according to principles which displace and shut out the full self-concealing character of this event, in effect alienating themselves from their own source. Heidegger's own late lectures furtively resist such "technological" language. His discussions are presented in bits and pieces, in hints and metaphors and etymological maneuvers, in a dialogue form, in remarks on art works and meditations on poems. The natural inclination is to try to picture some unifying concept that will resolve the mixtures into a whole, but this will not do, for the idea is not to produce anything resembling an allegory

of ideas. The effect of Heidegger's efforts is to block any attempt to reduce what he is saying to a unitary concept. The effort to say what it is is misguided. In the end, it is not a portable concept to be taken from Heidegger's texts. If one wanted to say what the "poetic" is, one must say all of what heidegger says, and perhaps in no particular order.

The Athens address preserves the tension within Heidegger's thought regarding how the art work could serve as a way to "step back" from the technological impulse of modernity. Modern art is simply too undermined by subjectivism, commercialism, and other aspects of universal imposition to have much more than a negative, distancing revelation. The condition of the work of art in modernity nevertheless reveals something about the age: namely, that there are no things or even objects left. The modern work of art for Heidegger reveals that everything has been reduced to undifferentiable and denuded stockpiling. Art as *poiesis* for Heidegger is a movement via negativa from the standpoint of the activity of technology, but in a very qualified sense. It cannot become its own object of scrutiny. The opposition technological/ and non-technological cannot become the object of a strict, rigorous, serious analysis without one of those terms determining the value of the discourse itself. The thinking here must work at not becoming an integral part of the object it claims to follow, must obtain constantly to avoid the certainty of traditional concepts of art and language. What happens here is that we are in a position of not knowing what to say about art. We are maneuvered out of the theoretical attitude with respect to it. We are further than ever from getting a fix on it. And yet it is precisely because art, wherein we witness the happening of the origination of that which it is the task of thought to think, is poorest at pointing to and speaking out itself that this event has gone unthought in the history of thought, even though it is precisely this event which first lets there be a history of thought whatsoever. This is why Heidegger's later work takes the forms it does, and why he finds artists poets who have given themselves over to listening to the claims and possibilities of language to be closer to the call of the event than philosophers who have insisted upon the language of rigorous categories and logic. The original identity to which both man and being belong is found in the way in which each belongs to language in this special sense of opening.¹⁰

... *aletheia*- the revealed being that is itself concealing- a simple word, unthought in what it says in advance to the history of western Europe and to the world civilization which is an offshoot of it. A simple word? Impotent in the face of the action and the acts in the gigantic laboratory of scientific technology? Or rather is it another situation with a word

of this type and of this origin? Or rather is it another situation with a word of this type and of this origin? To conclude let us listen to a Greek word that the poet says at the beginning of his 4th Nemean Ode: "And the word lives well beyond the acts. If only by the favor of the graces, language will draw upon the abyss of the heart." [p.380]

This is one of the reasons why his thought is led to the poetic, which is both related to the goading-forth of technology, and yet sufficiently different from it to open the space for a confrontation with its activity. In many ways technology's ubiquity is necessary for some more original determination of man and being. So too does it now seem necessary, this late in the game, to address Athena, the one of many counsels. On the metope of Atlas from the temple of Zeus of Olympia, Heidegger follows her look, her guidance, to steer us with new bearings through that greatest of danger which always conceals its danger to itself within itself. What could she advise *this late* which would be neither the silent announcement of a world condition of the darkening of being through the essencing of technology, nor the replaying of the difficulties that Heidegger's thinking about art sought to make us aware in the first place, that we will not really even question technology but, in a way which makes every such address late, merely execute its mandate in a feedback circuit, the greater speed of which the less time is there to think?

Notes and References

- 1 The address, entitled "Die Herkunft der kunst und die Bestimmung des Denkens," is available, to my knowledge, only in German and French. For the German versions, consider Heidegger, *Denkerfahrungen*, ed. Hermann Heidegger. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. It is available also in *Distanz und Nahe, Reflexion und Analysen Zur Kunst der Gegenwart* (Festschrift für walter Biemel), ed. by P. Jaeger and R. Luthé. Würzburg: Königshausen and Neumann, 1983, pp. 11-22. For the French version, see Martin Heidegger: *Cahier de l'Herne* #45. Paris: Librairie Generale Francaise, 1983, pp. 365-380. the translations in the present text, and their pagination, are taken from the French text, and are for the most part the work of my colleague Professor Tom Brown of the French department of Ashland University. Douglas Chismar of Ashland University also helped on German and Greek nuances of the translation.
- 2 Heidegger. *Being and Time*. Translation by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper and Row, 1962.
- 3 Heidegger, "Holderlin's 'Germanien' und 'Der Rhein'" [Winter Semester, 1934-5] in *Gesamtausgabe*, Vol. 39, ed. by Susanne Ziegler. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1980, p. 100
- 4 Heidegger, *Holzwege*. 5th edition. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1972. "The Origin of the Work of Art." Translated by Albert Hofstadter. In *Poetry, Language, Thought*, pp. 15-88. New York: Harper and Row, 1971.
- 5 Heidegger's remarks on technology are spread throughout several texts, but are most concentrated in "The Age of the World- Picture" and "The Question Concerning Technology." Translated by William Lovitt. In *The Question concerning Technology and other Essays*, 115-154. New York: Harper and Row, 1977. I follow Kolb's translation of Gestell as "universal imposition." See David Kolb, *The Critique of Pure Modernity*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986.

6 I translate *Ereignis* merely as the event. Heidegger's views on Ereignis are as well spread throughout various texts. Good starting places are: *Identity and Difference*, translated by Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper and Row, 1969; Heraclitus Seminar, translated by Charles Siebert. University of Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1979; *On Time and Being*, translated by Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper and Row, 1972.

7 In "Age of the World-Picture" Heidegger describes how experimentation in modern science, the characteristic methodology of modern science, adheres to a rigor that is guaranteed by a fixed "ground-breaking" schema that is projected in advance of the setting up and execution of experimentation. Experimentation is guided by a set of rules or principles that are determined to be applicable to the diversity of facts even as they change, and the laws that are determined to hold change constant in a necessary course or direction. An example of the type of principle Heidegger describes is the principle of inertia. Experimentation thus integrates the manifold of facts in flux within the "ground-breaking" schema that is projected in advance. Explanation of what is already known is provided by facts that are displayed in the course of experimentation, and explanation of facts that are displayed in the course of experimentation is provided by facts which have already been brought under the purview of the principles of the laws at work in the "ground-breaking" schema. This methodology is continually adapted to results of experimentation. This constitutes the *Betrieb*, the "driven activity" characteristic of modern science. For Heidegger, within the complex machinery that is necessary to physics in order to carry out the smashing of the atom lies hidden in the whole of physics up to now.

The projected "ground-breaking" schema guarantees the rigor of scientific methodology insofar as it becomes identified with nature as such. Heidegger describes the schema as the self-contained system of motion of units or mass related spatiotemporally. Into this ground plan of nature as supplied in keeping with a prior stipulation, the following definitions among others have been incorporated: motion means change of place. No motion or direction of motion is superior to any other. Every place is equal to every other. Every force is defined according to -- i.e., is only -- its consequences in motion, and that means in magnitude or change of place in the unity of time. Rather than a discovery of nature, modern science, with its methodology of experimentation and explanation, announces the institution and establishment of the already projected "ground-breaking" schema as nature per se. This identification is inseparable from a mode of world-apprehension whereby world is apprehended as picture.

Anything and everything is "brought to stand before oneself as standing over against oneself" -- everything is proposed, or represented, to oneself. World is apprehended as picture. Once this takes place, the existence of any and every entity is identified with the position that it holds exclusively. That position is dependent upon a subject that apprehends the world-as-picture. The subject takes over the identity of the essential nature of a human being. The order or arrangement of entities in the picture is one that involves, essentially, the possibility of being totally deployed or exhibited as a system. These features of the apprehension of world-as-picture are indispensable for the scientific operation of bringing the diversity of facts in flux under the purview of principles and laws at work in the projected "ground-breaking" schema, and thereby rendering the sphere of research, opened by that schema, thoroughly accessible to scientific methodology.

In pointing out the indications in Descartes' work of the limited or finite character of the identification of the subject as metaphysical ground in relation to visual perception, Merleau-Ponty picks up this thread and points out how Descartes's work holds open possibilities of modes of world-apprehension other than that which is essential to the metaphysical foundations of the modern epoch. In his essay "Eye and Mind," Merleau-Ponty discusses Descartes' understanding of Renaissance art and his investigation of sight in *The Dioptric*, essentially following the working out of the metaphysical foundations of the modern age that entail the apprehension of world-as-picture according to Heidegger. See Heidegger, "Age of the World-Picture," in *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*. Translated by William Lovitt. New York: Harper and Row, 1977, p.115-155; and Merleau-Ponty, "Eye and Mind," in *The Primacy of Perception*. Northwestern University Press, 1964, pp. 159-193.

- 8 Heidegger, "Only a god Can Save Us." Interview in *Der Spiegel*, May, 1976. Translated by William Richardson in *Heidegger: The man and his Thought*. Chicago: Precedent, 1981, pp.45-72.
- 9 Heidegger also discusses this in his contemporaneous *Heraclitus Seminar*, translated by Charles Siebert. University of Alabama: University of Alabama Press, 1979, pp.11-14.
- 10 Petzet's recent book shows Heidegger to have a lifelong interest in arts other than painting and poetry. See Heinrich Petzet, *Encounters and Dialogues with Martin Heidegger, 1929-1976*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.

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Review Article

DAVID BEST, *The Rationality of Feeling*,

The Falmer Press, London, 1992, pp.211

David Best's *The Rationality of Feeling* marks the further progress—indeed, in some sense, the culmination - of work Professor Best began with his publication of *Expression in Movement and the Arts* (Lepus Books) and *Feeling and Reason in the Arts* (Allen & Unwin) 1984. This new work marks the latest and most powerful statement of Best's views on a number of matters crucial to Arts Education and, given the arrival, implementation and requirements of National Curricula all over the world, it could not have come at a more opportune time.

- - Professor Best is concerned to expose and refute two "Myths", the continuing prevalence, promulgation and projection of which - not least by members of the Arts Education community themselves - he believes to be severely damaging and potentially fatal to the place and standing of the Arts as indispensable elements in the curricula of educational institutions. The first "myth" Dr Best attacks is that of subjectivism; this is a thesis that takes two forms: (a) the belief that there are some experiences that are purely private and amenable only (presumably by some kind of introspection or direct and privileged self-knowledge) to the one having the experience (this is a manifestation of, and often goes along with, a fierce tenure of some kind of dualism, of which Mind-Body dualism is perhaps the most common); and (b) the belief that value judgments (particularly artistic judgments) are merely expressions of private taste and personal preference-in sum, simply whether one "likes" a work of art (or, come to that, a piece of behavior) or not is held to be sufficient justification for making a judgment about it. The second "myth" is that of "scientism", which we may see as the continued privileging of a form of positivism or verificationism; this view holds that, in contradistinction to the supposedly "soft" of "highly subjective" realms of the arts, morality or religion (the cognitive status of which amounts to little more than expressions of belief or even prejudice, the natural sciences and mathematics are paradigms of neutrality, objectivity and knowledge.

Both Myths are subjected throughout this book to devastating refutation by Best, who in the best philosophical tradition - shows that there are much better, securer and more objective arguments, that can be deployed so as to underpin the case for the arts in education, and urges that these should be embraced and propounded by arts educators, as a way of ensuring that the

curriculum is humanised and made a focus for the educational endeavor of a community concerned to secure its culture and give meaning and value to its life.

Professor Best is concerned to argue from the beginning of his book onwards that "artistic experience is as fully rational, and as fully involves cognition or understanding, as any discipline in the curriculum, including the so-called core areas of the sciences and mathematics". He wishes to "insist that artistic feeling is itself cognitive and open to objective justification."

He maintains that the roots of artistic understanding are our natural responses to and engagement in the arts and related activities. Our natural responses to, actions involved in, and activities of, the arts give sense to the reasons with which we objectify our artistic judgments. The roots of artistic, as of any form of understanding, are to be found in what is involved in a child's learning, in the natural ways of responding and acting which are the preconditions of learning. ACTION lies at the root learning - action which takes place in and inseparably from a social context, and which is an expression of cultural practices. But of course action itself is..... inseparable from feeling, cognition and rationality.

Professor Best's principal target is what he calls the fallacious, mischievous and educationally disastrous doctrine of subjectivism. He argues that a major source of subjectivist assumptions in and about the arts is a misconception regarding the nature of objectivity, knowledge and learning. He develops a powerful version of objectivity and maintains that artistic appreciation, like understanding in any sphere, allows the indefinite but not unlimited possibility of interpretation and of the extension of understanding which gives sense to interpretation and judgment. Knowledge and objectivity of any kind, he shows, rest on underlying conceptual grasp and human judgment. He concedes that artistic appreciation is certainly an individual matter, in that fully to appreciate a work of art one must have experienced and thought about it for oneself. But so far from implying subjectivism, that amounts to a repudiation of subjectivism - for what can thought amount to if it is not thought about the work ?

Best makes the important point that differences of opinion and even debating with oneself about the interpretation and evaluation of what is expressed in a work of art are central to the character of artistic appreciation. He argues that this inevitable and desirable range of individual variations in response, interpretation and evaluation is not incompatible with objectivity, rationality and the possibility of reaching understanding and perhaps agreement. It mistakes the

character of rationality & objectivity to suppose that a separate category of a relativistic kind is necessary for such debates and differences.

His attack on subjectivism and individualism he develops by maintaining that in the arts, language and many other aspects of human life, the possibility of individual development in thought and experience, so far from being restricted by, actually depends upon the learning of the disciplines of objective publicly shared cultural practices. The commonly assumed polarity between freedom to express oneself and the learning of disciplines he claims is completely misconceived and potentially disastrous educationally. Pupil progress in the arts and language depends crucially upon the activities of first class teachers, who are prepared to intervene and give direction. To fail to intervene is to fail to educate.

Best takes this argument further with respect to "creativity". He points out that it is unintelligible to suppose that learning can be achieved without the imposition of any expectation and therefore limitations at all. It follows from this that the notion of being creative in a vacuum is no just impossible; indeed it makes no sense. The very sense of creativity is given by the medium, discipline, and criteria of the relevant subject or activity. Elsewhere Best refers to Martha Graham's dictum that one needs at least five years rigorous training in the discipline to be able to be spontaneous in dance. The same might be said with respect to creativity.

Apart from the powerful and forceful anthropological argument developed in Chapter 2, which underpins the whole case presented in the book, probably the finest, most complex and most convincing argument in the whole of the book is that on "Feeling" put forward in Chapter 8. In an extended essay in the philosophy of mind and language, Best argues, in a passage reminiscent of a point of Strawson's on *Individuals*, that, while a physical body is not the kind of thing that can have feelings, a human being is; so, similarly, while a physical object is not the kind of thing that can express feeling, a work of art is. Best maintains that the feeling is a quality of the art object and that is why a work of art has an expressive quality; in our learning to understand an art form, we are at the same time learning to understand the criteria for the feelings expressed in it.

Best carries the weight of this argument forward to expose the unintelligibility and futility of subjectivist claims that "feeling" and "creativity" must lie there somewhere, behind or embodied in the human being or the work of art; rather he claims feeling is what art necessarily expresses. The intention of the artist cannot be characterised independently of the concept of art. This entails that feeling can be learned, both in the arts and indeed generally. The education of

feeling in the arts, Best avers, consist in giving reasons for, and encouraging people, to recognise for themselves, different conceptions of a work of art. He goes on to make a point about artistic detachment or spontaneous engagement, and avows that the objectivity, the rationality, of artistic experience necessarily involves feeling: artistic responses are rational and cognitive in kind, whether spontaneous and excited or not. With respect to the "Particularity of Feeling", he notes that an appropriate emotional response in the arts is possible only for someone with at least some grasp of the criteria of the particular medium of art. Those criteria constitute the limits of the sense and appropriateness for the possibility of an individual emotional response.

Best uses this point to demonstrate that his argument for the objectivity, rationality and cognitive character of artistic experience and response is not in the least opposed to the idea of spontaneous and individual response: the concept of art, he shows, would be unimaginably impoverished without the wealth of individual differences of insight and sensitivity of response. The final Chapter of the book on "Art and Life" is devoted to showing how the responses we have in life can be heightened and refined by seeing the ways in which feelings are expressed in powerful works of art. Best uses two telling examples to show that the reality of feeling in the arts is inseparable from the possibility of its expression *in the arts* : one is from Lucian Freud ("As far as I am concerned the paint is the person") and the other Wilfred Owen's insistence that it was not that the pity was in the poetry but that the poetry was in the pity. Best comments that a work of art can reveal the character of sincere feelings and in that way give the possibility of deeper and more finely discriminated emotional experience. In that way reasoning in the arts can give a richer possibility of feeling, not only in the arts, but in life.

Best tackles all the major themes in the arts, aesthetics and arts education throughout the book and the above summary only gives a flavour of some of the themes he tackles and the deft, fine-drawn arguments he employs. He works away tirelessly, remorselessly and - to my mind - entirely successfully at major themes in the Arts, language, philosophy and education. Indeed this book could be usefully and appropriately adopted as required reading in courses not only in Arts Departments of higher education institutions, but in Philosophy Departments for their courses in Mind, Language and Aesthetics, and in Education Faculties for their work in Curriculum and its philosophical foundations. The student in any of these would pick it up and read it with fascination and enthusiasm : Best makes his points well - he has a fund of humorous anecdotes to en-liven and sharpen the points he makes; he draws on a rich fund of telling examples from

his own knowledge of and obvious love for the Arts; he is well and widely read on all the major literature in the area and is full of suggestions of further reading; he provides throughout a most useful guide to all the major controversies with which each area he tackles is replete; he proffers a veritable cornucopia of further questions for students to take on in their own study and group seminars; and above all he puts forward his own working out of his case and provides them with suggestions for answers to some of those questions, that gives them an example and exhibition of philosophical argumentation at work, of the very highest class. Best is no negative critic; far from it. He has a powerful counter-thesis of his own to put forward and the driving force of his argumentative power carries his readers along with him to a conclusion so irresistible that what is philosophy has become in itself a work of art compelling the most respectful attention and the highest admiration.

I certainly found myself quite persuaded by the case he makes. Indeed he and others can now read my own recantation. I was certainly one of those - I plead guilty ! who argued quite a few years ago that, for example, (a) an education in the arts was in some sense also an education in morality; (b) that sport was largely an activity to be judged primarily in aesthetic terms; and (c) that an education in at least one of the Arts in a school setting was, to a certain extent, an initiation into the whole aesthetic mode of thinking. Best's fine-drawn arguments and telling examples convince me that, if I was not mistaken in advancing these intriguing theses, then I should at any rate be willing now to subject them to the same kind of rigorous re-appraisal so well exemplified in this splendid volume.

In sum, Dr Best's book makes for one of the best, most sustained and most passionate defences of the role and importance of the Arts in our community's educating institutions at the present time and, for that reason, it should be made required reading for all those who are preparing themselves to teach, make policy and administer it in these fields. But it should also be placed prominently on the desks of all teachers (and not merely those in the Arts) principals of schools, system officials and local and national government authorities and politicians at all levels: a reading of this valuable work would perhaps convince them to give up some previously unexamined (even if long treasured) notions they might have otherwise continued to entertain, and to arm them with much better ones- much more redolent of the positive theses put out in this volume by Professor Best and much more strongly resistant to the kind of refutation of which his book was chosen by the UK Standing Committee on Studies in Education as "the

best book published in the year", for its doughty defence of the arts, philosophy and education it is one of the best books put out in a very long time indeed.

Perhaps one final passage might serve to illustrate the clarity and point of Best's powerful and compelling case :

Both Language and the arts are expressions of conceptions of life and value. The character of the individual thoughts and experiences of individual human beings is determined... by the culture of a community. And by culture I mean that inextricable amalgam of social practices, language and art forms which give man his conception of the meaning and value of life. It is in that highly significant sense that language, art forms, cultural practices actually create the character and identity of human beings. The immense responsibility and rich possibilities of those of us involved in education, at all levels, are clear, daunting and exciting.

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Book Reviews

Scandinavian Aesthetics Today

Jennette Emt & Goran Hermeren (ed) : *Understanding the Arts : Contemporary Scandinavian Aesthetics*, Lund University Press, 1992, 288 pp.

Ossi Naukkarinen & Olli Immonen (ed) : *Art and Beyond : Finnish Approach to Aesthetics*, International Institute of Applied Aesthetics, Lahti and The Finnish Society of Aesthetics, 1995, 261 pp.

Lars-Olof Ahlberg & Tommie Zaine (ed): *Aesthetic Matters : Essays presented to Goran Sorbom on his 60th birthday*, Uppsala, Uppsala University, 1994, 185 pp.

Subg-Bong Park : *An Aesthetics of the Popular Arts*, Uppsala University, 1993, 188 pp.

One of the most interesting events in the recent history of aesthetics is the growth of this discipline in Scandinavian countries. Although aesthetic thinking in Scandinavia is more than a century old, it is only during the last two decades that the work of its philosophers and aestheticians has made its mark in the international field. Exchange of ideas among scholars in national and international conferences and publication of journals on aesthetics have facilitated debate and discussion on aesthetic matters. The diversities of the concerns of the Scandinavian scholars and the variety of their approaches to theoretical as well as practical aesthetics are well represented in the four publications in review here.

Understanding the Arts is a collection of fifteen papers written in English by scholars from Sweden, Finland and Norway and published for the first time here. The papers differ widely in scope, method and form ; different kinds of problems are discussed by the scholars from different theoretical and philosophical points of view; however, the focus is on literary aesthetics as is evidenced by the large number of papers in this field. The editors are to be congratulated for having maintained a strict standard and quality of the papers as well as their

readability, not only for the experts but for the general reader also. The four sections into which the papers have been grouped are : (a) Art and the Aesthetic; (b) Criticism and Interpretation; (c) Fiction and Metaphor; (d) Art and Theory, each section containing four papers except the third.

In his paper "On the Aesthetic", Wetterstrom sets out to define 'the aesthetic' as a concept with autonomous properties and for that purpose reviews the theories of Beardsley, Dickie, Stolnitz and Mc Gregor and finally proposes a value - dependent aesthetic based on aesthetic object, properties and experiences. In contrast, Mathlein and Tannsjö argue for what they christen as "aesthetic nihilism" in so far as the diversity of people's judgments on art proves that "there are no intrinsic aesthetic values". Two of the papers are devoted to an examination of the concept of beauty: Persson lucidly presents his supervenience theory of sensational beauty as an objective quality and Pitkanen presents a persuasive critique of Kant's theory of art and diagnoses the source of its unsatisfactoriness as the philosopher's concept of beauty.

Prof. Olsen examines the assumptions and procedure of theoretical criticism derived from structuralism and post-structuralism in contrast to the traditional criticism which he calls atheoretical. He shows how this new theoretical concept of criticism is problematic as a critical instrument in so far as it has extended the object of criticism to all texts, literary or otherwise and has insisted that all texts are internally contradictory and can be interpreted to have no meaning. In an interesting paper, Osterberg makes a fresh foray into that much-discussed problem of intention and argues that, fundamentally, the controversy between intentionalists and anti-intentionalists is a normative one, based on different views regarding the proper function of literature, neither view being logically refutable. Petterson speculates about the possibility of constructing a theory of interpretation based on the concept of literary communication and the critic's or scholar's aims of interpretation.

In a masterly paper, "Expression, Meaning and Non-verbal communication", Goran Hermerén argues that the prevalent models of communication can not be applied to contemporary art in an illuminating way. He, therefore, distinguishes between "nonverbal forms of expression" and "non-verbal

communication" and observes that it is the former and not the latter that can be fruitfully applied to visual art. Jeanette Emt's closely argued, perceptive paper, "On the Nature of Fictional Entities", has the thesis that fictional entities are ontologically abstract entities which exemplify the properties ascribed to them by the fictional works in which they occur as well as 'critical' properties outside the internal context of the fictional work provided by such contexts as of the history of their creation and reception. She also distinguishes her abstract entity of fictional characters as well as Wolterstorff's view of fictional entities as eternal kinds.

Pettersson rightly shows that the features of literary realism emanate from the concept of a shared world; those aspects of our existence which can either be perceived by others or can be adequately conveyed to others by verbal means. Brinck's paper on metaphor argues that metaphor combines terms from different semantic fields which normally are not related and that such statements of similarity are open-ended being either objective or subjective. Goran Sorbom approaches the theory of imitation in an original way arguing that Aristotle's theory is a theory of representation and not of art as such. He details out exhaustively the stages through which the original theory came to be conceived as an art theory although art theories originated only from 18th century onwards. Nordstam examines the creative process and the role of convention in it with reference to Mondrian's paintings and Ahlberg studies aspects of post-modernism in art and philosophy. All in all, the papers in the collection evince the originality, perceptiveness and scholarship that are distinctive of Scandinavian aesthetics today.

The thirteen papers of *Art and Beyond* demonstrate a variety of approaches to aesthetics by the Finnish scholars. The collection opens with two detailed surveys; a historical outline of aesthetics as an academic discipline in Finland by Johan Wrede and an overview of the current state of Finnish aesthetics by Naukkarinen. Both the surveys are highly informative and tell us about the enthusiasm and interest in which aesthetics is embraced by scholars and others in Finland today. The section on Art has a paper on future architecture in which Bonsdroff interestingly argues about the two worlds of architecture, the real and the imagined, effecting a balance of nature and culture.

In his paper on "the Fictional in Literature", Haapala provides a detailed critique of Ingarden's theory of intentional objects and proposes that the fictional is an invitation to imagine fictional truths in a work about non-existent people, objects and the like. Routila's theory of art for art education asserts that works of art are complicated, multidimensional, open entities that convey to us whole worlds of human life with their material gestalt and that there is no major structural difference among the media of different art. Saatela examines the role of historical knowledge in understanding and evaluating art and reviews the theories of Anita Silvers, Terry Eagleton, Jonathan Culler and Arthur Danto. He suggests that the work of art has an identity in so far as it is part of a tradition and that art does not destroy its past but reappropriates it dynamically for the present.

The papers in the section, "Beyond", are concerned with practical applications of aesthetics and constitute the most interesting feature of this collection. Honkanen discusses everyday values of an aesthetic nature and Kinnunen argues that comedy and humour as such do not belong to aesthetics although calling something bad comedy or bad humour is an aesthetic value judgement. Varto speaks about the significance and influence of technology in the modern world and proposes a meeting of technology and aesthetics in applied aesthetics. Sepänmaa argues that all human acts can be examined in an aesthetic frame of reference, hence it is possible to work on Thomas Munro's concept of the 'practicalization' of aesthetics. It is in this context that he visualises the role of applied aesthetics even beyond the current practice of environmental aesthetics. The picture of Finnish aesthetics that emerges from the book is highly instructive to the non-Finnish readers and the editors deserve congratulation for their choice and presentation of this representative collection to the international readers.

Aesthetic Matters is not designed to be a collection of papers by Scandinavian authors only; it contains essays by scholars and writers from other countries as well. Thus, for example, Frances Berenson writes on imagination of which emotions and feelings are a necessary part and is characterized by the freedom it affords us to follow where our fancy takes us. Goran Hermerén's paper, "Music, Action and Language", rejects the thesis that music is language or even communication and insists that music has an intrinsic value which can not be

replaced by other forms or means of expression. Johannessen enquires into the role of metaphor in scientific understanding and particularly its cognitive function in his paper, "Metaphor and science". He presents a detailed critique of the theories of Black and Kuhn in this context and proposes that the metaphor's principal and subsidiary subjects are like 'examples' on the object level and their juxtaposition brings forth 'new' meaning. Olsen's paper, "The Role of Theory in Literary Studies", in this collection presents a closely - argued refutation of the claim of critical theory to be an independent discipline and shows that such theory has no role to play in literary studies.

In "Aesthetic Reactions", Sattela examines Wittgenstein's ideas about 'aesthetic reaction' in order to oppose "hermeneutic universallism" different versions of which are said to be fathered by Wittgenstein's lectures on aesthetics. Tommie Zaine offers a perceptive critique of Dickie's institutional theory of art from the perspective of literary art. A text becomes an art work only when it is judged to be so; but today there is such a diversity of opinion as to what constitutes the essential properties of art that no one properly could be singled out to reach a definition of literary art in terms of necessary and sufficient properties. Hence, it is the judges and the revisers who turn out to be the core personnel of the literary art world. Ahlberg shows that contemporary theories of art and culture derived from the Anglo-Saxon analytic tradition and the continental deconstructive oppose the essentialism and foundationalism of earlier theories inspired by the classical tradition. The critique of aesthetics which the current theories engender is diagnosed as a "negative essentialism" which can not bring about the end of aesthetics and philosophy of art.

An Aesthetics of the Popular Arts is Park's doctoral dissertation accepted by Uppsala University. Park's approach to his subject is not only original but is backed by wide - ranging scholarship. He develops a unified theory of the aesthetic by defining the aesthetic situation as a life-situation considered to be so from the outset. Such a view makes possible the integration of folk art, popular art and elite art and elite art into the broad field of art in general. Park thus sets out an analysis of the popular from the aesthetic point of view as elaborated by him and observes that entertainment is the primary function of the popular arts. He enumerates five elemental

quantities of the experience of the popular; the comic; the erotic; the sensational; the fantastic and the sentimental and observes that story-telling serves as the proper combination of these qualities. The subtlety of Park's analysis is matched by the lucidity of his presentation. One can safely predict that Park's contribution will remain a standard work in the field.

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Thomas R. Metcalf, *Idologies of the Raj*. Part III. Vol.4 of The New Cambridge History of India. Ed. Gordon Johnson, Cambridge : Cambridge UP, 1994. 244 pp. ISBN 0-521-39547-X.

The large body of modern research over the last half - century and prospectives on South-Asia's historical evolution justify the publication of *The New Cambridge History of India*, which in a way is an improvement on the original *Cambridge History of India* published between 1922 and 1937. *Ideologies of the Raj* is a part of this with new project comprising four points with several volumes under each. This is, in fact, the fourth volume under part -III entitled *The Indian Empire and the Beginnings of Modern Society*. An isolated volume in the series, the general editor guarantees, is never a handicap for the reader, as each one is self-contained dwelling on a separate theme.

This volume is a study of the complex structures of the British Raj of the manners in which the colonial members tried to legitimise the imperial project. It begins with the British search in the eighteenth century for ideas on the basis of which they could come to terms with their new status as an imperial people, a fact they were made aware of by the conquest of Ireland. The result, the author says, was the formulation of a suitable definition of a civilized people, that included the volumes of the right to property and the rule of law. These attempts to construct the principles of organization of a proper society were intimately connected with an evolving British national identity that integrated the English, Scots and Welsh into a single community. Subsequently British nationalism came to be associated with the growth of empire as British identity was defined in relation to the outer world. The values of

enlightenment were used to proclaim the superiority of Britain as a modern and civilized nation as against the barbarous East. The British construction of an image of the self with the help of the ideas of enlightenment such as rationalism and secularism was dependent on an idea of the 'other' supplied by the non-European world which was thus emptied of all content. The East, an abode of the anti-Christ and an unknown quantity was paradoxically transformed into a part of the known world, as the devil too was an integral part of the medieval world order, a philosophy the Brition found useful for their purpose. This kind of a series of polarities such as masculinity and femininity, honesty and deceit and so on, that went into the shaping of the ideology of the Raj.

To reinforce their arguments the British brought in the idea of oriental despotism linking it with the tropical climate which, according to Alexander Dow, caused a stupor unbeatable by the labour needed for freedom. Romantic ideas, that support a rather personal style of governance, seeped into India further dispelling the possibility of disappearance, in the wake of the despotism as a fitting mode of administration for India. Thus the British emphasized the laziness and the lack of growth of the Indians. The exaggerated importance they attached to the original Indian texts vis-a-vis India's historical experience was meant to underline the timelessness of the Indian society, implied also in James's conception of Hindu law. The British managed to mobilize support for their endeavour from the native populace and culture. The idea of decline in Indian cosmology, important grist to the ideology mill of the Raj, together with the scholarly activities of the Brahmin pandits, who reluctantly participated in the British interpretation of vernacular materials, are instances of native collaboration in the preparation of an important discourse.

Liberalism with its assumptions of European or rather British cultural superiority was pressed into service to devalue the non-European cultures. It was accompanied by the British attempt to effect a liberal transformation of India shifting the locale of cultural value from beauty and dogma to language, experience and history. But the events of 1857 and their corollary, the abolition of the East-India company created space for an alternative vision of empire. Britain's unquestioned authority over India in the late nineteenth century encouraged

authoritarian liberalism which in collaboration with the theories of scientific racism reconstructed its imperial ideology. The theory of 'similarity' advanced by John Stuart Mill, who represented a more human face of British liberalism made way for that of India's persisting difference. On the other hand the imperculists were confronted with an additional problem of justifying their adventures overseas to the British populace knowing fully well that the imperial project commanded limited support among them. All this gave rise to a new vision of India as the 'jewel in the crown' of the British queen, the empress of India, linking British Patriotism with the empire. The idea of conquest was downplayed and positive values were attributed to imperialism, so that it could be a matter of pride for the British citizen.

Back in the colony the ideology of difference drew upon the ideas of the debilitating impact of the tropical climate and the racial degeneration of the Aryans through an inter mingling with the Turanians or the Dravidians, which arrested the growth of the Indian civilization and froze it at a medieval, even a feudal stage, thus erasing the significance of the common origin of the Indians and the British and thoroughly emasculating the language of 'similarity'. In this context Medievalism was used to sustain the Raj by invoking the ideas of benevolent paternalism. But in turn, it landed the British in a curious situation where they were faced with opposite tasks of trying to preserve the very thing they were out to abolish.

Further, the 'difference' was conceptualized in terms of gender. India was pronounced as a land of sexuality, disease and degradation, the body of the Indian women being the point convergence of all these evils. The Indian male was said to have lost his manliness, courage and determination owing to a conspiracy of the climate. Punjabi manliness was acknowledged but was never allowed to affect this theory.

Metcalf's claims of objectivity begin to look shallow when he examines the situation of the white woman in British India. Like Sara Suleri he finds the memsahib in an unenviable position as she is caught between masculine aggression and feminine grace in her identification with both British men and Indian women. Suleri's sympathy with the white woman originates in the latter's 'disadvantage' in relation to the 'freedom' of the Indian courtesan. Of course, they differ on

their approach to the native's relationship with the British household. For Suleri the native is a threat to the domestic peace of the British whereas in Metcalf he is desexualized and cut to size by a benevolent maternalism. There is another example of the authorial bias against the colonial subject. According to Metcalf, Gandhi's strategy of appropriating feminine virtues, attributed to India by the Raj, for the freedom struggle was borrowed from the ideas of white women, particularly Annie Besant and Madame Blavatsky. This could mean a white man's refusal to believe in the capacity of the colonized for original thinking. Furthermore, Metcalf's analysis of the Indian political scenario marks a significant difference from that of Ashis Nandy when the former sees Gandhi's strategies reinforcing the gendered assumptions of the Raj instead of inverting them. This seems to be the wishful thinking of an imperialist not willing to see the emergence of an opposite ideology. Lastly, to think, as the author does, that the British efforts to classify and order the Indian society was not entirely prompted by political intentions is to invite controversy best avoided by an historian.

The subsequent process of ordering the Indian difference, the author observes, involved the preception of the caste system as a symbol of India's degradation, and the creation of a concept of separate Hindu and Muslim communities. Even Indian architectures were subjected to a communal taxonomy, the zenith of Indian not being attributed to the foreign invasions. But all British efforts to reduce India to perfectly ordered segments could not overshadow the contradictions. The arrival of a universalistic medical theory, insisting on equal susceptibility of all bodies to disease, enhanced the uncase of the colonial ideology, which saw India as a place of dirt, disease and sudden death. It was rather a land of dis-ease, from which the British sought an immunity with the help of different forms of distance like the Bungalow, the Civil Lines and the Hill station. The last with its resonance of an idyllic England was a kind of British enclave in India. Offering them at once a protection from the challenges of a new India and keeping them out of the reach of the ills of industrial England. Not satisfied with this they started building constituencies in India in order to check an increasing sense of British vulnerability.

On the other hand, Indian claims of equality gathered momentum with the help of supportive actions from people like

Ripon, J. S. Mill, Hunter and Ilbert, and an Indian participation in the administration could no longer be postponed beyond the early years of the twentieth century. The nationalist upsurge was another and more dangerous thorn in the flesh of the Empire containable, the British thought, only by a communal rhetoric. So community based electorality came up serving as the first step towards the Pakistan movement. But neither these strategies of the imperialists nor the intensely passionate objections of Churchill to the hand over of power could stop the slow and steady progress towards independence. Once India achieved freedom the British lost no time to declare people like Dyer and Churchill exceptions in a long line of liberals, and portrayed the Indian independence as the ultimate fruition of the liberal spirit that characterized all British activities in India for more than a century.

Metcalf sees the same old structures of the Raj operating beneath the liberal rhetorics of the leaders of free India. Communal feelings, he says, are exploited with equal vigour for partisan ends, and the communal constructions of the Raj are not only confined now to the lounges of Delhi but have percolated into the streets and lanes of the provincial towns. He seems to believe that Britain is destined to be always at the head of an empire when he regards the large scale Asian immigration to Britain in the post-colonial period as an example of the Empire coming to Britain's doorstep after she had abandoned it overseas. He finds Britain using the same ideology formulated during the Raj along with its contradictions while trying to tackle multiculturalism in the 1990s.

The selection of illustrations in this volume suggests an intention to highlight the power and majesty, the benevolence and the reforming zeal of the British, and to suppress the seamier side of the Raj. In spite of the lapses it is a commendable work and a valuable reading for the students of South-Asian Studies.

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The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism, Cambridge University press, Cambridge : Volume I, *Classical Criticism* (Ed. George A. Kennedy), 1989, pp. 378 ; Volume VIII, *From*

Rene Wellek, the most celebrated historian of criticism in our time, observed that "an evolutionary history of criticism must fail" and therefore all the eight volumes of his *A History of Modern Criticism : 1750-1950* are anthologies of critical essays on individual critics rather than any historical account of different critical phases. It does not mean that he was never historical in his critical writings, particularly when he surprises his readers by his rigorous pursuit of the evolution of critical concepts such as Classicism, Romanticism, Realism and Symbolism. Wellek, as against Croce and Auerbach, believes that criticism is a unified subject "because of the multitude of possible problems and crossings of problems, the extreme diversity of its presuppositions, aims and accents", and is content to understand criticism as "any discourse on literature." When W.P.Ker compares the literary historian with a museum guide who points and comments on the pictures, Croce treats the works of art as unique, individual, immediately present without any essential continuity and Arthur Lovejoy adopts the method of the "history of ideas" or tracing of single concepts or "unit ideas". On the other hand, Saintsbury's is an anti-theoretical, impressionistic history of literary taste and Atkins' method is dull summarising of doctrines without a chronological analysis of specific texts - as Crane comments, a "history without prior commitments as to what criticism is or ought to be" - a history "without a thesis". Wellek, however, does not agree with any one of them. For him, the history of criticism "cannot be simply a discussion of timeless texts and must not be reduced to a branch of general or cultural history". As a historian of criticism, his function has been to select texts and authors according to his own point of view, sense of direction, feeling for the future, ideal and criteria and elucidate the great diversity of views without giving up his own perspective. For Wellek, history of criticism is neither "argumentative" nor "polemical". Instead it is "doxographical" - elucidatory or expository.

It seems *The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism* accepts Wellek's views on history of criticism, and in accepting the elucidatory function of this history, accepting selection of authors, texts and schools of the periods in question according to

the historian's own point of view, the series finds no harm in rejecting the concept of a single-handed history running from Saintsbury to Welck through Atkins, Weinberg and others. Each volume is *not written* by a single author, but *edited by one* or more scholars who select topics and their authors as appropriate for the volume concerned. The first volume in its eleven chapters covers the Greeco-Roman tradition ranging from the pre-Socratic periods to the late Latin secular criticism with contributions by as many as seven scholars including the editor himself : G. Nagy, G. R. F. Ferrari, S. Halliwell, E. Fantham, D. Innes and D. A. Russell. The volume has an exhaustive bibliography of both the primary and secondary sources counting the works in even the non-English European languages published till date.

Out of several great merits of the volume one significant one is that it does not view the past as the part of a dead history: the past appears very much alive when it is read through a warm awareness of the present - "Readers who come to this volume from study of modern theory may be interested in the extent to which classical criticism anticipated features of such twentieth-century developments as semiotics, hermeneutics, deconstruction, psychoanalysis and reader-response criticism" (p. XI). But in no way the writers have ignored the genuine classical spirit, its validity in its proper historical context while viewing it through the lens of contemporary developments in critical taste. One example of the objectivity in investigation might be gathered from Kennedy's own chapter on Language and meaning in Archaic and classical Greece where he explores all the possible semantic perspectives of the Greek word *logos* which has become so prominent in our time. Similarly Halliwell's chapter on Aristotle's poetics is much more than any dull summarisation (in Cramer's comment on Atkins) of the critic he deals with. Both the information and interpretation the chapter provides are fresh additions to Aristotelian criticism.

The volume VIII of the series is a remarkable achievement both for the vision of the editor and for the authors who have been chosen so judiciously by the editor to contribute to the volume. The most significant aspect of the volume is that the critics who have been the constituent parts of the particular schools of contemporary criticism have written chapters on their own doctrines : Peter Steiner writing on Russian Formalism,

Lubomir Dolezel on Prague Structuralism and Richard Rorty on Deconstruction ! it is as it were, Aristotle writing on the Greek Tragedy or Horace writing on Augustan criticism for the first volume of this series ! It is a matter of great sorrow that Professor Selden is not alive to see his ventures bearing fruits so opulently.

The volume covers all the principal topics of contemporary criticism in its thirteen chapters : Formalism, Structuralism, Semiotics, Narratology, Deconstruction, Psychoanalytic and Marxist theories, Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, Reception theory, Speech act theory and Reader-oriented theories and the reader is undoubtedly inspired to read the authorities writing on their schools - among the others already mentioned Gerald Prince writes on narratology, Robert Holub on reception theory and Annette Lavers on Roland Barthes. The editor, in his introduction, clarifies the chronological complicity that concerns the period he handles, i.e., the twentieth century : "... this volume returns to the period before the emergence of New Criticism, and, leaping over for the most part the 1940s and 1950s, proceeds to follow the later developments in structuralist criticism during the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s." (p.3) The difficulty in dividing the history of twentieth century criticism into coherent groupings is partly due to the fact that in different European countries histories of criticism have not followed the same trajectories : although New Criticism and Russian Formalism emerged simultaneously, the latter outlasted the former, since it moved quickly towards the formulation of structuralism. Similarly, the editor clarifies the chronological crosscurrents among existentialism, phenomenology and deconstructionism.

Coming to the topics themselves - to the expositions or elucidations of the schools and concepts - a reader enjoys them individually without missing their identity as parts of a whole period connected with each other relevantly in a single chronological set-up. The volume is not just another book on contemporary criticism. It is a book which informs the reader what does criticism mean for a twentieth century man and how should a twentieth century man understand and enjoy criticism - a rare achievement in our intellectual pursuit.

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